

AL-TAWHĪD

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A Review Article

Vol. II, No. 4, Shawwāl—Dhū al-Hijjah 1405

(July—September 1985)

عَنِ الْإِمَامِ الْكَاسِمِ قَالَ :

تَفَقَّهُوا فِي دِينِ اللَّهِ! فَإِنَّ الْفِقْهَ
مِفْتَاحُ الْبَصِيرَةِ، وَتِمَامُ الْعِبَادَةِ، وَالسَّبَبُ إِلَى
الْمَنَازِلِ الرَّفِيعَةِ، وَالرُّتَبِ الْجَلِيلَةِ، فِي الدُّنْيَا
وَفُضِّلُ الْفَقِيهِ عَلَى الْعَابِدِ كَفَضْلِ الشَّمْسِ عَلَى
الْكَوَاكِبِ. وَمَنْ لَمْ يَتَّقَهُ فِي دِينِهِ، لَمْ يُرِضَ اللَّهُ لَهُ عَمَلًا

Understand the religion of God, because understanding is the key to insight, the complement of worship, and the means for attaining to high spiritual heights and eminence in the world and Hereafter. The merit of one who has mastered the understanding of religion over the [plain] devotee is like the sun's over the stars. God would never approve the [good] deeds of one who is devoid of the understanding of the faith.

Al-Imām Mūsā al-Kāzīm (A)
(*Tuhaf al-'uqūl*, p. 434)

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

*In the Name of Allah,
the Merciful and the Compassionate*

Editorial

The characteristic feature of Islam is that it is not only a religion in the common sense of the word, but a comprehensive scheme of life. Islam represents not only an ideal for the individual but also for the whole society. It aims not only to make men good Muslims but to form a truly Islamic society. The main characteristic of the present Islamic revival is that it aims to realize the objectives of Islam on a socio-political plane, objectives which have been neglected during the past by the Muslim masses, under the influence of despotic and un-Islamic rule.

According to the Islamic teachings, God is the Absolute Sovereign of the universe, and all creation is subject to this sovereignty through submission to the inexorable laws of nature. The human being, even in his voluntary actions, performed through his capacity for free choice and exercise of free-will, is completely subject to this sovereignty of God which pervades all being and existence (*al-wilāyat al-takwīniyyah*). However, this Divine sovereignty, exercised through the agency of natural laws, does not annihilate human freedom. Man as a being endowed with intelligence and free choice is responsible and answerable for his voluntary actions and by virtue of his intelligence and freedom is expected to submit himself to a second kind of Divine sovereignty (*al-wilāyat al-tashrī'iyyah*) exercised through the agency of revelation. However, this submission is entirely voluntary, and it is the function of religion to invite human beings to enforce the *wilāyah tashrī'iyyah* of God by conforming to His laws given through revelation. The nature of man, unlike that of other creatures, is susceptible to infinite variation. He may, by following the Divine-ordained path, uplift and edify his being, attain everlasting felicity and sublimity, and rise in station even higher than that of God's infallible angels. On the other hand, by rejecting Divine guidance and following his base desires, he may degrade himself to a level far below that of beasts and thus earn depravity and everlasting perdition. To refuse to conform to the revealed laws is a rejection of the *wilāyah tashrī'iyyah* of God and is considered *shirk* or polytheism by Islam. This is clear from the following Quranic verses and traditions:

وَمَا كَانَ لِمُؤْمِنٍ وَلَا مُؤْمِنَةٍ إِذَا قَضَى اللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ أَمْرًا أَنْ يَكُونَ لَهُمُ الْخِيَرَةُ مِنْ
أَمْرِهِمْ وَمَنْ يَعْصِ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ فَقَدْ ضَلَّ ضَلَالًا مُّبِينًا *

It is not for any believer, man or woman, when God and His Messenger have decreed a matter, to have the choice in their affair. Whosoever disobeys God and His Messenger has gone astray into manifest error. (33:36)

أَلَمْ تَرَ إِلَى الَّذِينَ يَزْعُمُونَ أَنَّهُمْ آمَنُوا بِمَا أُنزِلَ إِلَيْكَ وَمَا أُنزِلَ مِنْ قَبْلِكَ يُرِيدُونَ
أَنْ يَتَّحِقُوا إِلَى الظَّالِمِينَ وَقَدْ أُمِرُوا أَنْ يَكْفُرُوا بِهِمْ...

Hast thou not regarded those who assert that they believe in what has been sent down to thee, and what was sent down before thee, desiring to take their disputes to ṭāghūt, yet they have been commanded to disbelieve in them?....
(4:60)

In the above verse, the believers are forbidden from approaching any illegitimate judicial authority for solution of their mutual disputes. According to it, those who do not judge according to God's revealed criteria are referred to as 'ṭāghūt'. Elsewhere, those who do not base their judgements on the revealed criteria are considered unbelievers (*kāfirūn*), transgressors (*ẓālimūn*), and evil-doers (*fāsiqūn*) (verses 5:44, 5:45, 5:47). In the view of the Quran, to obey any authority in breach of Divine commands is rejection of Divine sovereignty. To recognize another authority in opposition or parallel to the authority of God is equivalent to indulging in polytheism. The Quran criticizes the Jews and Christians for accepting the verdicts of their priests, monks, and rabbis which violated the Divine law:

اتَّخَذُوا أَحْبَارَهُمْ وَرُهْبَانَهُمْ أَرْبَابًا مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ وَالْمَسِيحَ ابْنَ مَرْيَمَ وَمَا أُمِرُوا إِلَّا
لِيَعْبُدُوا إِلَهًا وَاحِدًا...

They have taken their rabbis and their monks as lords apart from God, and the Messiah, Mary's son—and they were commanded to serve but one God....
(9:31)

In a ḥadīth, al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) explains the meaning of this verse as follows:

عَنْ أَبِي بَصِيرٍ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ (ع) قَالَ: قُلْتُ لَهُ: «اتَّخَذُوا أَحْبَارَهُمْ وَرُهْبَانَهُمْ
أَرْبَابًا مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ؟» فَقَالَ: «أَمَا وَاللَّهِ مَا دَعَوْهُمْ إِلَى عِبَادَةِ أَنْفُسِهِمْ وَلَوْ دَعَوْهُمْ مَا أَجَابُوهُمْ
وَلَكِنْ أَحَلُّوا لَهُمْ حَرَامًا وَحَرَّمُوا عَلَيْهِمْ حَلَالَ فَعَبَدُوهُمْ مِنْ حَيْثُ لَا يَشْعُرُونَ.»

Abū Baṣīr says, "I asked Abū 'Abd Allāh whether they (the Jews and Christians) really considered their rabbis and monks as their lords. He replied, 'By God, they (i.e. the rabbis and monks) did not invite them (the Jews and Christians) to worship them, and even if they had done so, they (the Jews and Christians) would not have complied. Rather, they declared permissible that which was forbidden (by God) and forbade that which was permissible, and thus they (the Jews and Christians) worshipped them unawares.'" (*Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Kitāb faḍl al-'ilm, Bāb al-taqlīd*)

Other similar verses (19:81-82) are explained in another ḥadīth of al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) in the following manner.

الْأَمَامُ الصَّادِقُ «ع»: فِي قَوْلِهِ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ: «وَاتَّخَذُوا مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ إِلَهَةً لِيَكُونُوا لَهُمْ عِزًّا * كَلَّا سَيَكْفُرُونَ بِعِبَادَتِهِمْ وَيَكُونُونَ عَلَيْهِمْ ضِدًّا *». قَالَ: لَيْسَ الْعِبَادَةُ هِيَ السُّجُودُ وَالرُّكُوعُ، إِنَّمَا هِيَ طَاعَةُ الرَّجَالِ. مَنْ أَطَاعَ الْمَخْلُوقَ فِي مَعْصِيَةِ الْخَالِقِ، فَقَدْ عَبَدَهُ.

Explaining the verses “And they (the unbelievers) have taken to them other gods apart from God, that they might be for them a might. No, indeed! They (i.e. the false gods) shall disavow their service (on the Judgement Day), and they shall be pitted against them (i.e. their former followers)”, al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) said, “By ‘worship’ (referred to in the verses) bowing and prostration are not meant. What is meant is obedience offered by men. Whoever obeys another creature in violation of the (commands of the) Creator, really worships it.” (*Wasā'il al-Shi'ah*, vol. XI, p. 423)

It is worthy of notice that in the verses quoted above (9:31 and 19:81-82) criticism is addressed to the followers, which implies the responsibility of the people for choosing their leaders. This means that the blame of obedience to illegitimate authorities, tyrants and despots, referred to as *tāghūt* in the Quran, lies squarely on the heads of the people. It means that it is the responsibility of the people to establish the sovereignty of God over their individual and social affairs, failing which they are answerable before God. The prophets and messengers are Divine emissaries who inform the people about the laws ordained by God. But the people themselves are responsible for establishing and maintaining the sovereignty of those laws, which is the same as sovereignty of God over their affairs and acceptance of the guidance provided by Him.

Consider the following verse, in which the Quran states the objective of the mission of the prophets:

لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ...

Indeed, We sent Our messengers with the clear signs, and We sent down with them the Book and the Balance, so that men might uphold justice.... (57:25)

In this verse the duty of upholding justice is placed not specifically on the shoulders of some authority or individual, but on the shoulders of the common people. In fact, throughout the Quran all commands applicable to the people are addressed to the people themselves. It is

the believing masses who are asked, for example, to establish the *ṣalāt* (22:78, 58:13, etc.), as well as to struggle in the way of God (5:35, 9:41, 22:78, etc.), to maintain military readiness to frustrate the enemies (8:60), to fight the polytheists and unbelievers (9:29, 9:36, etc.), to establish social justice (4:135), to cooperate in every good and beneficial project (5:2), to command one another to good and forbid one another from evil (9:71, 22:41, etc.), to safeguard the Divine laws and to maintain their sanctity (9:112), and to judge equitably (4:58). The Quran makes it plain that the affairs of the Muslim community should be settled through mutual counsel amongst Muslims (42:38) (obviously, the decision reached through consensus may not contradict any Divine command and in absence of such contradiction the people may decide according to their wish and wisdom). Even the Prophet (S) in his capacity as an infallible leader and a Divinely inspired teacher, guide, and ruler, was commanded by God to consult public opinion in affairs pertaining to the Islamic community (3:159). Ultimately, it is up to the believers to preserve and maintain the practice of the faith in its entirety, and to refrain from division and dispute:

شَرَعَ لَكُمْ مِنَ الدِّينِ مَا وَصَّىٰ بِهِ نُوحًا وَالَّذِي أَوْحَيْنَا إِلَيْكَ وَمَا وَصَّيْنَا بِهِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ وَمُوسَىٰ وَعِيسَىٰ أَنْ أَقِيمُوا الدِّينَ وَلَا تَتَفَرَّقُوا فِيهِ...

He has laid down for you (O believers) as religion that He charged Noah with, and that We have revealed to thee (O Muḥammad), and that We charged Abraham with, Moses and Jesus: So, (O believers) Establish the religion, and scatter not regarding it... (42:13)

The Quran, unlike other religious scriptures, directly addresses the common man. In several places in its verses it states explicitly that it is a book of guidance for mankind in general (2:185), like the Torah and Gospel before it (3:3-4, 6:91), and in particular for the Muslims and the believers (3:138, 2:97, 10:57, 16:64, 16:89, 16:102, 27:2, 27:77, 41:44). The Quran, throughout, aims to inspire the common man to adopt a life infused with Divine ideals. It is not to be considered a handbook for some class of priests and clergymen, but is to be regarded as a general invitation for all mankind. In several places, the Quran refers to the covenant taken with the Children of Israel to follow the Mosaic Law. It were the Children of Israel as a community who were party to the covenant, not the person of Moses (A) or the priests:

وَإِذْ أَخَذْنَا مِيثَاقَكُمْ وَرَفَعْنَا فَوْقَكُمُ الطُّورَ خُذُوا مَا آتَيْنَاكُمْ بِقُوَّةٍ وَاذْكُرُوا مَا فِيهِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَتَّقُونَ *

And when We took compact with you, and raised above you the Mount (saying): "Take firmly (with unwavering determination and strength) what We have given you, and remember what is in it (i.e. don't forget it through passage of time and preserve it generation after generation); haply you shall be God-fearing (i.e. become such as We want you to be). (2:63)

The fact is that the people form the best, most lasting and the most powerful base for implementation of the Divine laws. In the same way as the Children of Israel were responsible for safeguarding and implementing the Mosaic Law, the Muslim masses are collectively responsible for implementation of the laws of Islam. Since the Quran makes the people the foundation for actualization of its laws and their driving force, it uses every kind of means to encourage the believers to strive and struggle in the way of God, for the purpose of establishing God's sovereignty over human society. The following are some examples of this kind of encouragement:

فَضَّلَ اللَّهُ الْمُجَاهِدِينَ بِأَمْوَالِهِمْ وَأَنْفُسِهِمْ عَلَى الْقَاعِدِينَ دَرَجَةً...

...God has preferred in rank those who struggle with their possessions and their selves over the ones who sit back (passively)...(4:95)

أَمْ حَسِبْتُمْ أَنْ تَدْخُلُوا الْجَنَّةَ وَلَمَّا يَعْلَمِ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ جَاهَدُوا مِنْكُمْ وَيَعْلَمَ الصَّابِرِينَ *

Do you suppose that you should enter Paradise without God know who of you have struggled and who have remained steadfast? (3:142)

وَالَّذِينَ جَاهَدُوا فِينَا لَنَهْدِيَنَّهُمْ سُبُلَنَا وَإِنَّ اللَّهَ لَمَعَ الْمُحْسِنِينَ *

But those who struggle in Our cause, surely We shall guide them in Our ways; and God is with the good-doers. (29:69)

وَجَاهِدُوا فِي اللَّهِ حَقَّ جِهَادِهِ هُوَ اجْتَبَاكُمْ وَمَا جَعَلَ عَلَيْكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ مِنْ حَرَجٍ مِلَّةَ أَبِيكُمْ إِبْرَاهِيمَ هُوَ سَمَّاكُمُ الْمُسْلِمِينَ مِنْ قَبْلُ وَفِي هَذَا لِيَكُونَ الرَّسُولُ شَهِيدًا عَلَيْكُمْ وَتَكُونُوا شُهَدَاءَ عَلَى النَّاسِ...

... And struggle (O believers) for God as is His due, for He has chosen you, and has laid on you no impediment in your religion, being the creed of your father Abraham; He named you Muslims aforetime and in this, that the Messenger might be a witness against you, and that you might be witnesses against mankind.... (22:78)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِنْ تَنْصُرُوا اللَّهَ يَنْصُرْكُمْ وَيُثَبِّتْ أَقْدَامَكُمْ *

O believers, if you help God, He will help you, and confirm your feet. (47:7)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا كُونُوا أَنْصَارَ اللَّهِ...

O believers, be you God's helpers.... (61:14)

مَنْ ذَا الَّذِي يُقْرِضُ اللَّهَ قَرْضًا حَسَنًا فَيُضَاعِفَهُ لَهُ أَضْعَافًا كَثِيرَةً...

Who is he that will lend God a good loan, so that He may multiply it for him manifold?... (2:245)

The above are few of the innumerable instances of such encouragement offered by the Quran to the believers to strive and struggle for the sake of advancement of the Divine faith.

Now if we admit that it is the people's responsibility to safeguard Islam and to struggle for its implementation and advancement, we should examine whether it is possible to implement the Divine commands without an Islamic government. A perusal of the Islamic legislation regarding penal, financial, social, political and military matters reveals that implementation of Islam in its entirety, as required by the Divine Legislator, is not possible without the existence of a State and government fully committed to the objectives of Islam, and qualified to implement its laws.

It was their awareness of the necessity to establish an Islamic government and their responsibility in this regard that the Muslims of Iran started their revolutionary struggle against the *tāghūtī* regime of the Shah. They chose as their leader a faqih, and a pious man of integrity, courage, foresight and political insight to guide them in this struggle for the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Thereby they fulfilled their momentous duty of establishing the sovereignty of the Divine laws in their society and a State authority to supervise their implementation in conformity with the Book and the Sunnah.

The highest office in the Islamic Republic, which is the office of the *Rahbar* or Leader, is based on the conception of *wilāyat al-faqih*. In a nutshell, *wilāyat al-faqih* means that it is the responsibility of the people to elect a jurisprudent possessing the qualities described in Article 5 of the Constitution to the sovereign office of leadership and headship of the Islamic State. Two ideas are intertwined in the conception of *wilāyat al-faqih*: first, the duty of the people to install a person qualified to supervise the functioning of the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and the armed forces and to guard against any deviations from the Islamic criteria in their functioning; second, the qualifications of the person chosen for that high office, which are: (1) expertise in Islamic jurisprudence, (2) piety and integrity, (3)

knowledge of contemporary events and world affairs, (4) moral courage and forbearance, (5) administrative ability, (6) resourcefulness and foresight, and (7) acceptability to the majority of the people. This conception of *wilāyat al-faqīh*, firstly, ensures that the affairs of the Islamic Republic are in conformity with the Islamic laws and principles; secondly, it recognizes the duty and the right of the people to participate in shaping their own destiny, a right which is recognized by Islam and a duty which is stressed by the Quran and implicit in the following verse:

.... إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُغَيِّرُ مَا بِقَوْمٍ حَتَّىٰ يُغَيِّرُوا مَا بِأَنفُسِهِمْ....

....Indeed God does not change the condition of a people as long as they do not change their own condition.... (13:11)

The major difference between the Western conception of democracy and the Islamic idea of government is that in a democracy the legislation and policies of the State are determined, in theory, solely and absolutely by the will of the people, however arbitrary and capricious that may be. Indeed it may be said that the common thing between despotism and democracy is arbitrary rule, in the sense that the laws and policies of the State are not subject to any kind of control by Divine or moral laws and principles. Even if a Divine law or a moral principle is honoured by legislatures, it is not because of its Divine origin or inherent morality but because it enjoys popular support. The common doctrine is that of the absolute sovereignty and ultimate authority of the human beings over their affairs. In the same way as in a dictatorship the wishes of a despot are laws of his country, in a democracy the wishes of the people assume the status of law. The difference however, between the two is that in a dictatorship, arbitrary rule is the prerogative of a single individual, whereas in a democracy the prerogative arbitrary legislation and policy-making of the government is democratically shared.

That which is common between an Islamic government and a democracy is that in an Islamic State the right of the people to govern themselves and to manage their own affairs is recognized. Apart from the Qur'an and the Sunnah, this right is based on the empirical fact of human freedom. But the difference between the two forms of government is as important as the similarity: in an Islamic State the people, since they are Muslims, voluntarily subordinate their will to the Will of the Almighty Creator. In fact this submission to the Will of God is the essence of *al-'islām* (lit. submission).

The *wilāyat al-faqīh* is a "democratic" conception in that the individual or body elected to the office of *wilāyah* enjoy their autho-

rity not merely because of their personal qualifications, but mainly because of their acceptability to the people. In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the *Walī*, whether an individual or a council of three or five jurists, is elected by the Assembly of Experts, a body consisting of directly elected representatives of the people. This council is empowered not only to elect a new Leader or members of a Leadership Council, but is also empowered to dismiss them in case they lose any of the qualifications for remaining in that office. The slightest deviation from Islamic norms is sufficient for disqualifying the *Walī* and for dismissing him from the office.

The importance of the conception of *wilāyat al-faqīh* lies in its being an instrument of ensuring the Islamic character of the Muslim State and a means for realization of the sovereignty of the Divine laws in society. *Al-Walī al-Faqīh* performs this vital function by making use of the powers granted to him by the Constitution. The most important of these is his right to appoint the six *fuqahā'* of the Guardian Council, which is charged with the responsibility of determining if the legislation approved by the legislature is compatible with Islamic criteria and the Constitution. He assures the Islamic character of the armed forces of the country and their loyalty and obedience to the Divine commands in matters of war and peace, by making use of his powers to appoint and dismiss the commanders of the armed forces. According to the Constitution, he is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and controls the decisions of the Supreme National Defence Council through his appointment of four of its seven members: two advisers, in addition to the Chief of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces and the Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (the other three members of the seven-member council are: the President, the Prime Minister, and the minister of defence). The *Walī-e-Faqīh* may declare war or make peace, and mobilize the armed forces, on recommendation of the Supreme National Defence Council. Like the independence of the armed forces from the executive, he guarantees the independence of the judiciary from the executive by appointing the head of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General (who are two members of the five-member Supreme Judicial Council, the highest judicial authority of the country, the three other members being judges elected by the judges of the courts of the country). Apart from the Guardian Council, whose six *fuqahā'* are appointed by the Leader and which controls the Islamic quality of the approvals of the legislature, the judges of the country are also charged by the Constitution to safeguard Islamic criteria in relation to the regulations approved by the executive. Article 170 of the Constitution says, "Judges of courts are obliged to refrain from executing statutes and regulations of the government that are in con-

flict with the laws or the provisions of Islam, or lie outside the competence of the executive power. Every one has the right to demand the annulment of such regulation from the Court of Administrative Justice.”

A study of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran will reveal that *al-Walī al-Faqīh* in his functions is closer to the legislature (through the Guardian Council), the armed forces (through the Supreme National Defence Council), and the judiciary (through the head of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General), than the executive. His influence over the legislature, the armed forces, and the judiciary is mainly through key appointments; he does not intervene in the daily business of these bodies. Thus it may be said that the office of *wilāyat al-faqīh* as envisioned by the Constitution, is one which determines the *direction* of the State, not its *movement* and *momentum*; he is legally remote from the executive wing, which is subordinate to the legislature in matters of law and policy. *Al-Walī al-Faqīh*, apart from his key appointments, has little active role to play in the routine business of the government. The role of this office may be compared to the stationary magnet in an electric generator within whose magnetic field the rotor, constituting the legislative, executive, judiciary bodies and the armed forces, revolves. In the same way as a generator fails to generate voltage without its magnetic field, the Islamic Republic loses its legitimacy and Islamic character without the office of *al-Walī al-Faqīh*. From the viewpoint of the strength of its grounds and its success in capturing the essentials of Islamic legitimacy, *wilāyat al-faqīh* is the most complete solution found so far in Muslim political thought. The conception finds its basis not only in the Islamic tradition but also in independent rational argument. In fact the rationalist arguments advanced in its favour are more formidable than those which are derived from the Sunnah and ḥadīth.

However, there is a certain divergence of views among Shi‘ite scholars regarding the conception of *wilāyat al-faqīh* and its scope. Moreover, the anti-Islamic propaganda of the superpowers, their allies, and stooges has been effective in distorting the image of *wilāyat al-faqīh* in the minds of many people. We therefore feel the necessity to publish a series of articles and essays on the topic so that the concept and its related aspects become perfectly clear. The reader will find the first of such articles in the present issue of *Al-Tawḥīd*. We hope to publish more of such articles dealing with the subject by different authors for the benefit of the English-speaking readers who have no recourse to the original works in Persian and Arabic.

Tehran,
Dhū al-Qa‘dah, 1405.

Forty Ḥadīth: An Exposition* Part 2

by Imām Rūḥullāh al-Mūsawī al-Khumaynī

translated from the Persian by Mahliqā Qarā'ī

THE SECOND ḤADĪTH:

بِالسَّنَدِ الْمُنْتَصِلِ إِلَى مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ يَعْقُوبَ عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ عَنْ أَبِيهِ عَنْ أَبِي الْمَغْرَا عَنْ يَزِيدَ بْنِ خَلِيفَةَ قَالَ: قَالَ أَبُو عَبْدِ اللَّهِ (ع): كُلُّ رِبَاءٍ شِرْكٌ إِنَّهُ مَنْ عَمِلَ لِلنَّاسِ كَانَ ثَوَابُهُ عَلَى النَّاسِ، وَمَنْ عَمِلَ لِلَّهِ كَانَ ثَوَابُهُ عَلَى اللَّهِ.

(On the authority of the above-mentioned narrators), Yazid ibn Khalifah reports from al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) that he said: “*Riyā*’ in any of its forms amounts to *shirk* (polytheism); verily, one who works for the people, his reward lies with them, and one who works for God his reward lies with God.”

R*iyā*’ means to falsely make oneself appear to be virtuous, good natured or a true believer in God before the people for the sake of earning their respect and admiration, or with the purpose of gaining good reputation among them. The hypocrite feigns integrity, uprightness, virtue, honesty and piety without an authentic intention of acquiring these traits for the sake of God. It has several grades and degrees.

The first stage is comprised of two steps:

1. At the first step an individual makes a display of his religious beliefs, and shows off his knowledge of the religious teachings in order to

*The original work in Persian, recently published under the title “*Arba‘īn, yā chihil ḥadīth*” was written by Imām al-Khumaynī forty-six years ago and was completed in the month of Muḥarram 1358 (April-May, 1939). The manuscript of this work, together with that of two other unpublished works of the author, *Sharḥ Du‘ā-e saḥar* and *Ādāb al-ṣalāt*, were recovered from the library of the late Āyatullāh Akhund al-Hamadānī. All the three works have now been published.

project himself as an honest person in the eyes of people to gain their confidence and respect. Such a kind of person tries to make a display of his trust in God and His Power, saying that he does not believe in any being except Him. He also tries to present himself as a staunch believer through various means, especially by declaring that he depends on none but God. Or such a person, with his gestures and utterances, poses himself to be a staunch follower of the true faith, and this is a more common kind of *riyā'* than the first one. For instance, when the trust in God or submission to His Will is discussed, he wags his head in affirmation with a sigh, and thus deceives people giving an impression that he is one of the true believers.

2. The second step on the path of *riyā'* is represented by those who eradicate false belief from their hearts and, through such purification, want to attain power and respect among people; they sometimes articulate their belief overtly, sometimes make a covert display of their purity.

The second stage, too, is comprised of two steps:

1. At the first step an individual demonstrates his piety and virtuous deeds.

2. At the second step one pretends to have done away with the antitheses of piety and virtue, and behaves in such a manner as if he is free from all vices, and the aim of all this is to win the confidence of others.

The third stage of *riyā'*, which is considered to be overt by the *fuqahā'*, also consists of two steps:

1. The first step is marked by an individual's performance of the prescribed forms of piety, prayers and good deeds in front of other people with the intention of demonstrating his good qualities and praiseworthy habits, or by his posture as a person who strictly adheres to the religious commands on purely rational grounds, and thus wishing to win the hearts of people and attracting their attention towards himself. Such acts, whether performed in total or in part, with the motive of *riyā'*, to please the others, are discussed in the books of *fiqh*.

2. At the second step, one abstains from evil deeds for the purpose of *riyā'* only.

Riyā' in Faith or Creed:

Remember that hypocrisy in religious faith is the worst kind of hypocrisy; its retribution also is the severest and its bad effects are far greater and more dangerous than those of other forms of hypocrisy. One who is guilty of this sin, if he does not believe genuinely in those ideas which he pretends to believe in, is counted among the *munāfiqūn* (hypocrites), whose place is in the Fire, and he is doomed to eternal

damnation and his punishment is the severest of punishments. But if he believes in them, and for the sake of winning peoples' hearts and for obtaining worldly honour and dignity he makes an ostentation of them, though he is not reckoned among *munāfiqūn*, this kind of hypocrisy will cause the light of faith to fade away from his heart and to make the darkness of infidelity and faithlessness to occupy the domain of his heart. Because in the first instance this person commits polytheism (*shirk*) of the covert type; while his religious beliefs and acts should purely be meant for God and His Holy Essence, he is guilty of committing the sin of doing them for others and thus makes them to share what should absolutely belong to Him only. In this way he makes others partners to God and has given permission to the Devil to occupy his heart as if it does not belong to God. It has been mentioned earlier that faith emerges from the depths of the heart, and in this matter mere abstract knowledge does not suffice. It has been stated in the tradition that any kind of *riyā'* is polytheism, but this vice, this disastrous atrocity, this hidden cruelty (to one's own self), and this vicious habit, results in nullifying the good deeds, and in surrender of the realm of the heart to other than God. The darkness of this vice causes man to leave this world as an unbeliever in God, and the feigned faith that he had assumed proves nothing more than a senseless and empty profession; it is a form without content, a body without soul and a skull without brain; and in no way is acceptable to God. This fact is confirmed by a tradition mentioned in *al-Kāfi*, narrated by 'Alī ibn Sālim:

قال: سَمِعْتُ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ (ع) يَقُولُ: قَالَ اللَّهُ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ: أَنَا خَيْرُ شَرِيكَ مَنِ اشْرَكَ مَعِيَ غَيْرِي فِي عَمَلٍ عَمِلَهُ لَمْ أَقْبَلْهُ إِلَّا مَا كَانَ لِي خَالِصًا.

The narrator of the tradition says that he heard al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) saying that God Almighty said, "I am the best of friends; one who makes others My partners in any matter, his deeds are not acceptable to Me. I accept only those acts that are purely done for My sake."

Hence, it is clear that if the spiritual acts (of the heart) are not performed with sincerity of the heart, they will neither be the object of attention of the Almighty, nor will He acknowledge them, and they will be credited in the account of that partner—the person, for whose sake they were performed. Thus the spiritual acts performed for the sake of somebody else, not for God, will surpass the limits of polytheism, and will enter the domain of *kufr* (infidelity). It may even be said that the performer of such adulterated acts would be treated as one of the *munāfiqūn*.

As his polytheism is not visible, his hypocrisy also is hidden. He, the poor fellow, considers himself to be a believer, whereas in reality he

is an idolater, and he is condemned to taste the chastisement prescribed for the *munāfiqūn*. How pitiable is the plight of one whose good deeds are to terminate in *nifāq*.

The Difference Between Knowledge and Belief:

Know that faith or belief is something different from the knowledge of God, the Unity of His Being, and His other Attributes—like *ṣifāt-e kamāliyyah* (the Attributes of Perfection), the Positive Attributes, *ṣifāt-e jalāliyyah* (the Attributes of Glory), and the Negative Attributes, etc.—and the knowledge of angels, holy scriptures, and the Last Day. Anyone who possesses the knowledge of all these things is not necessarily a believer. The Devil possesses the knowledge of all these things more than I and you or any other individual, but still he is an unbeliever. The faith is a yearning of the heart—an inner experience, which if not genuine, does not become faith. Anyone who has gained knowledge of religion through rational demonstrations and arguments, ought to submit to them whole-heartedly with the totality of his being and obey the call of his heart dutifully—i.e. with complete surrender to God, with humility and fear—and accept all the responsibilities expected of him sincerely without any question. Only then he can become a perfect *mu'min*. Culmination of the faith is tranquillity and peace of mind. When the light of faith is stabilized, it brings with it tranquillity of the heart, and this is something which does not issue from knowledge.

It is possible that reason may accept something which is according to its dictates and logic, but the heart may not be ready to agree with it, thus making knowledge useless. For instance, you know through your reason that a dead person cannot do any harm and that all the dead in the world do not possess any power of action, even as much power as is possessed by a fly, and that all the physical and spiritual faculties depart as soon as one is dead; but since your heart has not accepted it and has not approved of the judgement of the mind, you cannot spend a dark night with a dead body. But if your heart yields to your mind and approves of its judgement, this job will no more be difficult for you. After some effort the heart resigns to the dictates of reason, then no dread of the dead remains in the heart.

Therefore, it is clear that the submission which is the gratification and comfort of the heart is quite a different thing from knowledge, which is the gratification of the mind. It is possible that one can logically prove the existence of the Great Intelligent Designer, the Unity of His Divine Being, the Day of Judgement and other true beliefs, but such a belief cannot be considered as faith (*īmān*), and the person

cannot be regarded as a *mu'min*, but he may be counted among the non-believers, hypocrites and polytheists.

Today my eyes and yours are closed, and we do not possess any divine vision. Our terrestrial eyes are unable to perceive, but when the hidden is revealed and the kingdom of heaven is manifested, the physical world vanishes and reality is disclosed; you will realize that you were not a believer in God, and your rational judgement was not congruous with your faith. Unless the words: ' لا إله إلا الله ' (there is no god except God) are inscribed on the tablet of the heart with the pen of reason, man is not a true believer in the Unity of God. When this sacred and holy dictum is impressed on the heart, the domain of the heart turns by itself into the kingdom of God Almighty. Then only man does not see anyone else as efficient in the realm of truth; he does not expect any rank, any distinction or riches from anybody else; he does not seek for honour and fame with the help of others; and his heart does not become hypocritic and profane. Therefore, if you see that *riyā'* is stealing into your heart, you should realize that your heart has not really surrendered itself to reason, and faith has not illuminated your heart yet; for you consider others to be your God and see them as efficient agents in the world, and you do not trust Him, the only God; it means that you have joined the company of hypocrites, polytheists and idolaters.

Dangerous Effects of *Riyā'*:

O, you given to *riyā'*, who have entrusted your truthful beliefs and religious understanding to the custody of the enemy of God—the Devil, and have attributed to others what specifically belongs to God, you have exchanged those lights which would have illuminated your heart and spirit, and would have proved to be the source of your salvation and eternal bliss, which would have been responsible for being blessed with Beatific Vision and acquiring Divine nearness, with the dreadful darkness of eternal misfortunes; you have lost the other-worldly treasures, and have alienated yourself from the most sacred threshold of the Beloved, and have deprived yourself of the sight of the visage of the Most High. Be prepared for the darkness, which is not to be followed by any ray of light; the scorn and shame from which there is no release; the diseases which have no cure; the death after which there is no life; and the fire which is ignited from within the depths of the heart to engulf the whole region of your spirit, as well as the realm of the body. It is beyond your capacity and mine to conceive or perceive the intensity of that fire, as God Almighty has mentioned in His Holy Book:

نَارُ اللَّهِ الْمَوْقَدَةُ * الَّتِي تَطْلُعُ عَلَى الْأَفْئِدَةِ *

(It is) the fire of Allah, kindled, which leapeth up over the hearts (of men).
(104:6-7)

The effect of the fire which is kindled by God will be that it would consume the hearts as well. No fire can consume the heart except that which is kindled in the hell. If the belief in the Unity of God, which is inherently engrained in human nature, is abandoned and is replaced with idolatry and infidelity, no intercession of any intercessor will be available to him, and man will be destined to suffer eternal damnation. What kind of chastisement will it be? It will be the effect of the Divine wrath, issuing from His sense of Honour.

Thus, my friend, do not make yourself an object of the Divine wrath for the sake of an illusion, an insignificant and trivial popularity in the eyes of weak creatures of God, and for the sake of worthless attention of hopeless human beings. Do not make a bargain of those Divine blessings, those infinite favours and benevolences with popularity among people, which is not even effective and long-lasting, from which you cannot derive any benefit except inviting ultimate shame and regret. And while your relations are severed with this world of illusion and deception and you cease to act, no regret and sorrow will be of avail.

An Advice for Getting Rid of the Curse of Riyā’:

What I am going to mention here to you is expected to work effectively for curing this disease of the heart, your as well as others'. It shall be also according to the rational dictates as well as is in conformity with the truths of revelation and tradition of the *Ma'ṣūmūn* (the infallibles). It is as well verifiable on the basis of the teachings of the Quran and your and my reason. God Almighty, by means of His all-embracing power and might, which governs the whole universe and is immanent in the realms of all possible beings, takes under His control the hearts of all His servants, as no one is outside the range of His power and the domain of His domination; and no one should occupy the hearts of human beings without His permission and His creative Will; not even the person himself has any control over his own heart without the permission of God Almighty. This fact has been revealed implicitly and explicitly in the Quran as well as the traditions of the members of the Household (*Ahl al-Bayt*) of the Prophet (S). Hence, God Almighty is the real owner of the hearts and has sovereignty over them, and you, a helpless and weak creature of Him, you cannot claim to be the master of your heart, without His leave. His Will is predominant over ours and other creatures' resolution. Therefore, your hypocrisy and deceit, if it

is meant for attracting the attention of His servants and for earning respect and popularity among them, know that it cannot bear any fruits, for this is totally beyond your powers, and it belongs to the jurisdiction of His power. He is the owner and the ruler of the hearts. He makes the hearts of the people a seat of love for whomsoever He likes. It is possible that your act produces a result just contrary to your wish. Pay attention to what we have seen and heard about the double-faced hypocrites, whose hearts were not pure; they were ultimately condemned to be disgraced; whatever they intended, they could not achieve, but something that they did not desire happened to them. The following tradition in *al-Kāfi* points to the same fact:

عَنْ جَرَّاحِ الْمَدَائِنِيِّ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ فِي قَوْلِ اللَّهِ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ: «فَمَنْ كَانَ يَرْجُوا لِقَاءَ رَبِّهِ فَلْيَعْمَلْ عَمَلًا صَالِحًا وَلَا يُشْرِكْ بِعِبَادَةِ رَبِّهِ أَحَدًا» قَالَ: الرَّجُلُ يَعْمَلُ شَيْئًا مِنَ الثَّوَابِ لَا يَطْلُبُ بِهِ وَجْهَ اللَّهِ إِنَّمَا يَطْلُبُ تَرْكِيبَةَ النَّاسِ يَشْتَهِي أَنْ يُسْمِعَ بِهِ النَّاسَ، فَهَذَا الَّذِي أَشْرَكَ بِعِبَادَةِ رَبِّهِ، ثُمَّ قَالَ: مَا مِنْ عَبْدٍ أَسْرَّ خَيْرًا فَذَهَبَتْ آيَاتُهُ أَبَدًا حَتَّى يُظْهِرَ اللَّهُ لَهُ خَيْرًا وَمَا مِنْ عَبْدٍ يُسْرُّ شَرًّا فَذَهَبَتْ آيَاتُهُ أَبَدًا حَتَّى يُظْهِرَ اللَّهُ لَهُ شَرًّا.

The narrator of the tradition, Jarrāḥ al-Madā'ini, reports from al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) that he asked the Imam about the words of the Almighty that 'whosoever is desirous of meeting his Creator, he should perform virtuous deeds and should not ascribe any partner to God in his worship,' seeking an explanation. Al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) said, 'A person who performs good deeds but not for the sake of being blessed with the vision of his God, his acts are aimed at being considered as pious by the people, and he wishes that people should know about his deeds; such a person is counted among polytheists, who have ascribed partners to God.' The Imam (A) continued: 'There is none in the world, who has concealed his good deeds and after passage of time God has not revealed them. And there is none in the world who could conceal his wicked deeds for ever, for they were exposed by God before he passed away from the world.'

Hence, my dear friend! try to be worthy in the eyes of God. Try to win the hearts of the creatures by first pleasing the real owner of the hearts, so that He comes to your rescue. Work for the sake of God. As a consequence God Almighty, besides showering His favours and excellences upon you in the Hereafter, will bestow His honours and favours on you in this world as well, and will befriend you. He will raise your status in the eyes of people and will exalt you in both the worlds. But the only thing that you have to do is to sincerely cultivate the love of God in your heart, untainted and unspoiled, with struggle

and effort. Purify your inner self so that your actions also will be pure and untainted by the love of the world or hatred of fellow beings; your spirit should be pure and untainted and all the infirmities and corruptions of the soul should be eliminated. Of what advantage is the love or hatred of the weak creatures of God, and gaining favour and name among them? Even if it has some benefit, it is insignificant and short-lived. It is possible that this love of the world may lead you to hypocrisy, and God forbid, it may convert you into a polytheist or a hypocrite or an unbeliever. If you are not disgraced in this world, you will be surely disgraced in the other world, in Almighty's court of justice, in front of His truthful and worthy servants, in front of His esteemed prophets and those angels who are nearest to God, and you will have to hang down your head in shame, and you will be left in a state of utter helplessness. Can you imagine the disgrace of that day? God alone knows what sort of darkness is to follow that disgrace. It will be the day, as God Almighty has said:

... وَيَقُولُ الْكَافِرُ يَا لَيْتَنِي كُنْتُ تُرَابًا *

... and the disbeliever will cry: 'Would that I were dust'. (78:40)

Then it will be of no good. You, poor fellow, for the sake of a trifling love, for the sake of a fame of no avail among the creatures of God, you did not care for the promised Divine favours and have failed to gain His good pleasure, and have incurred His indignation and wrath instead.

The deeds by means of which you could have gained Divine favours, could have secured a happy and blissful life in eternity, and could have attained the highest station in the highest heaven; you have replaced it with the darkness of polytheism and hypocrisy, and have procured for yourself regret, shame and the severest chastisement, and have converted yourself into a 'sijjīnī' (an inhabitant of the lowest or dungeon of hell) instead. It occurs in the tradition in *al-Kāfī* that it has been reported from al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) that the Prophet (S) said: 'Indeed when the angel of God joyously takes to the higher heaven the good deeds of a man, as he carries the good deeds heavenward, God Almighty orders him to place those deeds in 'Sijjīn', since they were not performed for Him alone.⁴ You and I cannot imagine what 'Sijjīn' is, and which kind of demons are appointed there; and you cannot contemplate the horrors inflicted upon the sinners there. And once we have been made to face it, it will not be possible for us to get rid of it, as all the means of repentance shall be cut off. Wake up my friend! and cast away your negligence and carelessness, and weigh your actions in the balance of your reason, before they are weighed and

measured in the other world. And cleanse the mirror of your heart of the rust of polytheism, hypocrisy, and two-facedness. Do not allow the rust of impurity of polytheism and infidelity to gather in such a way that it cannot be cleansed with the fire of the other world. Do not allow the light of your nature to be turned into the gloom of apostasy. Do not be a traitor to yourself and do not destroy what God has entrusted to you, calling it:

فِيضَتْ اللَّهُ الَّتِي فَطَرَ النَّاسَ عَلَيْهَا...

...the nature (framed) of Allah in which He hath created man.... (30:30)

Therefore, burnish the mirror of the heart, so that the light of Divine magnificence may be reflected in it, and may make you forget this world and everything in it, and your heart is kindled with the fire of His love, so that all other attachments and associations may be dissolved in such a manner that you do not spurn a single moment for the sake of the worldly things; and you derive such a pleasure from His remembrance that all the animal pleasures may appear to you a gimmick. If you cannot attain this station, even then do not give up the gifts of God that are promised to be given in the next world and are mentioned in the Quran and the traditions of the *Ma'sūmūn* (A), for the sake of gaining the short-lived favour of the weak creatures of God. Do not deprive yourself of all the Divine favours and do not make a bargain of the eternal felicity with the everlasting distress.

Sincerity in Action.

Know that the real King of kings, the true Giver of real bounties, has bestowed upon us all these favours. He created all these things for us and prepared them for us even before we came into this world. He made our food a balanced diet and acceptable to our weak stomach—a patron and servant who serves us with an instinctive and natural love. He created for us suitable climes and weathers and has bestowed upon us all other seen and unseen favours here and in the other world, and after piling up all these gifts for us, He asks us to keep our hearts pure for His occupation, so that we ourselves may be benefited from His presence. In spite of all these warnings and cautions we still do not obey Him and do not pay heed to His words and do not act according to His wish. What an act of gross transgression. With whom are we trying to wage a war, the consequences of which we will have to face? Any slightest harm cannot be caused to His Kingdom, and we cannot exclude ourselves from His reign of power either. If we are acting like the polytheists we are causing harm to ourselves, because:

... فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ غَنِيٌّ عَنِ الْعَالَمِينَ *

...Lo! Allah is independent of (all) creatures. (3:97)

He does not need our worship, our service or our obedience. Any disobedience, polytheism, and two-facedness on our part will not cause any harm to His Empire, but as He is *أَرْحَمُ الرَّاحِمِينَ* (the Most Merciful of the merciful), His boundless mercy and compassion, and His perfect wisdom require of us the pursuance of the right path, and for this purpose He made clear the difference between good and evil, beautiful and ugly to us and warned us of the perils and hazards to be met on the road of human perfection and the path of true felicity. We are indebted to God Almighty for this great guidance and we have to show, with all humility, great respect towards Him in our worships, our devotion and our supplications, whose importance we cannot comprehend unless we gain an other-worldly vision. As long as we sojourn in this narrow physical world, confined to the limits of the sequence of time and shackles of space, we cannot comprehend the infiniteness of the realm of His power, and we cannot even thank Him in our prayers and supplications for His guidance. Never let the idea enter our mind, that by our service and devotion we are doing some favour to His prophets, His chosen servants, and the great *'ulamā'* of the Ummah. They are our benefactors, who have taken the charge of leading the Ummah towards felicity and deliverance, and who have accepted the responsibility of our emancipation from the darkness and shadows of ignorance and misfortunes, taking us towards the realms of light and joy and greatness. What a great responsibility they took upon themselves, and what horrible pains and troubles they underwent for the sake of our instruction, in order to deliver us from those obscurities and darkneses, that were the result of vain beliefs and compound ignorance, and the chastisements that were to befall us as a result of our bad habits and villainies. They wanted to save us from those hideous forms and dreadful figures in the other world that would be the outcome of our wicked deeds, and they helped us to reach the regions of light, joy and comfort and the spheres of serenity and composure, whose image our mind would fail to visualize. This physical world in spite of its vastness is so limited and narrow that we cannot imagine a heavenly houri with our this-worldly vision. Our vision does not possess enough power to behold the magnificence of that world, which has been described in the speeches of the holy prophets of God, especially in the all-embracing revelations of the *Khātim al-nabiyyīn* (Seal of the prophets), who perceived those truths through Divine revelations, saw them, heard them, and then asked us to acquire them. And we, like recalcitrant children, disobey the commands of the wise, and even

do not pay heed to the dictates of our own reason, always being more than ready to oppose the Divinely guided ones. And those sanctified pious souls, out of the love and kindness that they possessed for the creatures of God, did never fall short of their duty, did never appeal to our meaner and baser faculties by bribing them to attract us towards heaven and felicity; they never tried to make us yield through intimidation or force. They did not either demand any remuneration or reward for the services they rendered. The remuneration asked by the Prophet (S) *مَوَدَّةُ ذَوِي الْقُرْبَىٰ* (kindness for his kinsfolk), which is not really a payment for his services, is also meant for our own benefit, being the brightest of our achievements in the next world. Our sense of indebtedness to them in fact serves ourselves and we are benefited more from it than they are. How are they benefited by the righteous acts of poor beings like us? In what way will our sincerity and obedience do them any good? In what way do you and I consider our humble selves benefactors of the guides of the Ummah, from an ordinary faqīh to the great Prophet (S) and God Almighty? All of them have in their own right fulfilled their function of guiding us and showing the right path, for which we are indebted to them and even a fraction of it we cannot pay back in this world. Nothing of this world is worthy of the repayment of their debt: *فَلِلَّهِ وَلِرَسُولِهِ وَلِأَوْلِيَاءِهِ الْمِنَّةُ* (It is to God, His Prophet (S), and His saints to whom all owe gratitude), as God Almighty has said:

... *قُلْ لَا تَمُنُّوا عَلَيَّ إِسْلَامَكُم بَلِ اللّٰهُ يَمُنُّ عَلَيْكُمْ أَنْ هَدَيْتُمُ لِلْإِيمَانِ إِن كُنْتُمْ صَادِقِينَ * إِنَّ اللّٰهَ يَعْلَمُ غَيْبَ السَّمٰوٰتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاللّٰهُ بِصِيرٍ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ **

... Say: Deem not your surrender a favour unto me; nay, but Allah does confer a favour on you, inasmuch as He hath led you to the faith, if ye are earnest. Lo. Allah knows the Unseen of the heavens and the earth. And Allah is Seer of what you do. (49:17-18)

Hence, if we are sincere in our faith in God, it is in itself a favour bestowed upon us by God. God Almighty is Omniscient, and has the knowledge of the hidden. He is Omniscient, knows the inner, hidden reality of all our actions, and He is fully aware of the nature of our faith and the extent and degree of our submission to His Will.

We, the helpless creatures, who do not know the reality, acquire our knowledge from the *faqīh* and think that we have done favour to him. We offer congregational prayers behind an *‘ālim*, and we assume that we have conferred a favour on him, whereas, in fact, we are indebted to him. We do not realize this, and, therefore, this faulty outlook turns the effects of our deeds upside down and drags us into *‘Sijjīn’* making our actions worthless.

The Second Stage of Riyā':

At this stage, though *riyā'* is of lesser intensity than it is at the first stage, but it is possible that if the hypocrite does not heed the warnings, and repeatedly behaves in the same way (the *riyā'* of action) it is likely to terminate in the *riyā'* of the former stage—the *riyā'* of faith. We have already mentioned in the exposition of the previous tradition that in the '*Ālam al-malakūt* (the celestial world) man may have a different form other than the human form. Those forms will be in accordance with the state of one's soul and its traits. If you possess good human qualities, in the other world those qualities will retain you in the human form, provided they are not deviated from the path of moderation. Good faculties will be considered as true merits only when the sensual self does not interfere with them, and the self does not play any role in their formation. Our respected teacher and shaykh Āyatullāh Shāhābādī used to say that the measure of the false and invalid spiritual practice and true religious spiritual struggle is as to what extent selfishness is involved in such practices, i.e. whether all spiritual effort is for God or for selfish motives. If the wayfarer on the heavenly journey treads a selfish path and his spiritual exercises are meant for acquiring powers for worldly ends, his efforts are rendered invalid, and his *sulūk* (progress on mystic path) will lead him to the calamity of the other world. The false claims of spirituality are usually made by such people. And if the wayfarer treads the right path, and is genuinely in search of God, his devotion is within the bounds of the Shari'ah, and God will help him, as promised in the following verse of the Quran:

وَالَّذِينَ جَاهَدُوا فِينَا لَنَهْدِيَنَّهُمْ سُبُلَنَا...

As for those who strive for Us, We surely guide them to Our paths.... (29:69)

Hence, his actions will lead him to felicity; egoism will be eliminated and self-conceit and pride will recede. This is quite clear that anyone who demonstrates his good deeds before people, his aim is a selfish aim, and he will be branded as a selfish, self-conceited, egoistic and egocentric person, and his godliness will be considered as nothing but false and pretentious, which will invalidate his good deeds. As the domain of your existence is replete with the feelings of self-love, the lust for wealth, power and fame, and the wish for ruling over the creatures of God, your good deeds and your excellences cannot be adjudged as virtuous deeds, and your moral behaviour is far away from truly religious morality. The operating force in your realm is satanic and your inner state is not a human condition. When you will open

your eyes in the other world, you will perceive yourself in an unhuman form, similar to one of those of the devils. For such selves, which are dens of the Satan, it is impossible to gain religious knowledge and learn the spirit of *tawḥīd*. Unless the realm of your inner self is converted into a human state and your heart is purged of impurities and unholiness, you cannot be benefited from spiritual exercises, as God Almighty states in a *ḥadīth-e qudsī*:

لَا يَسْعُنِي أَرْضِي وَلَا سَمَائِي بَلْ يَسْعُنِي قَلْبُ عَبْدِي الْمُؤْمِنِ.

There is no clearer sign in the earth and in the heavens of the elegance of the Beloved than the heart of a true believer (*mu'min*).

The believer's heart is in the occupation of God, not at the disposal of the self. The heart of the believer is not self-willed, nor is it vagrant. It is said of it:

قَلْبُ الْمُؤْمِنِ بَيْنَ إصْبَعِي الرَّحْمَنِ يُقَلِّبُهُ كَيْفَ يَشَاءُ.

The heart of the true believer (*mu'min*) lies between two fingers of God, that He may turn it whatever way He pleases.

O you, the poor creature, who worships the self and the Devil and ignorance are the agencies operating in the realm of your heart, you yourself have prevented the hands of God from handling your heart. What sort of faith you are required to possess that your heart be the object of Divine illumination, absolute rule of the Truth may prevail there? Make it a point that unless you change yourself, and as long as the bad habit of ostentatiousness and vanity dominates your deeds, you will be branded as an unbeliever and you will be grouped with the *munāfiqūn* (hypocrites), even though you imagine yourself to be a believer in God and as one who has resigned himself to the Will of God.

The Value of Human Existence as a Trustee of Divine Honour:

My friend! wake up from the slumber of forgetfulness and carelessness, be aware, do not let sleep overtake your senses, and know that God Almighty has created you for His own sake, as stated in one *ḥadīth-e qudsī*:

يَا بَنِي آدَمَ خَلَقْتُ آلَاءَ شَيْءٍ لِأَجْلِكَ وَخَلَقْتُكَ لِأَجْلِي.

O progeny of Adam, We have made everything for you and you for Our

service.

He has made your heart His own habitation. You and your hearts are the abodes of Divine Honour. God Almighty is intolerant regarding His Dignity and Honour. Do not be careless in this regard, and do not justify any violation of the Divine principles; and be afraid of His retribution so that you may not be disgraced and made infamous in this world in such a way that despite all efforts you are not able to undo what may befall you. You are guilty of violation of Divine Honour in your heart that belongs to the celestial world, in front of the angels of God and His prophets. The moral excellences through which the saints of God (*awliyā' Allāh*) acquired resemblance to Him, are being surrendered by you to others than God, and you are surrendering your heart, the seat of God, to His enemy, thus committing *shirk* (polytheism) in the heart of your hearts. Be afraid of God Almighty, Who besides bringing down your other-worldly image and degrading you in front of His angels and His prophets, will also expose and dishonour you in this world itself and you will be condemned to unmeasured indignity which shall be also irreparable, and irremediable, an infamy that cannot be redressed. God Almighty is *Sattār*, He conceals the sins, but He is jealous also. He is *أَرْحَمُ الرَّاحِمِينَ* —the Most Merciful of the merciful, but at the same time He is *أَشَدُّ الْمُعَاقِبِينَ* —the severest of the punishers also. He Himself says that He covers up bad deeds as long as they do not cross certain limits. God forbid, lest the gravity of your deeds should arouse His anger and should it overcome His tolerance and willingness to conceal sins, as you have read in the ḥadīth.

Hence, come to your senses, seek refuge in God and turn back to Him, for God Almighty is the Compassionate and always seeks for an excuse to shower His mercy. If you ask for His forgiveness, He will readily forgive you, and will cover up your blemishes and past deeds, so that no one will be able to know about them, and He will make you a man of great distinctions, a paragon of virtues and an image of His Attributes. He will make your will consummate in the next world as His own Will is executed throughout the cosmos. It is narrated in a ḥadīth that when the people are placed in the Paradise, a message from the Almighty will be given to them and its purport will be as follows: 'From the One who is Eternal and Immortal to him who is also eternal and immortal: Whatever I desire to bring into existence I command it to be and it comes into being; from this hour it has been decreed that you also command whatever you desire to bring into existence and your wish would be obeyed.'

Therefore, do not be egocentric, and subordinate your will to the Will of God Almighty; He will then make you an instrument and manifestation of His Will. He will give you power in the realms under

His control, and bestow upon you the capacity to create in the Hereafter. (Of course, this is not the same as *tafwīd*, which is a false notion, as proved elsewhere.)

Now, my friend, do as you please; either accept it or reject it. But know, that God Almighty is not in need of you or me or any other creature, and He has no need of our service and sincerity.

RIYĀ' IN WORSHIP:

The third stage also is divided into several sections.

Section I:

The *riyā'* of this kind is more common and manifest than those mentioned above. Because we ordinary human beings usually do not belong to the above-mentioned two states. For this reason, the Devil cannot get hold of us in the way he encroaches upon those who belong to the other states. But since the majority of the worshippers express their devotion to God through formal prayers, the Devil commonly intervenes at this stage more frequently. Sensual temptations are also commoner at this stage. In other words, since such type of people tend to seek the physical pleasures of heaven through their actions, and they aspire to attain higher station by performing good deeds and abstaining from performing wicked ones, the Devil finds an access through this way; and he nurtures the roots of *riyā'* and deceit with great care, so that it may bear the fruits that are desired by him. He transforms their virtues into vices, and makes them to enter hell through the path of ritual worship. The acts by means of which they aim to secure paradise for themselves are transformed by him into the means of their destruction and doom. The deeds which would have led one to *'Ilīyyīn*—the highest heaven, are so distorted that their performer is thrown into *Sijjīn* by angels at the command of God. Therefore, persons who lay greater emphasis on this aspect (i.e. formalistic) and ignore other aspects, have nothing except apparently good deeds to secure salvation in the next world; they are required to be more cautious, so that this provision also may not be snatched away from their hands and they may not be consigned to the flames of hell and deprived of felicity for ever. They should watch over their acts lest the doors of heaven be closed and the doors of hell be opened to them.

How to Combat Riyā'?

Most often the sanctimonious person himself does not know that this particular vice has penetrated his deeds and his deeds have now

assumed hypocritical proportions and hence become worthless. Because the temptations of the Devil and the self are so unobservably shadowy and subtle and the path of humanity is so delicate and tenuous that unless anyone is extremely discriminate, he cannot understand their inherent evil. He imagines that his actions are meant for pleasing God, whereas they are serving the interests of the Devil. Since man is naturally created self-centred, the veil of self-love and egoism covers his flaws and vices from his own eyes. God willing, we shall also discuss this subject while commenting upon certain other aḥādīth; I ask for God's help in this regard.

For instance, the acquisition of religious knowledge, is one of the important religious duties and a kind of worship; but a man busy attaining excellence in this field is liable to fall an easy prey to the vice of *riyā'*, which seizes his heart in such a way that he himself is not aware and the same thick curtain of self-love obstructs his vision. He desires to gain an important position in the eyes of great scholars and men of distinction and honour, by solving an important problem in such a way that no other person has solved it before; he tries to project himself as a person distinguished from others by presenting the subject in a unique way, to make himself the focus of everyone's attention; with an air of self-assurance, he assumes that if anyone among the scholars and dignitaries eulogizes him in flattering terms, he will be able to receive the applause and praise of the whole gathering. The poor fellow fails to realize that even if he earns worldly fame and honour among scholars or the elite, he will be disgraced in the eyes of the King of kings, and these actions of his will lead him to *Sijjīn*. This act of *riyā'* is also accompanied with some other vices, like the wish for humiliating and insulting others, or injuring the feelings of his brother in faith, or sometimes being rude to a believer; each one of these vices is enough for landing him in hell. If again your deceptive self falls in the snares of its own guiles and succeeds in convincing you that your aim has been to make known a tenet of Shari'ah and pronouncing the word of truth, which is one of the most meritorious acts of religious devotion, and that you do not aim at demonstrating your spiritual superiority, you ought to interrogate your self by asking that if a friend of yours had solved the same religious issue in a better way and had defeated you in the gathering of those scholars and highly placed persons, even then would you have taken the same position? If it is so, you were true to your own self. But if your self again is bent upon deceiving others and does not refrain from committing another treachery and contends that the utterance of truth is a meritorious act, and possesses a spiritual reward also, and that it is in your interest to attain an elevated station in the Hereafter, you are advised to ask your self: Suppose if God Almighty accords you the real glory for your defeat in case you gracefully accept

it, would you still desire to prevail? If you see that your self loves to dominate others in academic discussion for gaining publicity among the scholars for your knowledge and scholarship, and the discussion that you undertake is aimed at winning others' respect and honour, then know that the intellectual discourse, which is the highest form of worship and prayer, is transformed into the sinful act of *riyā'*, which, according to the narration of *al-Kāfī*, will lead you to *Sijjīn*, you are classed as a polytheist, and this act was performed with the motive of gaining respect in the eyes of the people. This act of yours, according to a tradition, will cause more harm to your faith than the harm done by two wolves who attack a herd of sheep without a shepherd from both sides. Therefore, you who are a scholar and responsible for reforming the Ummah and paving the way to the Hereafter, and curing spiritual infirmities, it is necessary for you first to correct yourself and maintain a sound spiritual state, so that you do not fall under the category of the scholars who do not act upon what they profess.

Pray to God Almighty to purify our hearts of the stains of polytheism and hypocrisy, and cleanse the mirror of our hearts of the rust of the love of the world, which is the source of all vices. O God! kindly help us and protect us helpless beings, afflicted with the disease of vanity and the lust for power and honour, and guard us in this hazardous journey along the intricacies of the labyrinthine dark path, O the Mightiest and the Most Powerful.

Riyā' in Congregational Prayers:

Congregational prayer is an eminent form of Islamic worship, and the leader of this prayer holds a distinctive position of honour. For this reason, Satan also intrudes more in this worship. He is much more envious of the *imām* (leader) of the *jamā'ah* (congregation) than anybody else. He is always busy finding the ways of keeping away the believers from receiving this Divine honour, and deprives their action of the element of sincerity and truth and drives them to *Sijjīn*. He tries to convert them into polytheists, and for this purpose he invades the hearts of the *imāms* through various means, such as *'ujb* (self-admiration), which we shall discuss later on, and *riyā'*, which is a display of religiosity through this significant worship for impressing the people, gaining publicity, and earning their admiration and respect; for instance, when an *imām* sees that a certain pious person is attending the congregational prayer, he tries to make an ostentation of his humility and devotion in order to capture his attention and win his admiration; he tries to find various ways of mentioning him in the gatherings of people not present in the congregation; in order to show his importance, he drags the name of that pious man again and again and tries to inform

the people about his presence as a follower in the congregational prayer; thus, he tries to create a false impression of a close association with him, especially if he belongs to the business class, and expresses such a great love and friendship for him which he never expressed even for a single moment for God or His favoured servants. And if, God forbid, any of the aristocrats loses his way and comes to pray with the congregation, it is a bigger disaster. The Devil is not unmindful of the leader of a small congregation either. He approaches him and makes him aware that he is so unmindful of worldly gains that he is content to spend his time in a small local mosque of a poor neighbourhood. This feeling is also similar to the first, or even worse than that; as the vice of jealousy spreads its tentacles in the hearts of such people, who do not enjoy the bounties of this world; the Devil deprives them of the glories of the other world too, and they are condemned to suffer in both the worlds. At the same time, the Devil, does not lose his grip on the collars of people like you and me, who have no access to the leadership of a congregation, and who lament the absence of proper means; he makes us doubt the utility of congregations of Muslims, and makes us scorn and flout them. We may be led to look upon our failure to capture a congregation as otherworldly seclusion, and ourselves as free from love of station and honour. Then we become worse than both of the groups, we neither belong to the first category of people, who enjoy the good things of this life, nor do we belong to the second category, whose achievements are comparatively humbler; nor do we have any claim to the next world; nevertheless if we get an opportunity, we might prove to be more power-hungry, honour-thirsty, and greedy than either of the groups.

How Does Riyā' Infiltrate the Ranks of the Congregation?

The Satan is not content with dragging the leader of the congregation to the hell. His lust is not satiated with that. He infiltrates the ranks of the worshippers also. Since the first row is more esteemed than other rows, and its right wing superior to the left, he makes them his target more often than any other row. He attracts the pious towards the right part of the first row, and incites them to pose to be superior to others in the eyes of the people. The helpless fellow, unconscious of the Satan's whispering, tries to demonstrate his superiority through a sanctimonious glance or gesture, which displays his inner polytheism, which is enough for sending him to *Sijjīn*. From here, the Satan then steals into other rows to allure other people: on account of his awkward gestures and funny behaviour a devotee becomes the target of jeer and sneer of others, who consider themselves to be free from all sort of faults. Sometimes it has been observed that a respectable person,

especially a scholar of rare distinction and high intellectual calibre, is made to sit by the Devil in the last row, in order to make people realize that though his position is much higher, but since he does not care for worldly position and is free of self-esteem, he has come to sit in the last row. Some people of this kind will never be seen sitting in the first row.

The Satan is not satisfied with influencing the imam and his followers; he sometimes catches hold of one of the loners by the beard, persuading him to leave his house or shop, and by means of his allurements he launches him into a corner of the mosque over a prayer-mat. For such a man, no imam is *'ādil*, or qualified to lead prayers. The Satan makes him perform a prolonged prostration and *rukū'* and an extended prayer. In his heart of hearts, this individual wishes to make people believe that he is pious and conscientious to such a degree that he avoids the congregation, so that he may not be trapped into following an unjust imam. This person, besides being conceited and sanctimonious, is also ignorant of the laws of the Shari'ah. The *marji' taqlid* (legal authority) whom he follows may not have laid any condition for praying behind an imam except acceptability of his outward behaviour. But the loner is not concerned with that, for his real motive is *riyā'*. He merely wants to present himself as a man of piety in order to gain the favour and admiration of people.

In the same way, our other activities also are interfered with by the Satan. This damned creature, whenever he finds a murky heart, he makes it his resting place and tries to spoil our visible and invisible deeds, and transforms our good deeds into such as lead us directly to the hell.

An Invitation to Sincerity:

My friend, be judicious and careful in your actions. Demand from yourself an account of every deed. Cross-examine yourself for every detail; try to evaluate your deeds through introspection whether they were meant for the realization of virtue or motivated otherwise. What motivated you to ask questions about mid-night prayers? Was it purely for the sake of God with an intention to perform such prayers, or for projecting your image as a deeply religiously person? Why is it that you are eager to inform others about your pilgrimage by all possible means and about the number of times you undertook it? Why are you not content with confining your charitable deeds to yourself alone, and what do you want to gain by informing the others of your acts of charity, for as soon as you find an opportunity you announce them? If it is undertaken for the sake of God, and you intend that people should imitate you, and you think in terms of *الدالُّ على الخير كفاعله* (the one who shows the path of virtue is as worthy as the doer of it) while

performing this deed, its display is justified; thank God, for He has enabled you to act with a clear conscience and pure heart. But beware of the guiles of Satan while interrogating your self, for he can project the acts adulterated with *riyā'* as selfless and sacred. If your action is not for the sake of God, then it is better to abstain from doing what you have been doing, for it amounts to *sum'ah*, i.e. advertisement of false virtues, which is a branch of the accursed tree of *riyā'*; for God Almighty does not approve of it and condemns its perpetrator to *Sijjīn*. We ought to seek refuge in God from the vice of deceit, whose guiles are very subtle. We have a general idea that our deeds are not pure and sincere, because had we been His true servants, why does the Devil, despite promising not to impede the actions of His true servants, disturb our sanctity and make us an instrument of his evil designs? In the words of my respected teacher, the Devil is the watchdog of the Almighty's court; he does not bark at the person who is near to God, and does not bother him. As the watchdog does not drive the friends of the master away from the house, in the same way, the Satan also recognizes God's friends, and does not allow any stranger to get access to Him. Therefore, whenever you realize that the Satan interferes in your affairs, you should immediately know that your actions are not performed with sincere intentions and are not meant for the Almighty. If you are a sincere believer in God, why doesn't your tongue pour forth words of wisdom, coming from the heart? For about forty years you imagine that you have been performing virtuous deeds in order to please God, whereas it occurs in a ḥadīth that whosoever remains faithful to God for forty days, springs of wisdom emanate from his heart. This is, therefore, a sign for us to comprehend that our deeds were not performed for the sake of God, though we ourselves are not conscious of it, and this is the main cause of our irremediable sickness.

Pitiable is the condition of the devotees, worshippers, leaders and followers of Friday congregations and men of high knowledge and learning! When they will open their eyes in the court of the Most High on the Day of Judgement, they will come to know that they are not only among the sinners, perpetrators of major sins, but even worse than infidels and idolaters, and their record of deeds even darker than theirs.

It is a matter of pity for a person that his prayers and other devotional acts should serve as fuel for the fires of hell. May God save us from the moment when, in spite of one's alms-giving and *zakāt* and piety, one's appearance will be distorted to such hideousness that it is not even imaginable. You, a helpless creature, are branded as a *mushrik*, an idolater, and a sinner despite your belief in the Unity of God. God willing, He will forgive the sinners by His mercy, but for the *mushrik* He has said that He will not forgive him if he dies without repentance.

It is stated in the aḥādīth that one used to *riyā'*—the one who makes a display of his religiosity, devotion, high religious status, his preaching and leading of prayers, his fasting, his *namāz* and even his pious deeds for the sake of gaining respect in the hearts of people—is a polytheist. His *shirk* (idolatry) is confirmed by the traditions of the Imams of the Holy Household (A) and the Quranic text, and hence his sin is unpardonable. It would have been better for you to be among the perpetrators of major sins, to be one notorious for his evil conduct and perpetration of obvious indignities, while being a monotheist, instead of becoming a polytheist.

Now, my friend, introspect seriously and find some remedy to cure your (spiritual) sickness, and realize the futility of acquiring honour in human hearts, a small piece of flesh which will not satisfy a bird's appetite. These weak creatures possess no power, and their estimation is insignificant. The real power is to be sought in Him; He is the Absolute Cause of all causes—the Ultimate Cause. Even if all creatures make a joint effort to create a single mosquito, they will not be successful in doing so, and if the mosquito causes them a slight harm they will not be able to avert it if God does not will so.

All power belongs to the Almighty. He is the Mover of the universe. Whenever you do something and make an effort to perform something, inscribe on your heart with the pen of reason: لا مُؤْتَرَفِي الْوُجُودِ إِلَّا اللَّهُ (no one is effective in the realm of existence except God).

By all possible means equip your heart with the principle of unity of Divine Action (*tawḥīd-e af'ālī*), which is the first stage of the belief in the Unity of Being, and thus convert it into the heart of a true believer. Illuminate your heart with the holy dictum of: لا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ (there is no god but Allah); and mould it accordingly. Lead your heart to the stage of tranquillity (*iṭmi'nān*), and make it realize that human beings can cause neither harm nor good, and that God alone is capable of doing any harm or good to anybody. Cure your vision, which suffers from blindness, so that you are not raised blind on the Day of Judgement and complain to the Almighty رَبِّ لِمَ حَشَرْتَنِي أَعْمَى (My Lord! wherefore have You raised me (here) blind...? [20:125]). The Will of the Almighty prevails over the wills of other beings. If your heart surrenders to these holy words, and has faith in them, this can be hoped that your deeds will be rewarded and all the traces of polytheism, *riyā'*, infidelity and hypocrisy will be wiped out from the face of your heart. This profound faith is in accordance with reason and revelation, and there are no traces of determinism (*jabr*) present in it. It is possible that some people who do not know the meaning, the basic principles and ingredients of determinism may mistake it as such, whereas it is not *jabr* but *tawḥīd*. Determinism is a kind of *shirk*; whereas *tawḥīd* is right guidance, determinism is misguidance. This occasion is not proper for

discussing determinism and freedom. But those who fully understand this issue can appreciate the import of what I say. Moreover, the Prophet (S) has asked us not to indulge in such discourses. Anyway, ask God Almighty, through supplication and humble entreaties all the time, especially in loneliness, to guide you and to illuminate your heart with the light of *tawhīd*. Ask Him to endow you with the vision of the hidden, the perception of the unity (in diversity)—the Unity of Divine Being, so that you may not attach importance to anything else and consider every other thing as insignificant and trifle. Beseech His Holy Essence to make your actions pure and sincere, and lead you to the path of sincerity and love. And if you have reached such a spiritual station that your prayers are responded and you can do something for this helpless creature of God, who has squandered his life in meaningless pursuits, devoid of any real purpose, hankering after desires and lusts, whose sins have sickened the heart to a point where no exhortation, advice, Quranic verse, or tradition of the Prophet (S), or argument or wise saying can have any effect, do pray for him; may be your prayer shall secure his deliverance. God never turns away a believer from His court, and He grants his prayers. By ever remembering these things, which you already know and which are also not new to you, be heedful and sincere from within the heart, and, without ceasing, critically reevaluate your movements, pauses, and your behaviour. Always scrutinize your secret intentions, and strictly take account of everything in the same manner as one business partner is accountable to the other. Abstain from everything that resembles *riyā'* and simulation, however virtuous it may appear to be. Even in the matter of obligatory religious duties, if you believe that you cannot perform them sincerely in public, perform them secretly, though it is preferable to perform them openly. It is rare for *riyā'* to occur in obligatory duties themselves; more often it relates to their mode of performance and to acts which are *mustahabb* or supererogatory. In any case, purge your heart from the dirt of polytheism with perfect solemnness and severest self-criticism, lest, God forbid, you should pass away from this world in this state that your performance is deplorable, and there is no hope of salvation for you. Then you will invite the wrath of God, as mentioned in the tradition quoted in *Wasā'il al-Shī'ah* from *Qurb al-'asnād*, and reported from Amir al-mu'minīn 'Alī (A):

إِنَّهُ قَالَ: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ (ص): مَنْ تَرَيَّنَ لِلنَّاسِ بِمَا يُحِبُّ اللَّهُ وَبَارَزَ لِلَّهِ فِي السَّرِيَا يَكْرَهُهُ اللَّهُ لِقِيَّ اللَّهُ وَهُوَ عَلَيْهِ غَضَبَانٌ وَلَهُ مَا قِئْتُ.

Amir al-mu'minīn 'Alī (A) reports that the Prophet (S) said: "One who does some act liked by God in order to show off to people, and in secret manifests

such qualities as are abominations to God, he shall encounter God's anger and wrath [on the Day of Resurrection]."

There are two probable interpretations of this ḥadīth. Firstly, it is about such a person who presents himself as paragon of virtue before people, while his inner self is immersed in ugly vices. Secondly, it may be about a person who performs outwardly virtuous deeds with the intention of *riyā'*. In any case, it is obvious that the ḥadīth condemns *riyā'*, because the performance of the obligatory acts and duties if not motivated by *riyā'*, cannot be the object of Divine wrath. In all probability the second meaning is closer to the import of the ḥadīth, as the open performance of wicked deeds is a greater evil.

This is a warning for us to be cautious lest, God forbid, we do something to incur the wrath of the King of kings and the Most Merciful of the merciful: *أَعُوذُ بِاللَّهِ مِنْ غَضَبِ الْحَلِيمِ*

A Tradition of Imām 'Alī (A):

We conclude this section with a tradition reported from the commander of the pious, Amīr al-mu'minīn (A), recorded in *al-Kāfī*. Al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq has also reported the same tradition from al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A), which forms a part of the last will and testament of the Prophet (S) to 'Alī (A):

عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ قَالَ: قَالَ أَمِيرُ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ (ع): ثَلَاثُ عِلَامَاتٍ لِلْمُرَائِي: يَنْشِطُ إِذَا رَأَى النَّاسَ، وَيَكْسَلُ إِذَا كَانَ وَحْدَهُ، وَيُحِبُّ أَنْ يُحْمَدَ فِي جَمِيعِ أُمُورِهِ.

Said al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) that Amīr al-mu'minīn (A) said: 'There are three distinguishing features of one accustomed to *riyā'*: he expresses joy and cheerfulness when he is greeted by people; he becomes cheerless and sullen when alone; and he wishes to be praised for everything he does.'

Since this vice is so hidden and subtle that it remains unnoticed by the person himself, he is unaware of the fact that inwardly he is a hypocrite, and he imagines his actions to be pure and untainted. Therefore, the signs of this characteristic have been described so that men should be able to identify their hidden motives by examining their inner self in their light and be able to prevent and treat them accordingly. An individual may introspect and know that he is not inclined to perform his religious duties when he is alone; even if with great compulsion he forces himself to perform them, or even if he performs them habitually, he does not perform with real sincerity and purity of heart, but rather as a physical exercise; but while performing his prayer in the mosque, in the congregation of the people and in the presence of

others, he becomes animated, performing his prayer with utmost joy and enthusiasm. He is inclined to perform long and protracted *rukū's* and prostrations; he performs the *mustahabb* actions properly, caring about their minutest particulars. If one pays a little attention to one's inner state, one may come to know the reason for this vigour. Why is it so that he spreads the net of his (pretended) piety for catching the attention of people? He may mislead himself by saying that he is more pleased with praying in the mosque, as it is more meritorious to do so, and that it brings more rewards also. He will convince himself by saying that it is preferable to say prayer in a better way in front of others, in order that they may follow his example and be attracted towards the religion. Man deceives himself by all means and never thinks of correcting himself. For a sick person who considers himself to be sound there is no hope of being cured. The ill-fated man's innermost being not only secretly aims to parade his good deeds before people, remaining unconscious of its inner urge, but is also bent upon presenting his sin as worship and his conceit as propagation of religion, despite the fact that the performance of the *mustahabbāt* prayers is *mustahabb* in seclusion. Why is it that your self always responds in public, and why do you relish weeping out of the fear of God in the gathering of people, though in loneliness in spite of squeezing your eyes you cannot bring out a single tear? Where is the fear of God? Does it grip you in the gatherings of people only? Does it overwhelm you only on the occasion of the Nights of Great Value (*لَيْلَةُ الْقَدْرِ*) in front of several thousands of people? Such a man offers one hundred *rak'ah's* of *namāz* and recites the *Du'ā-i Jawshan-i Kabīr* and *Du'ā-i Jawshan-i Ṣaghīr* in addition to several *sūrah's* of the Quran and is not bored and does not feel the slightest weariness. If man performs something purely for the sake of God or for gaining His blessings, or out of fear of hell or in the hope of heaven, why should he desire that his deeds be praised by men and admired by them? His ears are all the time eager to listen something in his praise, and his heart is after those who observe his devotion and notice how venerable this gentleman is, for he is so punctual about the prayer and is so concerned about the supererogatory duties. If your deeds are meant for God, what does this exaggerated craving mean? If the fear of hell and the hope of heaven force you to perform these deeds, what does this love of publicity mean? You ought to realize that this desire issues from the accursed and abominable tree of *riyā'*. Therefore, try as much as you can to purify yourself of these absurd inclinations (to the extent possible), and try to reform yourself.

Variation in Grades and Degrees of Qualities among Different Individuals:

At this stage it is essential to remind you that each one of the qualities of the soul, both the good ones and the bad, has numerous grades and degrees. Those who acquire virtues and give up vices are grouped with the 'urafā', saints and friends of God (*awliyā' Allāh*). As for other individuals, the nature of vices and virtues is determined by the spiritual station to which they belong. It may be that the qualities which are considered to be vices for those belonging to higher spiritual station are not considered vices for those belonging to a lower stage. On the contrary, in a way, they may even be regarded as their accomplishments. And similarly the qualities that are regarded as virtues for the people of a lower category may be vices for men of a higher category. *Riyā'* is also one of such (relative) vices that we are discussing presently. Authenticity (*ikhhlāṣ*) is the highest stage of freedom from *riyā'* and is characteristic of the saints (*awliyā' Allāh*); others do not share this quality. The common people generally attain a lower stage of it, and this does not harm their *imān* or *ikhhlāṣ*, because, generally, they have a natural inclination that their virtues be known to others. Though they may not have intentionally performed them for the sake of demonstrating them, but their self is instinctively inclined to make them known. This tendency does not annul their action, nor does it make them infidels, hypocrites (*munāfiqūn*) or polytheists either. But the same trait is considered to be a shortcoming in the case of a *walī* or 'ārif bi-Allāh, as for them it amounts to *nifāq* or *shirk*. Absolute purification from the impurity of polytheism and obtaining perfect authenticity (*ikhhlāṣ*) of devotion is essentially a primary condition for attaining the stage reserved for *awliyā' Allāh*, and there are even higher stages which they can attain, but, here, it would be out of place to go into these details. Our Imams, upon whom be peace, have declared that their worship was the worship of emancipated souls (*aḥrār*), which was performed for the sake of love of God alone, neither due to the fear of hell nor in the hope of heaven; and they considered this stage to be the first step of their *wilāyah*. To them worship is a state of ecstasy and rapture which is beyond the reach of our imagination and understanding. Apart from the above-mentioned aḥādith narrated from the Prophet (S) and Amir al-mu'minin (A), there is another ḥadīth also, reported by Zurārah from Imām Abū Ja'far (A), which is as follows:

عَنْ زُرَّارَةَ عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ (ع) قَالَ: سَأَلْتُهُ عَنِ الرَّجُلِ يَعْمَلُ الشَّيْءَ مِنَ الْخَيْرِ فَيَرَاهُ إِنْسَانٌ
فَيَسِرُّهُ ذَلِكَ؟ فَقَالَ: لَا بَأْسَ، مَا مِنْ أَحَدٍ إِلَّا وَهُوَ يُحِبُّ أَنْ يَظْهَرَ لَهُ فِي النَّاسِ الْخَيْرُ، إِذَا لَمْ

يَكُنْ صَنَعَ ذَلِكَ لِذَلِكَ.

Zurārah reports that he questioned al-Imām al-Bāqir (A) about the status of a person who performed good deeds, which were seen by others and it made him happy. Said the Imam (A): "There is no harm in it; there is no one who does not like that his good deeds be made known to the people, in case he does not perform them [solely] for the sake of attracting their admiration.

In one of the two aḥādīth, the tendency of performing good deeds for the sake of earning respect and admiration is considered as the sign of *riyā'*, while in another ḥadīth it is stated that there is no harm in the joy resulting from the demonstration of a good deed. These two different positions are taken in view of the category to which an individual belongs. There are certain other reasons also for such a view, but we shall abstain from mentioning them.

What is Sum'ah?

At the end, it is to be noted that *sum'ah* means to orally transmit one's good qualities to the ears of people for the purpose of attracting them and publicizing oneself, and this tendency is a branch of the vicious tree of *riyā'*. For the same reason we have dealt with *sum'ah* as a part of *riyā'*, not as a distinct vice, and have not elaborated its meaning separately.

to be continued—'inshā' Allāh

NOTES:


1. *Uṣūl al-Kāfi*, vol. 2, p. 402.
2. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 450.
3. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 453.
4. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, the chapter concerning *riyā'*.
5. *Wasā'il al-Shi'ah*.
6. *Uṣūl al-Kāfi*, vol. 2, p. 295.
7. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 297.

EDITOR'S NOTE

In Part 1 of *Forty Hadith*, which appeared in the last issue of *Al-Tawhīd*, the original Arabic of the first ḥadīth was not printed due to oversight. With an apology for the mistake, we give here the text of the ḥadīth, which the author, in the original Persian work, mentions with different chains of transmission, all of which, however, end in Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb al-Kulaynī, the author of *al-Kāfi*:

عَنِ الشَّيْخِ الْأَجَلِ ثِقَةِ الْأَسْلَامِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ يَعْقُوبَ الْكَلِينِي، صَاحِبِ الْكَافِي، عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ
عَنْ أَبِيهِ عَنِ التَّوْقَلِيِّ عَنِ السُّكُونِيِّ عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ (ع) (إِنَّ النَّبِيَّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ بَعَثَ سَرِيَّةً فَلَمَّا
رَجِعُوا قَالَ: «مَرْحَبًا بِقَوْمٍ قَضَوْا الْجِهَادَ الْأَصْغَرَ وَبَقِيَ عَلَيْهِمُ الْجِهَادُ الْأَكْبَرُ»، فَقِيلَ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ مَا
الْجِهَادُ الْأَكْبَرُ قَالَ: «جِهَادُ النَّفْسِ».

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Wilāyat al-Faqīh: Its Meaning and Scope

by Āyatullāh 'Alī Mishkīnī

translated from the Persian by Shahyār Sa'ādat

The subject under discussion is the issue of the *wilāyah* and authority of the qualified faqīh. In order to understand the central issues related to this concept, we must comprehend the four following conceptions: (1) *walī* (one who enjoys *wilāyah* or authority); (2) *muwallā 'alayh* (those subject to this authority); (3) *wilāyah*; (4) the functions of *wilāyah*.

The term *walī* refers to the qualified faqīh who fulfils the conditions of *wilāyah*.

The term *muwallā 'alayh* refers to the individual, group, or society in regard to which the *walī* exercises *wilāyah*.

'*Wilāyah*' is the office which signifies the power and authority of the faqīh as established on legal grounds.

The functions of *wilāyah* are the legal rules applicable to *wilāyah* based on either religious or rational evidence.

We shall divide our discussion of the above-mentioned concepts and the related issues into a number of sections.

*This is the first part of an exposition of the concept of *wilāyat al-faqīh* by Āyatullāh 'Alī Mishkīnī, an eminent contemporary jurist of Iran. *Wilāyat al-faqīh* is a concept on which the present Islamic system in Iran and in particular the office of the Leader or the Leadership Council, with its powers and duties as stated in the Constitution, are based. The author presently heads the existing Experts' Assembly (Majlis-e Khubregān), a body elected by popular vote, whose job is to elect the future Leader or Leadership Council of the Islamic Republic. The Leader or the Leadership Council fulfils the function of *wilāyat al-faqīh*, a concept explained in the present article.

I. WALĪ: THE QUALIFIED FAQĪH

To begin with, in Arabic, the word "*faqīh*" literally means "someone who understands well". However, such derivatives as '*faqīh*', '*fahīm*', '*alīm*' and the like are different from other derivatives as '*faqīh*', '*fāhim*', '*ālim*' and the like, since in addition to characterizing the participle with a trait, they denote experience, speciality and perpetuity of the related quality. Thus *faqīh* is one who is an expert in the science of *fiqh*, in the same way as *hakīm* refers to someone who is well versed in *hikmah*, and *ṭabīb* refers to one who is an expert in the science of *ṭibb* (medicine). In the present study, therefore, the term '*faqīh*' refers not to any knowledgeable man or expert in general, but only to a particular class of experts who specialize in the science of *fiqh*. Thus '*faqīh*' is one who specializes in Islamic *fiqh* or jurisprudence and is a *mujtahid* qualified to give expert opinion (*fatwā*) with regard to the ordinances of Islam. The purpose of this article is to establish the right of *Wilāyah* of such an individual.

Secondly, it may be said that the Islamic teachings, and in fact the teachings of all heavenly religions, are divisible into three separate parts. These are: the principal doctrines; the ethical teachings; and the laws or commandments. This is so because human existence, for whose instruction and development those heavenly prophets and scriptures have been sent, can also be divided into three spheres, which are: intellect; psyche and psychological attributes and qualities; and the physical actions. Each of the three sections of the heavenly teachings is meant to purify, guide, and bring about the perfection of one of the related dimensions of human nature. The section related to man's intellectual dimension is the section consisting of the basic doctrines of the faith. The section concerned with man's emotional and psychological qualities and attitudes is ethics, while the section dealing with man's physical actions is the one consisting of the practical laws and commandments of religion. An expert in the first aspect of the teachings is called *mutakallim* (theologian); one in the second aspect is called *akhlāqī* (moralist); and one who specializes in the third aspect, *faqīh* (jurisprudent). Our discussion is centred around this third kind of expert, the individual who specializes in the knowledge of the practical laws and commandments of Islam.

Thirdly, in order to understand the concept of *faqīh* and the requirements of his expertise (*faqāhah*) correctly, and to know the qualifications a student of religious studies must acquire in order to be recognized as a *faqīh*, we must first see what the definition of the term *faqīh* is and, secondly, the preliminary stages which a student must go through before qualifying for the designation.

A *faqīh* may be defined as "an individual who possesses the

ability to derive most or all of the general rules and legal commandments of Islam from the original sources." In other words, he should have sufficient training in the preliminaries requisite for deduction, so that given all the necessary means, he should be able to derive and deduce any of the rules of the Islamic Shari'ah by investigating and examining the sources, should he be requested to do so. In this aspect, the position of the *faqīh* is exactly like that of the doctor, who can diagnose a disease if he is in possession of the necessary means, or that of the surgeon, who can perform surgery if he has access to the necessary instruments and means. Thus, the qualification which forms the basis of the aforementioned definition of '*faqīh*' is neither in the sense of being potentially capable of making logical deductions without considerable knowledge of Islamic laws and injunctions, nor does it mean that one should have actually derived all the relevant injunctions from the original sources and hold them ready in his memory for instant presentation. The expertise of a *faqīh* is comparable to the kind of expertise required of a doctor or an engineer in his own field; the difference being that the tools used by the *faqīh* are different, just as the job performed and the results obtained are also of a different class.

As to the prerequisites needed by a student of a religion to gain the aforementioned capacity, and therefore the status of a *faqīh*, are as follows:

1. Vocabulary:

That is, having a good enough command over the Arabic language to be able to correctly understand the meaning of the material constituting the Holy Quran and the traditions of the Ma'sūmūn (A).

2. Grammar and Syntax:

The student must have sufficient understanding of the various usages of Arabic words and the varied construction of sentences so that he may have a clear idea of the meaning of the texts of the Quran and other original sources.

3. Uṣūl al-Fiqh:

This science is the most important prerequisite for becoming a *faqīh*, and consists of a series of general principles which guide the *mujtahid* in making logical deductions from the original sources. This science therefore has a direct bearing on the process of deduction of the rules (*aḥkām*) of the Shari'ah on the basis of general principles derived

from reason, the Book, and the Sunnah.

4. *'Ilm al-Ḥadīth (The Science of Ḥadīth)*

This is the science by which one learns to investigate the chains of transmission of ḥadīth, so as to distinguish the weak (*da'īf*) and unreliable from the authentic (*ṣaḥīḥ*) and reliable traditions, so that the former are rejected and the latter are relied upon during the process of deduction.

5. *'Ilm al-Rijāl*

This science investigates the transmitters of ḥadīth and all those who form a link in the chain of transmission from the time of publication of the four main texts of ḥadīth (*al-kutub al-'arba'ah*) and other books dealing with textual evidence employed for deduction of *aḥkām*, all the way up to the Ma'sūm from whom any particular ḥadīth has been related. What is investigated is the character of the transmitters, their veracity, honesty, justice (*'adālah*), and reliability. The aim, of course, is to determine the degree of authenticity of the reported ḥadīth. However, since there is no ambiguity about the authorship of the above-mentioned books, there is no need to investigate the transmitters who lived after their compilation.

6. *Full Knowledge of the Relevant Quranic Verses:*

It is necessary for the student to have thorough knowledge of the exegesis of the verses of the Quran related to the *aḥkām* of the Shari'ah and their derivation, and are the original source for the practical *aḥkām* of Islam. The number of such verses is about five hundred.

It takes the student from twenty to forty years to gain full knowledge of these disciplines, depending on his natural aptitude and degree of diligence. Moreover, there is undoubtedly the supreme condition, which although not mentioned independently, is at the heart of all the other prerequisites, and that is that no one may attain to *ijtihād* without the blessing and approval of God Almighty.

II. MUWALLĀ 'ALAYH:

'*Muwallā 'alayh*' literally means something which needs to be looked after or someone who is in need of a guardian and is incapable of continuing or managing his life by himself. Thus '*muwallā 'alayh*' may refer to: (1) assets, such as land or property; or (2) people, such as

the minor, the insane, or society as a whole.

Assets:

The assets in need of a *walī*'s protection are of five kinds:

1. Private property, the *walī* of which is its owner.

2. Quasi-public property; such as charitable endowments (*mawqūfāt*), property gifted by the owner to be used for the benefit of the general public, property the owner of which is unknown, found objects, etc. The guardianship of these rests either with particular trustees, or with the Islamic judge (*ḥākim al-Shar'*).

3. Government property; such as *khums* (the twenty per cent Islamic tax that is levied on seven categories of items), and *anfāl*, which includes all lands, forests, mines, and surface water resources which have either never been utilized by anyone or have been used in violation of the law. Detailed treatment of this can be found in the relevant books of *fiqh*.

4. National property; such as conquered lands, *zakāt* (Islamic poor tax, which is laid on nine items), and so on. The guardianship of these two items rests with the qualified *faqīh* and sometimes may be delegated to private persons. In any case, all the above-mentioned assets need protection, be they funds or mineral, plant, or animal resources—except for the animals living in the wild that are capable of taking care of themselves without any outside assistance.

5. Public property; which does not belong to any particular individual and stands in need of guardianship, such as: mosques, shrines, holy spots, streets, highways, roads, and bridges.

Now we shall explain the five categories mentioned above more elaborately.

1. Religious endowments (*mawqūfāt*) are of many kinds; but primarily fall into four categories:

(a) Donations to individuals; for example, one may donate one's house to one's male descendants.

(b) Donations to a general category of individuals; such as students, the needy, and warriors.

(c) Endowments for particular purposes; such as for holding mourning ceremonies, marriages, the writing of religious books, and so on.

(d) Endowments for public use; such as when a property is donated for the purpose of building a mosque, school, inn, bridge, road, etc.

Our purpose in giving the detailed description of the above four types of *mawqūfāt* is to show that the last three types, with only minor differences, possess a public character, while the first type is essentially

private in nature.

2. *Waṣāyā 'āmmah*, or property bequeathed by its owner through a will for the benefit of the general public, can be divided along the same lines as indicated for endowments (*awqāf*) with only minor differences. Some examples of *waṣāyā 'āmmah* are: property bequeathed for the benefit of religious students, providing housing for the needy, providing subsistence for the poor, etc.

3. Property the ownership of which is unknown, and found property. Property the ownership of which is unknown must be used for the benefit of the poor and the needy with the permission of the Islamic judge. The same applies to found property, when there isn't any hope of finding its owner, or after one has performed the duty of announcing its finding publicly for a period of one year. Thus both of these two kinds of property are considered public property.

4. Government and national property: from the Islamic point of view there are numerous forms of ownership of property and assets, each subject to different kinds of regulations. For example, *khums* and *anfāl* are considered as government property in the sense that they are controlled by the chief of State and the head of the Islamic Ummah. The chief of State is the Imam himself when he is present, and his deputy in his absence. This property must be used, first of all, to provide for the expenditure and needs of the officials and employees of the State, and secondly, if anything is left over, for the welfare of society, according to the discretion of the Imam.

However, the income from conquered lands and the *zakāt* belong to the people, and giving of the *zakāt* to the poor is therefore left to the discretion of the alms-givers themselves. In spite of the private nature of these two categories, however, the *wilāyah* of the head of the Islamic Ummah applies to them also, and, if necessary, he may put them to some other use, as stated by the Quran:

وَاعْلَمُوا أَنَّمَا غَنِمْتُمْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ فَإِنَّ لِلَّهِ خُمُسَهُ وَلِلرَّسُولِ وَلِذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَالْيَتَامَىٰ وَالْمَسَاكِينِ
وَابْنِ السَّبِيلِ...

And know that whatever ghanā'im you acquire, a fifth thereof is for Allah, and for the Messenger and for the kinsfolk, and the orphans and the needy and the wayfarer,.... (8:41)

The above verse clearly indicates that the *khums* of *ghanā'im*, belongs to the head of the Islamic State. It also states the uses to which it must be put. From numerous traditions of the Ahl al-Bayt (A) it is clear that whatever belongs to God, belongs also to His Prophet and, after him, to the Imams. And the three groups mentioned in the verse

(the orphans, the needy, and the wayfarer) receive their subsistence from the Imam. Thus all kinds of *khums* are the property of the head of the State, for the purpose of managing the affairs of the country.

In the verse,

يَسْأَلُونَكَ عَنِ الْأَنْفَالِ قُلِ الْأَنْفَالُ لِلَّهِ وَالرَّسُولِ...

They ask thee (O Muhammad) of the anfāl. Say: 'The anfāl belong to Allah and His Messenger'.... (8:1)

all the about nine categories of *anfāl* are considered as the property of God and His Messenger, and God has entrusted His property to the head of the Islamic State. Thus, we can conclude that all the above-mentioned forms of income and assets belong to the State.

In the verse,

إِنَّمَا الصَّدَقَاتُ لِلْفُقَرَاءِ وَالْمَسْكِينِ وَالْعَامِلِينَ عَلَيْهَا وَالْمُؤَلَّفَةِ قُلُوبُهُمْ وَفِي الرِّقَابِ
وَالْغَارِمِينَ وَفِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ وَابْنِ السَّبِيلِ...

The alms (ṣadaqāt) are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the cause of Allah, and [for] the wayfarers.... (9:60)

zakāt is considered as belonging to the people and particularly the poor, to be used in meeting their eightfold needs; it is therefore to be considered as national property.

II. Persons:

The persons who are *muwallā 'alayh* can be divided into four categories: minors and orphans, the insane, slaves, and the society as a whole. All the four categories are classed as *muwallā 'alayh*, being incapable of managing their affairs properly and living in a way which is in accordance with the real purpose of creation and the role God has ordained for man. To leave them alone and unattended, therefore, without having provided them with a guardian and a *walī*, would cause confusion and chaos in human society. This is quite obvious in the case of minors and the insane. But as far as the slaves are concerned, when we realize that most of these slaves are actually prisoners of war, it becomes clear that if they were left to roam in the society that has captured them it would lead to all kinds of corruption and irregularity. It is therefore necessary that these slaves must have a guardian who supervises them and manages their affairs. Here it may be pointed out

that we mention slavery only as one example of *muwallā 'alayh*, and are not concerned here with Islam's attitude towards slaves and slavery, or the ways and means by which Islam has struggled to abolish this institution.

As for the fourth kind of *muwallā 'alayh*, that is, society as a whole, it requires some careful study to prove that it is indeed in need of guardianship. It is a step which must be taken, however, if we are to understand the nature of the *wilāyat al-faqīh*. This is so because most people have the notion that only those who are incapable of managing their own affairs stand in need of a guardian. They do not see society as a whole as being such, and so deny that society may be classed as *muwallā 'alayh*. Although one must agree that there is some truth in this popular notion of society in certain aspects, it should be brought to the attention of the general public that in certain other aspects society cannot be left to itself in the management of its affairs. Rather it may be said that, in some ways, society is even in greater need of guardianship and protection than minors, the insane, and slaves. To explain, the greater the incapacity of society to manage its affairs in a certain sphere, the greater and more evident is its need for guardianship in that particular sphere. The case of society is similar to that of minors and the insane who are, in general, considered incapable, by the Shari'ah, of handling their own finances. None the less, there are legal verdicts and traditions to the effect that minors and the insane may make wills and set their slaves free. It means that they are considered competent as far as these matters are concerned, and the guardianship of the *walī* either does not apply at all to them in these two matters, or if it does, the grounds for its doing so are weak.

The conclusion to be drawn here is, then, that society must also be viewed as an individual entity, and a judgement must be made as to in what aspects it is capable of self-management and in what aspects it lacks such competence and is in need of a *walī*. Accordingly we see that members of society are left free to conduct their affairs in various walks of life and to manage their own finances, because their competence is evident in their spheres; therefore, there is no need of a *walī* for them as far as these matters are concerned. There are aspects of social life, however, to which *wilāyah* does apply. Some of the most important of these concern the social, political, legal, and economic life of society.

To determine exactly in what aspects of its life society is competent to manage itself and in what aspects it stands in need of a *walī* needs careful consideration, full treatment of which can be found in the Islamic teachings. An examination of the rules of the Prophet (S) and Imam 'Alī (A) clearly shows the nature and limits of *wilāyah*, the obligations and rights of the *Walī* and Imam, and the cases in which the *Walī* is authorized to exercise control over the people's property or

their persons. As we shall explain more elaborately, it also proves that every society needs a full-fledged State, organized to meet the needs of the times, with long-term and comprehensive programmes, and sufficient budget to carry them out. It is in this context that the necessity for the existence of the *Walī* and Imam is clearly seen. Society needs an Imam who has authority to exercise control over public property, just as, on occasion, he may have to levy variable taxes on personal property in order to meet some dire need of the society or confront present or potential threats to the existence of the community. It may even be necessary at times for the people to be mobilized to perform certain tasks against their will because the long-term interests of the community warrant it. Is it not the case that the guardian of a minor sometimes forces him to undergo surgery, or has one of his limbs amputated or organs removed, or disposes of some portion of the minor's property in order to save the rest? Thus, if it is heard that some of the 'ulamā' have denied the validity of the *wilāyat al-faqīh*, it must be kept in mind that what they are denying is *wilāyah* in regard to matters in which they consider the people to be competent and capable of self management, such as the individual's prerogative to make decisions about his own person and property.

Arguments proving the scope of *wilāyah* may have three distinct sources: firstly, the judgement of reason; secondly, the example of the wise and their accumulated experiences; and thirdly, the texts of the Quran and the Sunnah.

A. The Judgement of Reason

The judgement of reason is based on the following considerations:

1. Man is by nature a social creature, driven to cooperative, collective life.

2. There are great differences among individual men in regard to the bent of mind, ideas, psychological characteristics, and physical aptitudes and capabilities.

3. Much conflict occurs among people because of differences of views, interests, aims, and ambitions, which leads at times to violent confrontation.

In the light of the above remarks, it is obvious that if people were to be left to themselves, the outcome may be corruption, discord, violence, chaos, and destruction of life and property. The only way, therefore, is to save society through an authority which can exercise effective control over the people's ambitions and runaway, uncontrolled desires. The Quran relates the story how the angels expressed their doubts about the wisdom of creation of Adam:

وَإِذْ قَالَ رَبُّكَ لِلْمَلَائِكَةِ إِنِّي جَاعِلٌ فِي الْأَرْضِ خَلِيفَةً قَالُوا أَتَجْعَلُ فِيهَا مَنْ يُفْسِدُ فِيهَا
وَيَسْفِكُ الدِّمَاءَ...

And when thy Lord said unto the angels: 'Lo, I am about to put a viceroy in the earth,' they said: 'Wilt Thou place therein one who will cause corruption therein and will shed blood....?' (2:30)

This sort of reaction on the part of the angels was of course justified in the light of what they knew about human nature. However, what they were ignorant of was God's plan to appoint spiritual leaders and guides to save human society from corruption and chaos, and to establish justice. Thus, God answered:

.... إِنِّي أَعْلَمُ مَا لَا تَعْلَمُونَ *

... Surely I know that which ye know not. (2:30)

B. The Practice of the Wise (*sīrat al-'uqalā*):

Since the dawn of civilization there has never been any human society without rulers and administrators. Whether voluntary or imposed, subjection of society to the authority of a guardian or ruler has continued until the present age and shall do so as long as civilized society continues to exist. All this we owe to precedents established by the wise, based on long and dearly won experience. In other words, experience, as well as reason, have taught us that every society needs a government and a governor. And having been convinced of its necessity, the wise have practically confirmed the necessity of the existence of State. It is the empirical evidence provided by the 'practice of the wise' (*sīrat al-'uqalā*) which distinguishes it from purely rational proof (*dalīl 'aqlī*).

C. The Textual or Canonical Proofs (*Adillah Naqliyyah*):

Textual or canonical evidence to the effect that society stands in need of a *walī*, guide, and leader, can be found in abundance. What follows is just a small sample of the verses and traditions providing such evidence.

1. Consider the following verse of the Quran:

كَانَ النَّاسُ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً فَبَعَثَ اللَّهُ النَّبِيِّينَ مُبَشِّرِينَ وَمُنذِرِينَ وَأَنْزَلَ مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ بِالْحَقِّ

لِيَحْكُمَ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ فِي مَا اخْتَلَفُوا فِيهِ...

Mankind were one community, and Allah sent (unto them) prophets as bearers of good tidings and as warners, and revealed therewith the Scripture with the truth that it might judge between mankind concerning that wherein they differed.... (2:213)

What we can deduce from this verse is that there was a time when human beings had not yet formed complex communities. At that time, they had not yet been given any divine law (*sharī'ah*), and were left to conduct their affairs by relying on their own judgement and common-sense. This state of affairs continued until men formed small communities, and conflict between communities developed because they had conflicting aims and objectives. It was to fulfil the need for guardianship, to remove these conflicts, that Allah appointed His messengers, and gave man the Scriptures which contained a comprehensive programme for social life and a set of laws to solve their differences and to resolve their conflicts. Now there is no contradiction between what has just been said and the belief that man has never been without religion since his creation, because religion and *Sharī'ah* are not the same thing. Religion consists of inner beliefs and certain rites of worship, and has been much the same since the time of Adam (A); while *Sharī'ah* is a collection of all the rules and regulations governing man's personal, social, economic, political, and other affairs. What can be derived from the Quran and the traditions of the Ahl al-Bayt (A) is that religion or *Dīn* has remained the same during all phases of human history. Throughout the real religion was *al-Islām*, i.e. submission to God. This is what the Quran states when it says:

إِنَّ الدِّينَ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ الْإِسْلَامُ...

Indeed the (only) religion with God is al-Islām.... (3:19)

There are, on the other hand, five different *Sharī'ah*'s, beginning with that of Noah (A) and ending with that of the Prophet of Islam (S).

2. Consider another verse which is similar to the one quoted above:

لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ...

We verily sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and revealed with them the Scripture and the Balance, that mankind may uphold justice.... (57:25)

3. Also consider the following verse:

رُسُلًا مُبَشِّرِينَ وَمُنذِرِينَ لِئَلَّا يَكُونَ لِلنَّاسِ عَلَى اللَّهِ حُجَّةٌ بَعْدَ الرُّسُلِ...

... Messengers of good tidings and of warning, in order that mankind might have no argument against Allah after the messengers.... (4:165)

4. Al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) said: "God is greater in majesty than that He should leave the world and its inhabitants without a leader and guide to uphold justice.

5. Al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) was asked: "Is it possible for God to leave a society without a guardian?" He answered: "Never."

6. Al-Imām al-Ridā (A) said: "The leader, the guardian, and the *Walī* of the Ummah is the means for protection of the faith and the guarantee for the integrity of the social structure, the development of the economy, and the implementation of the Divine Laws. His existence ensures the security of the frontiers, and enforcement of the laws of God; it procures the Divine rights, maintains the integrity of the faith, and safeguards the honour of Muslims. He puts sorrow and anger into the hearts of the hypocrites and plans the destruction of the unbelievers. The Imam of the Ummah is the untiring shepherd of the people, a capable statesman and administrator of their affairs, whose will and determination are impervious to exhaustion and weakness."

7. Of the verses of the Quran dealing with the prophets and their sovereignty over human society, there is the following verse dealing with God's appointment of Ibrāhīm al-Khalīl (A) as the Imam and leader of human society:

.... قَالَ إِنِّي جَاعِلُكَ لِلنَّاسِ إِمَامًا...

... He said: 'Lo! I have appointed thee a leader for mankind'.... (2:124)

And God, we are told, made David (A) His *khalīfah* or steward and bestowed upon him the sovereignty over society:

يَا دَاوُدُ إِنَّا جَعَلْنَاكَ خَلِيفَةً فِي الْأَرْضِ فَاحْكُم بَيْنَ النَّاسِ بِالْحَقِّ...

[And it was said unto him]: 'O David!' Lo, We have set thee as a viceroy in the earth; therefore judge aright between mankind'.... (38:26)

And Solomon (A) asked God to grant him authority and dominion unsurpassed by any other man:

.... وَهَبْ لِي مُلْكًا لَا يَنْبَغِي لِأَحَدٍ مِّنْ بَعْدِي... ..

... and bestow on me sovereignty such as will not belong to any after me....
(38:35)

And He gave Moses the mission of forming a State extending over the eastern and the western parts of Palestine:

وَأَوْزَنَّا الْقَوْمَ الَّذِينَ كَانُوا يُسْتَضَعُونَ مَشَارِقَ الْأَرْضِ وَمَغَارِبَهَا الَّتِي بَارَكْنَا فِيهَا... ..

And We caused the folk who were oppressed to inherit the eastern parts of the land and the western parts thereof which We had blessed.... (7:137)

to be continued—'inshā' Allāh



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The Ḥajj According to Five Schools of Islamic Fiqh Part 1

by Muḥammad Jawād Mughniyyah

translated from the Arabic by 'Alī Qulī Qarā'i

The Acts of the Ḥajj:

At the beginning, in order to make it easier for the reader to follow the opinions of the five schools of fiqh about various aspects of Ḥajj, we shall briefly outline their sequence as ordained by the Shari'ah.

The Ḥajj pilgrim coming from a place distant from Mecca assumes *iḥram*¹ from the *miqāt*² on his way, or from a point parallel to the closest *miqāt*, and starts reciting the *talbiyah*³. In this there is no difference between one performing 'Umrah mufradah or any of the three types of Ḥajj (i.e. *tamattu'*, *ifrād*, *qirān*). However, those who live within the *ḥaram*⁴ of Mecca assume *iḥrām* from their houses.⁵

On sighting the Holy Ka'bah, he recites *takbīr* (i.e. اللهُ أَكْبَرُ, 'God is the greatest') and *tahlīl* (i.e. لا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللهُ, 'There is no god except Allah'), which is *mustaḥabb*⁶ (desirable, though not obligatory). On entering Mecca, he takes a bath, which is again *mustaḥabb*. After entering al-Masjid al-Ḥarām, first he greets the Black Stone (al-Ḥajar al-'Aswad)—if possible kisses it, otherwise makes a gesture with his hand—then makes the *ṭawāf* (sevenfold circumambulation of the Ka'bah) of the first entry, which is *mustaḥabb* for one performing *Ḥajj al-'ifrād* or *Ḥajj al-qirān*. Then he offers the two *raka'āt* of the *ṭawāf*,

*This comparative study of the positions of the five Muslim schools of fiqh, Imāmiyyah, Ḥanafī, Shāfi'i, Mālikī, and Ḥanbalī, on various aspects of Ḥajj, is taken from the book *al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-khamsah* by the late 'Allāmah Muḥammad Jawād Mughniyyah, a Shī'ite scholar of Lebanon and a prolific author. The topics discussed in the second part are: *ṭawāf*, *sa'y* and *taqṣīr*, *wuqūf* at 'Arafāt, *wuqūf* at al-Muzdalifah, the acts of Minā, *Jamarāt al-'aqabah*, *hady*, the acts performed between Mecca and Minā, etc.

again greets the Black Stone if he can, and leaves al-Masjid al-Ḥarām. After this, he remains in the state of *iḥrām* in Mecca. On the day of *tarwiyah*, i.e. the eighth day of the month of Dhū al-Ḥijjah, or if he wants a day earlier, he goes forth towards 'Arafāt.

If the pilgrim has come for 'Umrah mufradah or Ḥajj al-tamattu', he performs the *ṭawāf* of the entry, which is obligatory (*wājib*) for him, and prays the two *raka'āt* of the *ṭawāf*. Then he performs the *sa'y* between Ṣafā and Marwah, and, following it, the *ḥalq* (complete head shave) or *taqṣīr*⁷ (partial shortening of the hair of the head). Then he is relieved of the state of *iḥrām* and its related restrictions, and things prohibited in *iḥrām* become permissible for him, including sexual intercourse.⁸ Then he proceeds from Mecca after assuming *iḥrām* for a second time, early enough to be present at the *wuqūf* (halt) at 'Arafāt (referred to as '*mawqif*', i.e. the place of halting) at noontime on the ninth of Dhū al-Ḥijjah. Assumption of *iḥrām* on the day of *tarwiyah*, i.e. eighth Dhū al-Ḥijjah is preferable.

The Ḥajj pilgrim, irrespective of the type of Ḥajj he intends to perform, turns towards 'Arafāt, passing through Minā. The period of the *wuqūf* at 'Arafāt is, for the Ḥanafī, Shāfi'ī, and Mālikī schools, from the noon of the ninth until the daybreak of the tenth; for the Ḥanbalī school, from the daybreak of the ninth until the daybreak of the tenth; and for the Imāmiyyah, from noon until sunset on the ninth, and in exigency until the daybreak of the tenth.⁹ The pilgrim offers invocations (*du'ā'*) at 'Arafāt, preferably (*istiḥbāban*) in an imploring manner.

Then he turns towards Muzdalifah (also called al-Mash'ar al-Ḥarām), where he offers the *maghrib* and '*ishā*' prayers on the night of the 'Īd (i.e. the tenth of Dhū al-Ḥijjah). Offering the two prayers immediately after one another is considered *mustaḥabb* by all the five schools. According to the Ḥanafī, Shāfi'ī, and Ḥanbalī schools, it is obligatory to spend this night (i.e. the night of the 'Īd) at Muzdalifah; for the Imāmiyyah, it is not obligatory but preferable. After the daybreak, he makes the *wuqūf* at al-Mash'ar al-Ḥarām, which is *wājib* for the Imāmiyyah and *mustaḥabb* for other schools. And at Muzdalifah, preferably, he picks up seven pebbles to be thrown at Minā.

After this, he turns towards Minā before sunrise on the day of 'Īd. There he performs the ritual throwing of stones, called *ramy*, at Jamarāt al-'Aqabah, no matter which of the three kinds of Ḥajj he is performing. The *ramy* is performed between sunrise and sunset, preferably (*istiḥbāban*) accompanied by *takbīr* and *tasbīḥ* (i.e. proclaiming God's glory by saying *سُبْحَانَ اللَّهِ*, 'How far God is from every imperfection!'). Then if a non-Meccan on Ḥajj al-tamattu', he should slaughter the sacrificial animal (a camel, cow, or a sheep), by agreement of all the five schools. However, it is not obligatory for one on Ḥajj al-

'ifrād, again by consensus of all the five schools. For one on *Ḥajj al-qirān*, the sacrifice is obligatory from the viewpoint of the four Sunnī schools, and for the Imāmiyyah it is not obligatory except when the pilgrim brings the sacrificial animal (*al-hady*) along with him at the time of assuming *iḥrām*.

For a Meccan performing *Ḥajj al-tamattu'*, the sacrifice is obligatory from the viewpoint of the Imāmiyyah school, but not according to the four Sunnī schools.

After this, he performs the *ḥalq* or *taqṣīr*, irrespective of the kind of *Ḥajj* he is performing. After *ḥalq* or *taqṣīr*, everything except sexual intercourse becomes permissible for him according to the Ḥanbalī, Shāfi'ī and Ḥanafī schools, and according to the Mālikī and Imāmiyyah schools, everything except intercourse and perfume.

Then he returns to Mecca on the same day, i.e. the day of the 'Īd, performs the *ṭawāf al-ziyārah*, prays its related two *raka'āt*, regardless of which kind of *Ḥajj* he is performing. After this, according to the four Sunnī schools, he is free from all restrictions including that of sexual intercourse. Then he performs the *sa'y* between Ṣafā and Marwah if on *Ḥajj al-tamattu'*, by agreement of all the five schools. For the Imāmiyyah school, the *sa'y* after *ṭawāf al-ziyārah* is also obligatory for one performing *Ḥajj al-qirān* and *Ḥajj al-'ifrād*. But for other schools, it is not obligatory if the pilgrim had performed the *sa'y* after the *ṭawāf* of first entry, otherwise it is.

For the Imāmiyyah, it is obligatory for all the types of *Ḥajj* to perform another *ṭawāf* after this *sa'y*. Without this *ṭawāf*, called *ṭawāf al-nisā'*, one is not relieved of the interdiction of abstinence from intercourse.

Then the pilgrim returns to Minā on the same day, i.e. the tenth, where he sleeps on the night of the eleventh, performs the threefold throwing of stones (*ramy al-jamarāt*) during the interval from the noon until the sunset of the eleventh—by consensus of all the five schools. For the Imāmiyyah, the *ramy* is permissible after sunrise and before noon. After this, on the day of the twelfth, he does what he had done the day before. All the legal schools agree that he may now depart from Minā before sunset. And if he stays there until sunset, he is obliged to spend the night of the thirteenth there and to perform the threefold *ramy* on the day of thirteenth.

After the *ramy*, he returns to Mecca, before or after noon. On entering Mecca, he performs another *ṭawāf*, *ṭawāf al-wadā'* (the *ṭawāf* of farewell), which is *mustaḥabb* for the Imāmiyyah and Mālikī schools and obligatory for the non-Meccans from the viewpoint of the remaining three. Here the acts of the *Ḥajj* come to conclusion.

The Conditions for the Ḥajj:

The conditions (*shurūṭ*) which make the Ḥajj obligatory (*wājib*) for a Muslim are: maturity (*bulūgh*), sanity (*'aql*), and 'capability' (*istiṭā'ah*).

The Proviso of *Bulūgh*:

The Ḥajj is not obligatory for children, regardless of whether a child is of the age of discretion (*mumayyiz*) or not (*ghayr mumayyiz*). For a *mumayyiz* child, the Ḥajj is voluntary and valid. However, it does not relieve him/her of the obligation to perform the obligatory Ḥajj (called *ḥijjat al-'Islām*) later as an adult possessing *istiṭā'ah*; this, in case he/she does not attain adulthood before the *wuqūf*. On this all the five schools of fiqh are in agreement.

It is permissible for the guardian (*walī*) of a *ghayr mumayyiz* child to take him along on the Ḥajj pilgrimage. In that case, he puts on the child the dress of *iḥrām*; instructs him to say the *talbiyah*, if the child can say it well, or otherwise says it himself on the child's behalf; and is cautious lest the child commits some act unlawful (*ḥarām*) for the pilgrims (*ḥujjāj*). The accompanying guardian also tells him to perform every act that the child can perform himself, and what he cannot, the guardian performs it on the child's behalf.

The schools of fiqh differ on two questions relating to the Ḥajj of a *mumayyiz* child: firstly, whether his Ḥajj is valid, irrespective of the permission of the guardian; secondly, whether he is relieved of the obligation of Ḥajj if he attains adulthood before *mawqif*. According to the Imāmiyyah, Ḥanbalī, and Shāfi'ī schools, the guardian's permission is a provision for the *iḥrām* to be valid. According to Abū Ḥanīfah, the idea of validity is inapplicable to the child's Ḥajj, even if *mumayyiz*, and regardless of whether he obtains the permission of the guardian or not; because, according to him, there is nothing to a child's Ḥajj except its significance as an exercise (*Fath al-Bārī, al-Mughnī, al-Tadhkirah*). According to the Imāmiyyah, Ḥanbalī and Shāfi'ī schools, if the child attains adulthood before *mawqif*, his obligatory duty of Ḥajj (*ḥijjat al-'Islām*) is thereby fulfilled. And according to Imāmiyyah and Mālikī schools, the duty is fulfilled if he renews *iḥrām* (as an adult), otherwise not; which means that he should start the Ḥajj all over again from the beginning. (*al-Tadhkirah*)

Insanity:

Basically the condition of insanity relieves a person of all duties. Even if he were to perform the Ḥajj, and presumably in the way

expected of a sane person, it would not fulfil his obligatory duty were he to return to sanity. If his insanity is periodic, when regained for a sufficiently long interval it is *wājib* for him to perform the Ḥajj with all its conditions and in all its details. However, if the interval of sanity is not sufficient to perform all the acts of the Ḥajj, he is quit of the obligation.

Istiṭā'ah:

All the five schools of fiqh agree that *istiṭā'ah* is a requirement for the Ḥajj duty to become obligatory, as mentioned by the Quranic verse: *مَنْ اسْتَطَاعَ إِلَيْهِ سَبِيلًا* ("... if he is able to make his way there").¹⁰ However, there is disagreement about the meaning of *istiṭā'ah*. In ḥadīth it has been defined as consisting of "*al-zād wa al-rāḥilah*". '*Al-rāḥilah*' implies the expenses of to and fro journey to Mecca, and '*al-zād*' stands for the expenses required for transport, food, lodging, passport fees, and the like. Moreover, the funds needed to meet such expenses must come out of the surplus after paying one's debts, after arranging for one's family's livelihood, meeting the requirements of one's source of income (such as land for a farmer, tools for a craftsman, capital for a tradesman, and so on), and without compromising the security of his life, property and honour. All schools agree about it except the Mālikis, who say that the duty of Ḥajj is obligatory for anyone who can walk. The Mālikis also do not consider the necessity of providing for the living expenses of the family. Rather, they consider it compulsory for one to sell off his essential means of life, such as land, livestock, tools, and even books and unessential clothes. (*al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*)

If a person upon whom the Ḥajj duty is not obligatory due to absence of *istiṭā'ah*, takes upon himself the burden and performs the Ḥajj, in case he attains *istiṭā'ah* afterwards, is his first Ḥajj sufficient or should he perform the Ḥajj once again? According to the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools, yes, repetition is not compulsory. According to the Ḥanbalī school, yes, but a duty left unattended, such as an unpaid debt, must be discharged.

According to the Imāmiyyah school, it does not suffice the obligation of Ḥajj if he attains *istiṭā'ah* afterwards, because the provisional is inseparable from the provision both in its presence and its absence. The Ḥajj performed before the attainment of *istiṭā'ah* is considered supererogatory (*nafl*). Later, with its realization, repetition of the Ḥajj becomes obligatory.

Immediacy (al-Fawr):

The Imāmiyyah, the Mālikī, and the Ḥanbalī schools consider the

obligation (*wujūb*) of the Ḥajj duty to be immediately applicable (*fawri*); i.e. it is not permissible to delay it from the moment of its possibility. It is sinful to delay, though the Ḥajj performed with delay is correct and fulfils the obligation. The author of *al-Jawāhir* says:

The immediacy of the obligation of Ḥajj means that it is necessary to take initiative to perform the Ḥajj in the first year of attaining *istiṭā'ah*, and failing that at one's next earliest opportunity.... Thereafter, there is no doubt about the sinfulness of the delay if one were to forgo the first opportunity in the case of absence of another.

According to the Shāfi'i school, the obligation of Ḥajj is not immediate (upon attainment of *istiṭā'ah*); rather one may delay it and perform it when he wishes.¹¹ According to Abū Yūsuf, the Ḥajj is an immediate obligation. Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan considers delay (*tarākhi*) permissible. Abū Ḥanīfah has no explicit text on the matter, though some of his contemporaries state that he implicitly believes in the immediacy of the obligation.

Secondary Issues Related to *Istiṭā'ah*:

Women and the Ḥajj:

Are there any additional conditions for women with regard to performance of the Ḥajj? All the five schools agree that it is not required that a woman should obtain the husband's permission for the obligatory Ḥajj duty, nor may he prevent her from undertaking it. However, there is a difference of opinion about whether the Ḥajj is obligatory upon her or not if she does not find a husband or a *maḥram*¹² to accompany her on the journey. According to the Imāmiyyah, Mālikī and Shāfi'i schools, the *maḥram*'s company or that of the husband is not at all a condition, regardless of whether she is young or old, married or unmarried; since the *maḥram*'s company is a means of her safety, not an end in itself. Accordingly, we have two cases: either she feels confident of her security on the journey, or she doesn't. In the first case, the Ḥajj is obligatory upon her and the *maḥram*'s company is irrelevant. In the second case, she lacks the requirement of *istiṭā'ah*, in spite of the *maḥram*'s company. Accordingly, there is no essential difference between a man and a woman in this respect.

According to the Ḥanbalī and Ḥanafī schools, the company of the husband or *maḥram* is a provision for the woman's Ḥajj, even if she were old. It is not permissible for her to perform the Ḥajj without his company. The Ḥanafī school further stipulates the condition that her location should be at a distance of three days' journey from Mecca.

Bequest (al-Badhī):

Al-Muḡhni, a text of Ḥanbalī fiqh, states: "If a person bequeaths money to another, it is not binding upon him to accept it, and it does not make the recipient *mustaṭī*' (possessing *istiṭā'ah*), irrespective of whether the bequeather is a relative or a stranger, regardless of whether the bequest suffices for the expenses of the journey and food. According to al-Shāfi'i, if the bequest is made by one's son, enough to enable him to undertake the Ḥajj journey, the Ḥajj becomes obligatory. This, because it enables him to perform the Ḥajj without having to bear a stranger's favour or without any accompanying encumbrance or harm.

According to the Imāmiyyah school, if the bequest is an unconditional gift made without the provision of performing the Ḥajj by the recipient, the Ḥajj is not binding, irrespective of who makes the bequest. But if the bequest is made with the condition that one perform the Ḥajj, the acceptance of the bequest is binding and may not be rejected, even if the bequest is made by a stranger; since it makes him *mustaṭī*' to undertake the pilgrimage.

Marriage:

What if one has only enough money either to get married or to perform the Ḥajj? Which of them is prior? The Ḥanafī text *Fath al-qadīr* (vol. II, "Bāb al-Ḥajj") mentions this question being put to Abū Ḥanīfah, who, in his reply, considered that priority lies with the Ḥajj. The generality (*iṭlāq*) of this answer in which he gives priority to the Ḥajj, taking into consideration that marriage is obligatory under certain conditions, allows us to conclude that for Abū Ḥanīfah delay in Ḥajj is not permissible.

According to the Shāfi'i, Ḥanbalī and Imāmiyyah scholars, marriage has priority if there is likelihood of distress (*ḥaraj*) or difficulty (*mashaqqah*) in refraining from marriage. In that case priority does not lie with the Ḥajj. (*Kifāyat al-'akhbār, al-Muḡhni, al-'Urwat al-wuthqā*)

Khums and Zakāt:

Payment of the *khums* and *zakāt* has priority over the Ḥajj. The condition of *istiṭā'ah* is not realized until both are paid off, like other kinds of debts.

Istiṭā'ah by Chance:

If someone travels to a place in the vicinity of the holy city of

Mecca, on business or for some other purpose, and his stay continues until the Ḥajj season, and if it is possible for him to reach the Holy Ka'bah, he thereby becomes *muṣtaṭī'*. And if he were to return home without performing the Ḥajj, by consensus of all the schools, he is not relieved of the obligation.

Istinābah (Deputation):

The Islamic duties (*'ibādāt*) are divisible into three categories, depending on a duty's nature whether it mainly involves bodily acts or financial expenditure.

1. The purely bodily *'ibādāt* are those which, like fasting (*ṣawm*) and prayer (*ṣalāt*), do not involve any financial aspect. According to the four Sunnī schools, such duties cannot in any circumstance be delegated to a proxy (*nā'ib*), either on behalf of a living or a dead person. But according to the Imāmiyyah school, taking a *nā'ib* is permissible on behalf of a dead person, though not for a living person, to perform *ṣawm* and *ṣalāt* for him, and under all circumstances.

2. The purely financial *'ibādāt* are those which do not involve bodily acts, such as *khums* and *zakāt*. In such *'ibādāt*, all legal schools agree, it is permissible to take a *nā'ib*. It is permissible for one to depute another to take out *zakāt* and pay other kind of alms (*ṣadaqāt*) from his assets.

3. The duties which involve both bodily and financial aspects, such as the Ḥajj, which requires such bodily acts as *ṭawāf* (circumambulation of the Ka'bah), *sa'y* (to and fro movement between Marwah and Ṣafā), *ramy* (the symbolic throwing of stones), and financial expenditures such as for the journey and its accompanying requirements. All the five legal schools agree that one who is capable of undertaking the Ḥajj in person and fulfils all the conditions thereof, should do so himself in person. It is not permissible for him to depute another to undertake it, and if he does so it would not relieve him of his obligation to perform it himself. If he does not do it in his life, according to the Shāfi'ī, Ḥanbalī and Imāmiyyah schools, he is not relieved of the duty because of the preponderance of the financial aspect, and it is obligatory to hire someone to perform the Ḥajj with a similar expenditure. In case he does not make a will for the Ḥajj, the amount should be taken out from his undivided heritage.¹³

According to the Ḥanafī and Mālikī schools, he is relieved of the obligation due to the bodily aspect; but if he mentions it in his will, the expense is taken out from the one third of his inheritance—like all other bequests—and if he doesn't, *istinābah* is not obligatory.

The Physically Incapable (al-Qādir al-'Ajiz):

One who meets all the financial conditions for the Ḥajj pilgrimage but is incapable of undertaking it personally due to old age or some incurable disease, all the legal schools agree, is relieved of the obligation of performing the Ḥajj in person, for God says: *وَمَا جَعَلَ عَلَيْكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ مِنْ حَرَجٍ* (... and He has laid no impediment in your religion....).¹⁴ However, it is obligatory upon him to hire someone to perform the Ḥajj for him. But if he doesn't, is it a negligence of a duty whose fulfilment continues to remain upon him? All the legal schools, with the exception of the Mālikī, agree that it is obligatory upon him to hire someone to perform the Ḥajj for him. The Mālikī says that the Ḥajj is not obligatory upon one who is incapable of undertaking it in person. (*al-Mughni, al-Tadhkirah*)

Furthermore, if a sick person recovers after deputing someone to perform his Ḥajj, is it obligatory upon him on recovery to perform the Ḥajj in person? According to the Ḥanbalī school, another Ḥajj is not obligatory. But according to the Imāmiyyah, Shāfi'ī and Ḥanafī schools it is obligatory, because what was fulfilled was the financial obligation, and the bodily obligation has remained unfulfilled.

Istinābah in al-Ḥajj al-Mustaḥabb:

According to the Imāmiyyah and Ḥanafī legal schools, one who has performed the *Ḥijjat al-'Islām*, if he wants to depute another for a voluntary, *mustaḥabb* Ḥajj, may do so, even if he is capable of undertaking it in person. But according to the Shāfi'ī school, it is not permissible. There are two narrations from Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, one indicating prohibition and the other permission. According to the Mālikī school, it is permissible for an incurable sick person and for one who has performed the obligatory Ḥajj to hire another for the Ḥajj. The Ḥajj so performed is valid, though *makrūh* (reprehensible). It is not considered as the Ḥajj of the hirer (*musta'jir*) and is counted as the *mustaḥabb* Ḥajj of the hired (*ajir*). The hirer gets the reward for providing assistance in the performance of the Ḥajj and shares the blessings of the prayers offered. When the Ḥajj is performed for the benefit of a dead person, irrespective of whether he has asked for it in his will or not, it is counted neither as fulfilment of the duty (*fard*) nor as a supererogatory (*nafl*) act, nor does it relieve him of the duty of the obligatory Ḥajj. (*al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*)

The Conditions for the Nā'ib:

The *nā'ib* should fulfil the conditions of: *bulūgh* (adulthood),

'*aql* (sanity), belief in Islam, exemption from the duty of obligatory Ḥajj, and ability to perform the Ḥajj properly. A man may represent a woman and a woman may represent a man, even if both the *nā'ib* and the one whom he represents have not performed the Ḥajj before.¹⁵

Should the *nā'ib* commence the journey from his own place or that of the deceased whom he represents, or from one of the *mawāqīt*? According to the Ḥanafī and Mālikī schools, the *nā'ib* should commence the pilgrimage journey from the place of the deceased, if he has not specified the starting point; otherwise according to his wish. According to the Shāfi'ī school, the pilgrimage commences from one of the *mawāqīt*; if the deceased person has specified one, then the *nā'ib* must act accordingly, otherwise he is free to choose one of the *mawāqīt*. According to the Ḥanbalī school, the *nā'ib* must start from the place that the deceased was obliged to begin from if he had performed the Ḥajj himself, and not from the place of his death. If the deceased person had attained *istitā'ah* at a place to which he had migrated, later returning to his own place, the *nā'ib* should start from the place of migration, not from the deceased person's home, except when the distance (between his home-town and the place of migration) is less than what is required for *qaṣr* in prayers performed by a traveller.¹⁶

According to the Imāmiyyah school, the Ḥajj is classified into *miqātī* (i.e. one which starts from one of the *mawāqīt*) and *baladī* (i.e. one which starts from the town of the deceased). If the deceased has specified one of these two kinds, then the one specified. If he has not specified, any one of the two may be performed. Otherwise the Ḥajj is *miqātī* and, if possible, starts from the *miqāt* nearest to Mecca, or else the *miqāt* nearest to the town of the deceased. The cost of *al-Ḥijjat al-miqātiyyah* is taken out from the undivided legacy in the case of obligatory Ḥajj, and the expense exceeding the cost of *al-Ḥijjat al-miqātiyyah* is taken from the one third. (*al-Jawāhir*)

Delay by the Nā'ib:

Once the *nā'ib* is hired, it is obligatory for him to act with immediacy. He may not postpone the Ḥajj beyond the first year. Also, it is not permissible for him to depute another, since the duty is his own. If we do not know that he actually went on the pilgrimage and performed all its essential acts, or if we doubt whether he performed them correctly and properly or not, or whether he failed to fulfil any of its obligatory essentials, then we assume that he acted correctly and properly, unless there is proof to the contrary.

Change of Purpose by the Nā'ib (al-'Udūl):

According to the Ḥanafī and Imāmiyyah schools, if one specifies to the *nā'ib* a particular kind of Ḥajj; such as *Ḥajj al-tamattu'*, *Ḥajj al-'ifrād*, or *Ḥajj al-qirān*; then it is not permissible for him to make any change. However, if a particular town was specified as the starting point and the *nā'ib* starts from another town, the purpose of the one who hires him is considered as fulfilled if the said specification was not really intended by the hirer; i.e. if by mentioning the route he meant the Ḥajj itself, and not the route specifically. (*al-Tadhkirah, al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*)

Al-'Umrah:

The Meaning of 'Umrah:

The word *'umrah* in common speech means "visit", but in the Shari'ah it means paying a visit to the *Bayt Allāh al-Ḥarām* (the Sacred House of God, i.e. the Holy Ka'bah) in a specific form.

The Kinds of 'Umrah:

The 'Umrah is of two kinds: the first which is performed independently of the Ḥajj (called *al-'Umrat al-mufradah al-mustaqillah 'an al-Ḥajj*), and the second kind which is performed in conjunction with the Ḥajj (*al-'Umrat al-mundammah ilā al-Ḥajj*). The *al-'Umrat al-mufradah*, the independent 'Umrah, all the five legal schools agree, can be performed at all times of the year, though it is meritorious to perform it during the month of Rajab according to the Imāmiyyah, and in Ramaḍān according to the four Sunnī schools. The time of the conjugate 'Umrah, which is performed before the Ḥajj and in the course of the same journey by the Ḥujjāj coming to the Holy Mecca from distant countries, by consensus of all five schools, extends from Shawwāl to Dhūl Ḥijjah. However, there is disagreement among legists about the month of Dhūl Ḥijjah, whether the entire month or only the first ten days belong to the Ḥajj season. Anyone who performs the conjugate 'Umrah is considered relieved of the obligation to perform the *al-'Umrat al-mufradah* by those who believe in its being obligatory.

Difference Between the Two Kinds of 'Umrah:

The Imāmiyyah scholars make a distinction between *al-'Umrat al-mufradah* and *'Umrat al-tamattu'*, citing the following reasons:

1. The *Ṭawāf al-nisā'* (to be explained later) is obligatory in *al-*

'*Umrāt al-mufradah*', not in the '*Umrāt al-tamattu*', and according to some jurists is forbidden.

2. The time of '*Umrāt al-tamattu*' extends from the first of the month of Shawwāl to the ninth of Dhū al-Ḥijjah, whereas *al-Umrāt al-mufradah* can be performed at all times of the year.

3. The pilgrim (*mu'tamir*) performing the '*Umrāt al-tamattu*' is required to shorten his hair (*al-taqṣīr*), whereas the *mu'tamir* of *al-Umrāt al-mufradah* can choose between shortening his hair or completely shaving his head (*al-ḥalq*), as shall be explained later.

4. The '*Umrāt al-tamattu*' and the Ḥajj occur in the same year, which is not the case with *al-Umrāt al-mufradah*.

Karrārah, in his book *al-Dīn wa al-Ḥajj 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*, says that, according to the Mālikī and Shāfi'ī schools, for the *mu'tamir* of *al-Umrāt al-mufradah* all things are permissible, even sexual intercourse, after the shortening of hair (*al-taqṣīr*) or the head shave (*al-ḥalq*), irrespective of whether he brings along with him the sacrificial offering (*al-hady*) or not. But according to the Ḥanbalī and Ḥanafī schools, the *mu'tamir* gets away with *al-taqṣīr* or *al-ḥalq*, if he does not bring the sacrificial offering; otherwise he remains in the state of *iḥrām* until he gets through the Ḥajj and the 'Umrah on the day of sacrifice (*yawm al-naḥr*).

The Conditions for the 'Umrah:

The conditions for the 'Umrah are essentially the same as mentioned in the case of the Ḥajj.

The Status of 'Umrah:

According to the Ḥanafī and Mālikī schools, the 'Umrah is not obligatory but a highly recommended *sunnah* (*sunnah mu'akkadah*). But according to the Shāfi'ī and Ḥanbalī schools and the majority of Imāmiyyah legists, it is obligatory (*wājib*) for one who is *mustaṭī'*, and desirable (*mustaḥabb*) for one who is not *mustaṭī'*. In support, they cite the Quranic verse: *وَأَتِمُّوا الْحَجَّ وَالْعُمْرَةَ لِلَّهِ...* (Perform the Ḥajj and the 'Umrah for Allah).¹⁷ (*Fiqh al-Sunnah*, vol. V; *al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*; *al-Jawāhir*; *al-Mughnī*)¹⁸

The Acts of the 'Umrah:

According to *al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*, whatever is *wājib* or *sunnah* for the Ḥajj is also *wājib* and *sunnah* for the 'Umrah. But the 'Umrah does differ from the Ḥajj in certain respects: there is no specific time for performing the 'Umrah; it does not involve the halt

(*wuqūf*) in the plain of 'Arafāt; neither the departure thenceforth to al-Muzdalifah; nor the *ramy al-jamarāt*.¹⁹ The Imāmiyyah book *al-Jawāhir* mentions that: "The obligatory acts (*af'āl* or *a'māl*) of the Ḥajj are twelve: *iḥrām*; the *wuqūf* at 'Arafāt; the *wuqūf* at al-Mash'ar al-Ḥarām; the entry into Minā; the *ramy*; the *dhibḥ* (sacrifice); its related *taqṣīr* or *ḥalq*; the *ṭawāf* (the sevenfold circumambulation of the Ka'bah), and its related *raka'āt* (units of the length of prayers); the *sa'y*; the *ṭawāf al-nisā'*, and its related *raka'āt*. The obligatory acts of *al-'Umrat al-mufradah* are eight: *niyyah* (intention); *iḥrām*²⁰; *ṭawāf*; its related *raka'āt*; the *sa'y*; the *taqṣīr*; the *ṭawāf al-nisā'*; and its related *raka'āt*."

This indicates that all the legal schools agree that the acts of the Ḥajj exceed those of the 'Umrah by the acts associated with the *wuqūf*. Moreover, the Imāmiyyah school considers it obligatory for the performer of the *al-'Umrat al-mufradah* to perform a second *ṭawāf*, the *ṭawāf al-nisā'*. Similarly the Mālikī school differs from others in considering *ḥalq* or *taqṣīr* as non-obligatory for *al-'Umrat al-mufradah*.

Two Subsidiary Issues:

1. The obligation (*wujūb*) of *al-'Umrat al-mufradah* is not connected with the *istiṭā'ah* for the Ḥajj. If, supposedly, it is possible for a person to go to Mecca at a time other than that of the Ḥajj and not possible at the time of the Ḥajj, then the 'Umrah instead of the Ḥajj becomes obligatory for him. If he dies without performing it, its expense is taken out from his heritage.²¹

Similarly, if one has *istiṭā'ah* for *Ḥajj al-'ifrād* instead of the 'Umrah, it becomes obligatory upon him; because each of them is independent of the other. This applies to *al-'Umrat al-mufradah*. As to 'Umrat *al-tamattu'*, which shall be explained later, its *wujūb* depends upon that of the Ḥajj, since it is a part of it.

2. According to the Imāmiyyah, it is not permissible for one intending to enter the Holy Mecca to cross the *mīqāt* or enter its *ḥaram* (sacred precincts) without getting into the state of *iḥrām*, even if he has performed the Ḥajj and the 'Umrah many times before. Only when the exit and entry recur several times during a month, or when after entering the city as a *muḥrim* he goes out and re-enters for a second time in less than thirty days, it is not obligatory. Therefore, *iḥrām* with respect to entry into Mecca is comparable to the *wuḍū'* before touching the Holy Quran. This clearly demonstrates the baselessness of the lie that the Shī'ah do not consider al-Bayt al-Ḥarām as sacred, and that they pretend to perform the Ḥajj for the sake of polluting the holy sanctuaries. (!)

According to Abū Ḥanīfah, it is not permissible to go beyond the *mīqāt* and enter the *ḥaram* without *iḥrām*, but entry into the remaining

area is permissible without *iḥrām*. Mālik does not agree with this, and two opinions are ascribed to al-Shāfi‘ī on the matter.

This much of discussion about the ‘Umrah is sufficient for throwing light upon it, so that the reader may grasp its difference with the Ḥajj, though only in some aspects. What we shall say later will offer further clarification.

The Forms of the Ḥajj:

All the five legal schools agree that there are three kinds of Ḥajj: *tamattu‘*, *qirān*, and *ifrād*. They also agree that by *Ḥajj al-tamattu‘* is meant performance of the acts of the ‘Umrah during the months of the Ḥajj. The acts of the Ḥajj itself are performed after getting through the ‘Umrah. They also agree that by *Ḥajj al-‘ifrād* is meant performing the Ḥajj first and then, after getting through the acts of the Ḥajj, getting into the state of *iḥrām* for performing the ‘Umrah and its related acts. The four Sunnī legal schools agree that the meaning of the *Ḥajj al-qirān* is to get into *iḥrām* for the Ḥajj and the ‘Umrah together. Then the *talbiyah* uttered by the pilgrim is: لَبَّيْكَ اللَّهُمَّ بِحَجٍّ وَعُمْرَةٍ

According to the Imāmiyyah school, the *Ḥajj al-qirān* and *Ḥajj al-‘ifrād* are one and the same. There is no difference between them except when the pilgrim performing the *Ḥajj al-qirān* brings the *hady* at the time of assuming the *iḥrām*. Then it is obligatory upon him to offer what he has brought. But one who performs the *Ḥajj al-‘ifrād* has essentially no obligation to offer the *hady*. In brief, the Imāmiyyah do not consider it permissible to interchange two different *iḥrām*'s,²² or to perform the Ḥajj and the ‘Umrah with a single *niyyah* (intention) under any condition; but the other legal schools permit it in *Ḥajj al-qirān*. They say that it has been named ‘*al-qirān*’ because it involves union between the Ḥajj and the ‘Umrah. But the Imāmiyyah say that it is because of the additional feature of the *hady* accompanying the pilgrim at the time of *iḥrām*.²³

According to the four Sunnī legal schools, it is permissible for the pilgrim, Meccan or non-Meccan, to choose from any of the three forms of the Ḥajj: *al-tamattu‘*, *al-qirān*, or *al-‘ifrād*, without involving any *karāhah* (reprehensibility). Only Abū Ḥanīfah considers *Ḥajj al-tamattu‘* and *Ḥajj al-qirān* as *makrūh* for the Meccan. The four Sunnī legal schools also differ as to which of the three kinds of Ḥajj is superior to the others. The best according to the Shāfi‘ī school is *al-‘ifrād*, and *al-tamattu‘* is superior to *al-qirān*. According to the Ḥanafī school, *al-qirān* has greater merit than the other two. The best according to the Mālikī school is *al-‘ifrād*, and according to the Ḥanbalī and Imāmiyyah schools is *al-tamattu‘*.

According to the Imāmiyyah school, *Ḥajj al-tamattu‘* is obligatory

upon one living at a distance of over forty-eight miles from Mecca, and he may not choose any other kind except in emergency. The *Hajj al-qirān* and *Hajj al-'ifrād* are performable by the people of Mecca and those living around it within a distance of forty-eight miles, and it is not permissible for them to perform except one of these two kinds. The Imāmiyyah base their argument on this verse of the Quran:

.... فَمَنْ تَمَتَّعَ بِالْعُمْرَةِ إِلَى الْحَجِّ فَمَا اسْتَيْسَرَ مِنَ الْهَدْيِ فَمَنْ لَمْ يَجِدْ فَصِيَامُ ثَلَاثَةِ أَيَّامٍ فِي الْحَجِّ وَسَبْعَةٍ إِذَا رَجَعْتُمْ تِلْكَ عَشْرَةٌ كَامِلَةٌ ذَلِكَ لِمَنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ أَهْلَهُ حَاضِرِي الْمَسْجِدِ الْحَرَامِ...

Moreover, according to the Imāmiyyah school, it is not permissible for one obliged to perform the *Hajj al-tamattu'* to change over to something else, except for the problem of shortage of time available, or, in the case of women, due to impending menses. In those cases it is permissible to change either to *al-qirān* or *al-'ifrād* on condition that the 'Umrah is performed after the Hajj. The limit of the shortage of time is failure to be present at the *wuqūf* in 'Arafāt until noon.

For one whose duty is *al-qirān* or *al-'ifrād*, such as the natives of Mecca or those from its surrounding region, it is not permissible to change to *al-tamattu'*, except in exigency (such as the fear of impending menses). After explaining this position of the Imāmiyyah school, the author of *al-Jawāhir* says, "I have not come across any different opinion on this matter."

And all the five legal schools agree that the *hady* is not compulsory for one performing *Hajj al-'ifrād*, though better if performed voluntarily.

to be continued—'in shā' Allāh

NOTES:

1. '*Ihrām*' is the state of pilgrim sanctity, which a pilgrim of Hajj or 'Umrah assumes on reaching *miqāt* (see note No.2). A pilgrim in the state of *ihrām* is called '*muḥrim*'. (Tr)

2. *Miqāt* (pl. *mawāqit*) refers to a number of stations outside Mecca from where the pilgrims intending Hajj or 'Umrah assume *ihrām*. They are:(1) Dhū al-Hulayfah (specifically, Masjid al-Shajarah); (2) Yalamlam; (3) Qarn al-Manāzil; (4) al-Juhfah; (5) three points situated in the valley of al-'Aqīq: al-Maslakh, al-Ghamrah, and Dhāt al-'Irq. Those pilgrims whose houses are nearer to Mecca than to any of the above *mawāqit*, assume *ihrām* from their houses.(Tr.)

3. The *talbiyah* is *wājib* according to the Imāmiyyah, Hanafī, and Mālikī schools, and *mustahabb* according to the Hanbalī's. Its time is the moment of beginning of *ihrām*.

4. The area roughly within a radius of six miles, with the Holy Ka'bah at the

centre, is called 'ḥaram', the sacred and inviolable territory of the sanctuary of the Holy Ka'bah. See the brief discussion under the subheading; "The Limits of the Harams of Mecca and al-Madīnah" in the present article. (Tr.)

5. According to the Imāmiyyah school, *Ḥajj al-tamattu'* is obligatory for non-Meccans, and Meccans may choose between *Ḥajj al-qirān* and *Ḥajj al-'ifrād*. According to the four Sunnī schools, there is no difference between a Meccan and a non-Meccan with regard to choice of any particular kind of Ḥajj, except that according to the Ḥanafī school *Ḥajj al-tamattu'* and *Ḥajj al-qirān* are *makrūh* for the Meccan.

6. The *ṭawāf* of the first entry or the arrival (called *ṭawāf al-quḍūm*) is *mustahabb* from the viewpoint of all except the Mālikī school, which regards it as obligatory.

7. According to the Imāmiyyah school, one is free to choose between *ḥalq* and *taqṣīr* if on 'Umrah *mufradah*. But a pilgrim on *Ḥajj al-tamattu'* is required to perform *taqṣīr*. Also according to the Imāmiyyah, it is obligatory for one on 'Umrah *mufradah* to perform, after the *ḥalq* or *taqṣīr*, a second *ṭawāf*, the *ṭawāf al-nisā'*, before which sexual intimacy is not permissible to the pilgrim. According to the four Sunnī schools, one is free to choose between *ḥalq* and *taqṣīr* in both. They do not require the pilgrim of Ḥajj or 'Umrah to perform *ṭawāf al-nisā'*, and according to the Mālikī school *ḥalq* or *taqṣīr* is not obligatory on one performing 'Umrah *mufradah*.

8. According to the Imāmiyyah school, the *mutamatti'* (pilgrim on *Ḥajj al-tamattu'* and its conjugate 'Umrah) acquires *taḥlīl* (i.e. relief from *iḥrām*) after *taqṣīr*, even when he brings along with him the sacrificial animal (*hady*). But according to the other schools, the *mutamatti'* who assumes *iḥrām* for 'Umrah from the *miqāt* obtains *taḥlīl* on *ḥalq* or *taqṣīr* when not accompanied by *hady*; but if he has brought along with him the *hady*, he remains in the state of *iḥrām*. However, according to them, the pilgrim of 'Umrah *mufradah* obtains *taḥlīl* regardless of whether the *hady* accompanies him or not. The author of *al-Mughni*, after making the above statement, says, "I have not come across a contrary opinion on this matter."

9. According to the Imāmiyyah school, the halt in 'Arafāt is obligatory for the entire period of time. But according to the other schools, a moment of halt is sufficient. All the legal schools are in agreement that offering the *zuhr* (noon) and 'aṣr (afternoon) prayers immediately after one another is *mustahabb*, because the Prophet (S) had done so.

10. The Qur'ān, 3:97.

11. Although the times have tended to support this opinion, and even though the traditions in favour of immediacy (*al-fawr*) of the duty of Ḥajj are open to criticism and controversy, but it leads towards negligence, and gradually towards abandonment of this sacred rite. Accordingly, the stress on immediacy is preferable, being more conducive from the viewpoint of the necessity to preserve the vitality of the Islamic faith.

12. *Maḥram* is a male relation with whom marriage is not permissible; viz; father, grandfathers, sons, grandsons, brothers, sons and grandsons of one's sister or brother, etc.

13. The Imāmiyyah, Shāfi'i, and Mālikī schools permit hiring another person to perform the Ḥajj for a fee. The Ḥanafī and Ḥanbalī schools do not consider it permissible. Nothing more than the expenses of journey, food and lodging may be given to the hired, they say.

14. The Qur'ān, 22:78.

15. One who has not performed the Ḥajj before is called *ṣarūrah*. According

to the Shāfi'i and Ḥanbalī schools, if one who has not performed the Ḥajj before, undertakes it on behalf of another, the Ḥajj performed is considered his own. But according to the Mālikī, Ḥanafī, and Imāmiyyah schools, the Ḥajj performed depends on his intention (*niyyah*).

16. The minimum distance required for *qaṣr* in *zuhr*, '*aṣr* and '*ishā*' prayers is 8 parasangs (approximately 44 kms. or 27.5 miles). (Tr.)

17. The Qur'ān; 2: 196.

18. According to *al-Mughni*, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal did not consider the 'Umrah as being obligatory for Meccans, for the reason that the most important act of the 'Umrah is *ṭawāf* (circumambulation of the Ka'bah) which they do and it suffices them.

19. In the book *al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*, it is the author's wont to give the text followed by a commentary and notes. In the text, he states the points of consensus of all the four Sunni schools, the different position of each is given in the commentary. What we have quoted here is taken from the text, not from the commentary.

20. According to *al-Dīn wa al-Ḥajj 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*, by Karrārah, one of the things which distinguishes the 'Umrah from the Ḥajj is that its *iḥrām* is not assumed from any of the *mawāqīt* specified for the Ḥajj. From the Imāmiyyah viewpoint, there is no difference between the *mīqāt* for one performing 'Umrah and the *mīqāt* for one on Ḥajj with regard to *iḥrām*.

21. The Imāmiyyah author of *al-Madārik* says: "The better known and sounder of opinions is that the obligation of 'Umrah is independent of the obligation of Ḥajj." The author of *al-Jawāhir* states, "The statements of fuqahā' are not free of confusion... the one which appears sounder is that those who live far away from Mecca are relieved of the obligation of 'Umrah *mufradah*, and that which is obligatory upon them is 'Umrat *al-tamattu'*, whose *wujūb* is related to that of Ḥajj.

22. According to *al-Jawāhir*, *al-Madārik*, *al-Ḥadā'iq* and other Imāmiyyah works on fiqh, it is not permissible for one already in the state of *iḥrām* to assume *iḥrām* for another purpose, until he completes all the acts of the rite (Ḥajj or 'Umrah) for which he had assumed *iḥrām*.

23. Ibn 'Aqīl is alone among Imāmiyyah legists in agreeing with the Sunni legists in that the acts of both the Ḥajj and the 'Umrah may be performed with a single *iḥrām* in *Ḥajj al-qirān*.

Foreign Policy of an Islamic State in the Light of the Qur'ān*

by Ibrāhīm Amīnī

Before entering into discussion on the subject, I would like to refer to two points. The first relates to our conviction that Islam is concerned with politics and has laid down the principles of establishing a State and governmental institutions and has legislated rules and laws pertaining to social life. Of course, this is already an accepted fact, and here we cannot substantiate it in detail. The second point: Islamic government is based on a particular ideology and faith and is aimed to attain certain objectives made obligatory by God. The legitimate Islamic ruler and all officers of such a State are not free to choose and pursue any line in internal and external policy according to their convenience. They have to follow the rules laid down in the revelation and have to work in that framework. In other words, firstly, they have to learn what Islam expects from them, and then they should translate the Islamic teachings into action for attaining the Divine objectives. At this stage they make use of the guide-lines of the Shari'ah. It is also to be kept in mind that they do not enjoy absolute freedom in reaching the desired targets; they should not violate, in any way, the Shari'ah. For instance, in the sphere of external policy, at the very outset it is to be ascertained if we have some responsibility towards the peoples of all countries, and whether Islam demands from

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us something in this respect. Whether, as an Islamic Republic, we have Islamic interests in and commitments towards all other countries. If so, what should be our target? We should be aware of our aim in having relations with other countries, so that we may know whether to maintain relations with a particular country or not. Keeping these points in view, we have to discuss some relevant issues and then arrive at the main subject.

The Universality of Islam:

The Prophet (S) of Islam was sent for all peoples of the world, and his Shari'ah was universal. It was not meant for a particular race or nation or any specific linguistic or regional group. The Quran declares:

قُلْ يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ إِنِّي رَسُولُ اللَّهِ إِلَيْكُمْ جَمِيعاً الَّذِي لَهُ مُلْكُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ يُحْيِي وَيُمِيتُ فَأَمِنُوا بِاللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ النَّبِيِّ الْأُمِّيِّ الَّذِي يُؤْمِنُ بِاللَّهِ وَكَلِمَاتِهِ وَاتَّبِعُوهُ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَهْتَدُونَ *

Say: 'O people! Surely I am the Apostle of Allah to you all, of Him Whose is the kingdom of heavens and the earth; there is no god but He; He brings to life and causes to die; therefore, believe in Allah and His Apostle, the ummi prophet who believes in Allah and His words, and follow him so that you may walk on the right path.' (7:158)

وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَاكَ إِلَّا كَافَّةً لِّلنَّاسِ بَشِيرًا وَنَذِيرًا وَلَكِنَّ أَكْثَرَ النَّاسِ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ *

And We have not sent you but to all men, as a bearer of good news and as a warner, but most men do not know. (34:28)

These two verses clearly state that the Prophet (S) was sent to guide the whole humanity and was designated as a bearer of good tidings (*bashir*) and as a warner (*nadhir*) as well. In some verses, it is said that Islam is a *Din* for the whole world, and shall ultimately prevail over all other religions. The Quran declares:

هُوَ الَّذِي أَرْسَلَ رَسُولَهُ بِالْهُدَىٰ وَدِينِ الْحَقِّ لِيُظْهِرَهُ عَلَى الدِّينِ كُلِّهِ وَلَوْ كَرِهَ الْمُشْرِكُونَ *

He it is who sent His Apostle with guidance and the religion of the Truth, that He may cause it to prevail over all religions, though the polytheists may be averse. (9:33)

And it further says:

هُوَ الَّذِي أَرْسَلَ رَسُولَهُ بِالْهُدَىٰ وَدِينِ الْحَقِّ لِيُظْهِرَهُ عَلَى الدِّينِ كُلِّهِ وَكَفَىٰ بِاللَّهِ

شَهِيدًا *

He it is who sent His Apostle with the guidance and the religion of the Truth that He may make it prevail over all the religions; and Allah is enough for a witness. (48:28)

In some verses God promised to ultimately entrust the believers with the job of ruling the earth and that power would fall into the hands of Islam. The Quran makes this promise in these words:

وَعَدَ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنكُمْ وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ لَيَسْتَخْلِفَنَّهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ كَمَا اسْتَخْلَفَ الَّذِينَ مِن قَبْلِهِمْ وَلَيُمَكِّنَنَّ لَهُمْ دِينَهُمُ الَّذِي ارْتَضَىٰ لَهُمْ وَلَيُبَدِّلَنَّهُم مِّن بَعْدِ خَوْفِهِمْ أَمْنًا يَعْبُدُونَنِي لَا يُشْرِكُونَ بِي شَيْئًا وَمَن كَفَرَ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ فَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْفَاسِقُونَ *

Allah has promised those of you who believe and do good that He will most certainly make them rulers in the earth, as He made rulers those before them, and that He will most certainly establish for them their religion which He has chosen for them, and that He will most certainly, after their fear, give them security in exchange. They shall serve Me, not associating anything with Me; and whoever is ungrateful after this—those are the transgressors. (24:55)

It is again asserted:

وَنُرِيدُ أَنْ نَمُنَّ عَلَى الَّذِينَ اسْتُضِعُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَنَجْعَلَهُمْ أَئِمَّةً وَنَجْعَلَهُمُ الْوَارِثِينَ *

And We desire to favour those who were oppressed in the earth, and to make them the imams, and to make them the heirs. (28:5)

These verses indicate that a bright future awaits the true believers and the righteous, who would rule the world, and Islam would be the ruling force. The believers would be free of fear in the matter of worship and polytheism would be uprooted completely.

Dissemination of Islamic Teachings:

Of course, Islam did not and cannot spread on its own, it requires effective propagation and armed struggle (*jihād*). This responsibility was entrusted to the Prophet (S) and he strived to fulfil it to his best. God, in the Quran, says:

أَدْخِ إِلَى سَبِيلِ رَبِّكَ بِالْحِكْمَةِ وَالْمَوْعِظَةِ الْحَسَنَةِ وَجَادِلْهُمْ بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ...

Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and goodly exhortation, and debate with them in the best manner.... (16:125)

فَلِذَلِكَ فَادِّعْ وَاسْتَقِمْ كَمَا أُمِرْتَ وَلَا تَتَّبِعْ أَهْوَاءَهُمْ...

To this (the Islamic message) then go on inviting, and be as steadfast as you were commanded, and do not follow their caprices.... (42:15)

According to these verses, the Prophet (S) is asked to invite people to embrace Islam with wise and appropriate methods of persuasion. Even in polemical debates he is advised to observe the best manners. In fulfilling this great responsibility he should be firm and not yield to the people's desires. The Quran says:

يَا أَيُّهَا الرَّسُولُ بَلِّغْ مَا أُنزِلَ إِلَيْكَ مِنْ رَبِّكَ وَإِنْ لَمْ تَفْعَلْ فَمَا بَلَّغْتَ رِسَالَتَهُ وَاللَّهُ يَعْصِمُكَ

مِنَ النَّاسِ...

O Apostle, deliver what has been revealed to you from your Lord; and if you do it not, then you have not delivered His message, and Allah will protect you from the people.... (5:67)

يَا أَيُّهَا الْمُدَّثِّرُ * قُمْ فَأَنْذِرْ * وَرَبِّكَ فَكَبِّرْ * وَيَسَابِكْ فَطَهِّرْ * وَالرُّجْزَ فَاهْجُرْ *

O thou shrouded (in thy mantle), arise, and warn. Thy Lord magnify, thy robes purify. And defilement shun. (74:1-5)

وَلَا يَصُدُّكَ عَنْ آيَاتِ اللَّهِ بَعْدَ إِذْ أُنزِلَتْ إِلَيْكَ وَادِّعْ إِلَى رَبِّكَ وَلَا تَكُونَنَّ مِنَ

الْمُشْرِكِينَ *

And let them not turn you aside from communicating the signs of Allah revealed to you. And invite [the people] to your Lord and be not of the polytheists. (28:87)

These verses impel the Prophet (S) to communicate the Words of God without any fear, as God will protect him. A glance into the books of history and biographies of the Prophet (S) (*Sirah*) reveals what endeavours the Prophet (S) undertook in propagating Islam and guiding the people and fighting the polytheists and idol worshippers for the sake of spreading the belief in Unity of God (*tawhīd*). On every opportunity he addressed the people, individually and collectively, and invited them to Islam with the force of his argument and exhortation.

Occasionally he visited cities and towns with this purpose. He sent some of his Companions to recite the Quran to the people and to guide them properly. He wrote letters to the rulers of many countries and invited them to embrace Islam.¹ It was through preaching and invitation that Islam gradually spread. Not only the Prophet (S) was made responsible for spreading and propagating Islam, but also all the believers were held responsible for the propagation of its message and teachings. God says in the Quran:

قُلْ هَذِهِ سَبِيلِي أَدْعُو إِلَى اللَّهِ عَلَى بَصِيرَةٍ أَنَا وَمَنِ اتَّبَعَنِي وَسُبْحَانَ اللَّهِ وَمَا أَنَا مِنَ
الْمُشْرِكِينَ *

Say: 'This is my way; I call to Allah with sure knowledge, I and those who follow me. To Allah be glory! And I am not one of the polytheists. (12:108)

It is emphasized in this verse that the followers of the Prophet (S) would continue his mission, irrespective of the fact that they belong to the age of the Prophet (S) or any later age. The committed Muslims in the course of performing this Divine mission had to suffer all kinds of hardships; they were tortured, imprisoned and even assassinated, but never gave up. Without such effort of Muslims, Islam would not have emerged victorious.

Inviting to Good, a Public Duty:

As a matter of principle the Quran makes it obligatory for all Muslims to command people to act rightly and enjoin what is sanctioned by God (*al-'amr bi al-ma'rūf*) and to forbid them from evil (*al-nahy 'an al-munkar*).

وَلْتَكُنْ مِنْكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى الْخَيْرِ وَيَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ
الْمُفْلِحُونَ *

And from among you there should be a party who commands to do good and enjoins what is right and forbids the wrong, and they are the successful. (3:104)

كُنْتُمْ خَيْرَ أُمَّةٍ أُخْرِجَتْ لِلنَّاسِ تَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَتَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَتُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَلَوْ
أَمَّنَ أَهْلُ الْكِتَابِ لَكَانَ خَيْرًا لَهُمْ مِنْهُمُ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ وَأَكْثَرُهُمُ الْفَاسِقُونَ *

You are the best of communities raised up for mankind; you enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong and believe in Allah. And if the People of the Book had believed, it would have been better for them; of them are believers

and most of them are evil-doers. (3:110)

The propagation of Islam is an essential part of the Divine duty of 'commanding to do good and forbidding evil' (*al-'amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar*).

Propagation of Islam: A Duty of the Islamic Government:

It is one of the duties of Muslims to propagate the faith in Unity of God (*tawhīd*) and to fight against infidelity, idolatry, and materialism. Every country where an Islamic government is in power is obliged to endeavour in this regard and to strive in every possible way to spread the Islamic message in other countries. It is the duty of the Islamic government to give top priority to the programme of Islamic propagation through radio, television, journals, and newspapers, and to utilize all the means of mass communication for this purpose. Distribution of Islamic books and cultural and academic exchange programmes along with other means of propagation are also useful in this respect. An Islamic government cannot afford laxity with regard to this important obligation; it has to include such programmes in its foreign policy.

Crusade against Oppression and Exploitation:

The second duty made obligatory for Muslims is waging war against all forms of oppression, exploitation, and corruption, defending the deprived and the oppressed, and establishing social justice. The Quran says:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ لِلَّهِ شُهَدَاءَ بِالْقِسْطِ وَلَا يَجْرِمَنَّكُمْ شَنَا نُ قَوْمٍ عَلَىٰ آلَا
تَعْدِلُوا إَعْدِلُوا هُوَ أَقْرَبُ لِلتَّقْوَىٰ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ خَبِيرٌ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ *

O believers, be you securers of justice, witnesses for God. And let not detestation for a people incite you to act inequitably; act equitably—that is nearer to God-fearing. And fear God; surely God is aware of what you do. (5:8)

لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ
وَأَنْزَلْنَا الْحَدِيدَ فِيهِ بَأْسٌ شَدِيدٌ وَمَنْفَعٌ لِلنَّاسِ وَلِيَعْلَمَ اللَّهُ مَنْ يَنْصُرُهُ وَرَسُولَهُ بِالْغَيْبِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ قَوِيٌّ
عَزِيزٌ *

Certainly We sent Our messengers with clear signs and sent down with them

the Book and the Balance that men may conduct themselves with justice; and We have made the iron, wherein is great strength and advantage for men, and that Allah may know who helps Him and His apostles in the secret; surely Allah is Strong, Mighty. (57:25)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ بِالْقِسْطِ شُهَدَاءَ لِلَّهِ وَلَوْ عَلَىٰ أَنفُسِكُمْ وَأَوَالِدِكُمْ
وَالْأَقْرَبِينَ إِنْ يَكُنْ غَنِيًّا أَوْ فَقِيرًا فَاللَّهُ أَوْلَىٰ بِهِمَا فَلَا تَتَّبِعُوا الْهَوَىٰ أَنْ تَعْدِلُوا وَإِنْ تَلَوْا أَوْ تُعْرِضُوا
فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ خَبِيرًا *

O believers, be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness for God's sake, even though it be against yourselves, or [your] parents or kinsfolk, whether the man be rich or poor; God is over and above them [in preference]. Therefore don't follow [your] base desires, lest you deviate, and if you swerve or turn aside, then surely God is aware of what you do. (4:135)

The believers are required to see that equity and justice are established and that they are not afraid of any power in this matter. One of the aims of the prophets has been to enforce social justice, and in the course of attaining this objective they even took up arms. Muslims are responsible for the defence of the deprived, the wronged, and the oppressed of the world at every cost, and if, in the extreme cases, there is no other way except war, they ought to fight valiantly. God declares in the Quran:

وَمَا لَكُمْ لَا تُقَاتِلُونَ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ وَالْمُسْتَضْعَفِينَ مِنَ الرِّجَالِ وَالنِّسَاءِ وَالْوِلْدَانِ الَّذِينَ
يَقُولُونَ رَبَّنَا أَخْرِجْنَا مِنْ هَذِهِ الْقَرْيَةِ الظَّالِمِ أَهْلُهَا وَاجْعَلْ لَنَا مِّنْ لَّدُنكَ وَلِيًّا وَاجْعَلْ لَنَا مِّنْ
لَّدُنكَ نَصِيرًا *

And what reason have you that you should not fight in the way of Allah and of the weak among the men and the women and the children, who say: 'Our Lord, bring us forth from this city, whose people are oppressors, and appoint to us from Thee a guardian, and appoint to us from Thee a helper'? (4:75)

الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا يُقَاتِلُونَ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ وَالَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا يُقَاتِلُونَ فِي سَبِيلِ الطَّاغُوتِ فَقَاتِلُوا أَوْلِيَاءَ
الشَّيْطَانِ إِنَّ كَيْدَ الشَّيْطَانِ كَانَ ضَعِيفًا *

Those who believe fight in the way of Allah, and those who disbelieve fight in the way of Tāghūt. Fight you therefore against the friends of Satan; surely the guile of Satan is ever feeble. (4:76)

According to this verse, holy war (*jihād*) for the sake of the oppressed is regarded as a commendable human virtue, and this view is

affirmed by those who are socially aware. Waging war for the sake of God is one of the symptoms of faith (*īmān*) and struggle in the way of the evil forces (*ṭāghūt*) is indicative of one's infidelity (*kufr*) to God. Again, the Quran says:

وَقَاتِلُوهُمْ حَتَّىٰ لَا تَكُونَ فِئْتَةٌ وَيَكُونَ الدِّينُ لِلَّهِ فَإِنِ انْتَهَوْا فَلَا عُدْوَانَ إِلَّا عَلَى الظَّالِمِينَ *

And fight them until fitnah (sedition, discord, persecution, corruption) is no more, and until the religion of God prevails. But if they desist, then let there be no hostility except against the oppressors. (2:193)

This verse, too, underlines the responsibility of Muslims towards the oppressed. They have to struggle and fight till persecution and corruption is eliminated from the face of the earth and the Divine law (*al-Dīn*) is established. Accordingly, Muslims cannot rest till evil is eradicated from the world. As you see the Quran has saddled Muslims with a heavy responsibility of fighting tyranny, corruption, exploitation, and colonialism, and defending the oppressed and the exploited, so that the rule of Divine justice is established. This Divine objective is to be attained by all the possible means: by educating and awakening the oppressed, by the way of exhortation, by exposing the evil designs of the oppressors and exploiters, by warning and overwhelming the transgressors, by diplomatic and political activities, by supporting all the freedom movements; and ultimately, if all attempts fail, one has to resort to war in case the necessary resources are at hand. It is the duty of every Muslim to struggle against all forms of tyranny and injustice, whether in their own country or in a foreign land, till they are totally destroyed. This Divine mission is to be kept in view while framing the foreign policy, and the best way of pursuing it, in accordance with specific conditions of different lands and times, should be adopted. But in any case it should be ensured that the main objective ever remains in sight. An Islamic government ought to function in such a manner that throughout the world it is identified as the staunch opponent of tyranny, arrogance, disbelief, and materialism, as the sincere defender of the deprived and the oppressed, as the standard bearer of Divine Unity and guidance, and as the vanguard of the forces enjoining the good and forbidding the evil. As an ummah entrusted with upholding justice, it has to provide leadership to all the movements struggling for independence in the world. It should set an example for the world of all the material and spiritual merits and human attainments.

Independence of the Ummah, its Relations with Non-Muslim Countries:

We propose to discuss a number of issues in this part of our discussion:

Islamic Unity:

Islam considers all Muslims as one ummah:

وَأَنَّ هَذِهِ أُمَّتُكُمْ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً وَأَنَا رَبُّكُمْ فَاتَّقُونِ*

And surely this ummah (community) of yours is one ummah, and I am your Lord, and be dutiful to Me. (23:52)

وَكَذَلِكَ جَعَلْنَاكُمْ أُمَّةً وَسَطًا لِتَكُونُوا شُهَدَاءَ عَلَى النَّاسِ وَيَكُونَ الرَّسُولُ عَلَيْكُمْ شَهِيدًا...

And thus We have made you a midmost nation that you may be the bearers of witness to the people, and that the Apostle may be a bearer of witness to you;.... (2:143)

The criterion of the unity of Muslims is nothing but faith and conviction, and they belong to nothing but Islam. Hence the differences related to racial, national, linguistic, regional, urban, and rural distinctions cannot and should not divide Muslims and alienate them from one another. Among Muslims a deep-rooted feeling of oneness exists that binds them together and they live like an integrated whole and foster brotherly feeling for one another. The Quran stresses this brotherly relationship in the following words:

إِنَّمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ إِخْوَةٌ فَأَصْلِحُوا بَيْنَ أَخَوَيْكُمْ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُرْحَمُونَ*

The believers are but brethren, therefore make peace between your brethren and be God-fearing that mercy may be showed to you. (49:10)

In Islam there are no multiple communities; there is only one ummah. They strive for one and the same goal. All Muslims are one ummah against their common enemy, i.e. the global pagan system.

Islam— a Perfect and Independent System:

Islam as an integrated system of religious, moral, political, social,

cultural and economic regulations is a perfect and comprehensive system, that has an independent culture which emanates from the source of revelation (*wahy*). It upholds a specific world-view with an emphasis on developing and perfecting human virtues and considers it to be the basis of all its programmes, and on this foundation constructs all the social structures and superstructures. Islam is a rich and independent culture which is essentially based on revelation. It was a result of assimilating this rich and independent culture that in the early period of Islam Muslims could make remarkably fast advancements in various spheres of civilization. This rich culture of Islam dawned in al-Hijāz and brought into existence, by revitalizing the human virtues and abilities, an ummah, small in number but immensely energetic and powerful in spirit. It gradually grew, spread and attracted various societies, peoples, and races towards itself. In a short time its light reached and engulfed the distant points of the earth. The vitalizing teachings of the Quran and its cultural independence generated and released light on such a scale that it illuminated each and every spot, penetrated the innermost depths of the soul and gave refuge to all men in its warm embrace. The rich and humanizing culture of Islam bestowed freedom and independence upon its followers to such an extent that they acted for a long time as the torch-bearers of civilization, knowledge, arts and sciences. A great number of the works of Muslims in the fields of arts and sciences are still alive and bear witness to this fact. In conceiving and executing its programmes Islam does not derive inspiration from any other school of thought, hence Muslims are not required to follow any other ideology. Therefore, a government can be called Islamic in case it endeavours to safeguard the independence of the Islamic Ummah, and if all its plans and programmes are derived from no other source except the school of Divine revelation. It organizes all its internal and external policies on the lines which ensure self-sufficiency of the Islamic Ummah, as a whole, in the spheres of science, industry, technology, economics, agriculture and military arms, and liberates it from the shackles of foreign alliances and dependence on alien powers. Such a policy demands independent thinking based on the Islamic ideology and a staunch resolution to implement this policy. All the planning of the Islamic government must be conceived in strict adherence to the Islamic teachings with a view to protecting and strengthening the independence of the Muslim Ummah. If a government fails to give foremost priority to these objectives in its internal and external policies, it does not deserve to be called 'Islamic' in any sense of the word.

The Quran and Exposure of the Enemies:

Islam has paid due attention to the independence of the Muslim Ummah, and for this very reason it has suggested certain measures to prevent any kind of alien interference in the internal affairs of an Islamic State on the part of the non-Muslims. The Quranic imperatives are categorical in this regard. In some of the Quranic verses the evil designs and targets of the plotting unbelievers are fully exposed, so that Muslims should not be deceived by their hypocritical attitude. They also suggest how this challenge should be met. A few relevant verses are quoted here:

مَا يَوَدُّ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا مِنْ أَهْلِ الْكِتَابِ وَلَا الْمُشْرِكِينَ أَنْ يُنَزَّلَ عَلَيْكُمْ مِنْ خَيْرٍ مِنْ رَبِّكُمْ
وَاللَّهُ يَخْتَصُّ بِرَحْمَتِهِ مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَاللَّهُ ذُو الْفَضْلِ الْعَظِيمِ *

The unbelievers of the People of the Book (the Jews and the Christians) and the idolaters do not like that any good should be sent down to you from your Lord, and God chooses especially whom He pleases for His mercy, and God is of bounty abounding. (2:105)

إِنْ تَمَسَسَكُمْ حَسَنَةٌ تَسُوهُمْ وَإِنْ تُصِبْكُمْ سَيِّئَةٌ يَفْرَحُوا بِهَا وَإِنْ تَصْبِرُوا وَتَتَّقُوا لَا يَضُرُّكُمْ
كَيْدُهُمْ شَيْئاً إِنَّ اللَّهَ بِمَا يَعْمَلُونَ مُحِيطٌ *

If you are visited with good fortune it vexes them, and if an evil afflicts you, they rejoice at it. Yet if you are patient and God-fearing, their evil designs will not harm you in any way; God encompasses the things they do. (3:120)

وَدَّ كَثِيرٌ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْكِتَابِ لَوْ يَرُدُّونَكُمْ مِنْ بَعْدِ إِيمَانِكُمْ كُفَّارًا حَسَدًا مِنْ عِنْدِ أَنْفُسِهِمْ
مَنْ بَعْدَ مَا تَبَيَّنَ لَهُمُ الْحَقُّ فَاعْفُوا وَاصْفَحُوا حَتَّى يَأْتِيَ اللَّهُ بِأَمْرِهِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ
قَدِيرٌ *

Many of the People of the Book wish that they might restore you as unbelievers, after you have believed, in the jealousy of their souls after the truth has become manifest to them; yet do you pardon and forgive, till God brings His command; truly God is powerful over everything. (2:109)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِنْ تُطِيعُوا فَرِيقًا مِنَ الَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْكِتَابَ يَرُدُّوكُمْ بَعْدَ إِيمَانِكُمْ
كَافِرِينَ *

O believers, if you obey a sect of those who have been given the Book, they will turn you after you have believed, into unbelievers. (3:100)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِن تَطِيعُوا الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا يَرُدُّوكُمْ عَلَىٰ أَعْقَابِكُمْ فَتَنْقَلِبُوا
خَاسِرِينَ * بَلِ اللَّهُ مَوْلَاكُمْ وَهُوَ خَيْرُ النَّاصِرِينَ *

O believers, if you obey the unbelievers they will turn you upon your heels, so that you turn back losers. No; but God is your Protector and He is the best of helpers. (3:149-150)

فِيمَا نَقَضُوا مِيثَاقَهُمْ لَعَنَّاهُمْ وَجَعَلْنَا قُلُوبَهُمْ قَاسِيَةً يُحَرِّفُونَ الْكَلِمَ عَن مَّوَاضِعِهِ
وَنَسُوا حَظًّا مِمَّا ذُكِّرُوا بِهِ وَلَا تَزَالُ تَطَّلِعُ عَلَىٰ خَائِنَةٍ مِنْهُمْ إِلَّا قَلِيلًا مِنْهُمْ فَاعْفُ عَنْهُمْ وَاصْفَحْ
إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُحْسِنِينَ *

So for their breaking their covenant We cursed them and made their hearts hard; they pervert words from their meanings; and they have forgotten a portion of what they were reminded of; and you shall always discover treachery in them excepting a few of them. Yet pardon them, and forgive; surely Allah loves the good-doers. (5:13)

وَلَنْ تَرْضَىٰ عَنْكَ الْيَهُودُ وَلَا النَّصَارَىٰ حَتَّىٰ تَتَّبِعَ مِلَّتَهُمْ قُلْ إِنْ هَدَىٰ اللَّهُ فَهُوَ الْهُدَىٰ
وَلَنْ اتَّبَعَتْ أَهْوَاءَهُمْ بَعْدَ الَّذِي جَاءَكَ مِنَ الْعِلْمِ مَا لَكَ مِنَ اللَّهِ مِن وَّلِيٍّ وَلَا نَصِيرٍ *

Never will the Jews be pleased with you, neither the Christians, not till you follow their religion. Say: "Surely God's guidance is the [only] true guidance." And if you follow their caprices after the knowledge that has come to you, you shall have against God neither protector nor helper. (2:120)

كَيْفَ وَإِن يَظْهَرُوا عَلَيْكُمْ لَا يَرْقُبُوا فِيكُمْ إِلَّا وَلَا ذِمَّةً يُرْضُونَكُمْ بِأَفْوَاهِهِمْ وَتَأْبَىٰ قُلُوبُهُمْ
وَكَثَرُهُمْ فَاسِقُونَ * إِشْتَرَوْا بِآيَاتِ اللَّهِ تَمَنَّا قَلِيلًا فَصَدُّوا عَن سَبِيلِهِ إِنَّهُمْ سَاءَ مَا كَانُوا
يَعْمَلُونَ * لَا يَرْقُبُونَ فِي مُؤْمِنٍ إِلَّا وَلَا ذِمَّةً وَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْمُعْتَدُونَ *

How can it be? If they get the better of you, they will not observe towards you any bond or treaty, giving you satisfaction with their mouths while their hearts do not consent; and most of them are transgressors. They have sold the signs of God for a small price, and have barred from His way; surely evil is that they have been doing, observing neither bond nor treaty towards a believer; they are the transgressors. (9:8-10)

هَٰ أَنتُمْ أَوْلَىٰ تُحِبُّونَهُمْ وَلَا يُحِبُّونَكُمْ وَتُؤْمِنُونَ بِالْكِتَابِ كُلِّهِ وَإِذَا لَقُوكُمْ قَالُوا آمَنَّا وَإِذَا
خَلَوْا عَصَوْا عَلَيْكُمْ الْآنَا مِلَ مِنَ الْغَيْظِ قُلْ مُؤْتُوا بَغِيظِكُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَلِيمٌ بِذَاتِ الصُّدُورِ *

Ha, there you are; you love them while they love you not; you believe in the

Book, all of it, and when they meet you they say, 'We believe,' and when they go privily, they bite at you their fingers. Say: 'Die in your rage,' surely God knows what is in the hearts. (3:119)

وَالَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ إِلَّا تَفْعَلُوهُ تَكُنْ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَفَسَادًا كَبِيرًا

As for the unbelievers, they are friends one of another. Unless you do this, there will be persecution in the earth and great corruption. (8:73)

These verses disclose the evil motives, secret designs, and the essential characteristics of the unbelievers, some of which are given below:

1. If any good fortune comes to you, the unbelievers and polytheists are unhappy, for they do not like to see you benefited from anything. They are happy if some misfortune befalls you.

2. The unbelievers nurture jealousy for you and wish to turn you back from your faith.

3. If you obey the unbelievers they would make you give up your faith.

4. The unbelievers are dishonest in dealings with you, and you ought to be always aware of their evil intentions.

5. The Jews and the Christians shall never accept you unless you embrace their faith.

6. Their pacts and covenants are unreliable. If they find means of subordinating you, they will violate all the treaties and compacts that they earlier signed with you.

7. The unbelievers shall never be friendly with you, even though you treat them as friends.

8. The unbelievers are united in friendship against you and shall cooperate with one another to inflict losses on you.

God, the Almighty, has warned Muslims of the malice, enmity, dishonesty, and subversive nature of the unbelievers so that Muslims may be conscious of the fact that they can never be trusted as friends and well-wishers. It is imperative to keep them at a distance and to strengthen your defences.

God places great emphasis on the defence of the freedom and independence of Islam against the dangers posed by the evil plots of its enemies. After enumerating some of the characteristics of the unbelievers and their evil objectives, God warns Muslims of the dangers of being friendly with them, placing reliance on them, and against surrendering their resources and powers to them. He warns them against following the unbelievers and thus directly or indirectly helping them in realizing their objectives. The Islamic State should not form friendly alliances with the unbelievers, nor are their covenants to be fully

trusted. Some Quranic verses in this context may be referred to:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَتَّخِذُوا بِيْطَانَةً مِّنْ دُونِكُمْ لَا يَأْتُونِكُمْ خَبَالًا وَّذُوَامَا عَنْتُمْ قَدْ بَدَتِ
الْبَغْضَاءُ مِنْ أَفْوَاهِهِمْ وَمَا تُخْفِي صُدُورُهُمْ أَكْبَرُ قَدْ بَيَّنَّا لَكُمُ الْآيَاتِ إِن كُنْتُمْ تَعْقِلُونَ *

O believers, take not for your intimates outside yourselves; such men spare nothing to ruin you; they yearn for you to suffer. Hatred has already shown itself of their mouths, and what their breasts conceal is yet greater. Indeed, We have made Our signs clear to you, if you understand them. (3:118)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَتَّخِذُوا الْيَهُودَ وَالنَّصَارَىٰ أَوْلِيَاءَ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ وَمَنْ
يَتَوَلَّهُمْ مِنْكُمْ فَإِنَّهُ مِنْهُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَهْدِي الْقَوْمَ الظَّالِمِينَ *

O believers, do not take the Jews and Christians for friends; they are friends of each other; and whoever amongst you takes them for a friend, he is one of them. Surely God does not guide the evildoers. (5:51)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَتَّخِذُوا الَّذِينَ اتَّخَذُوا دِينَكُمْ هُزُوًا وَلَعِبًا مِّنَ الَّذِينَ أُوتُوا
الْكِتَابَ مِن قَبْلِكُمْ وَالْكَافِرَ أَوْلِيَاءَ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ إِنَّ كُنْتُمْ مُّؤْمِنِينَ *

O believers, do not take for guardians those who take your religion for a mockery and a joke, from among those who were given the Book before you and the unbelievers; and fear God, if you are believers. (5:57)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَتَّخِذُوا عَدُوِّي وَعَدُوَّكُمْ أَوْلِيَاءَ تُلْقُونَ إِلَيْهِم بِالْمَوَدَّةِ وَقَدْ كَفَرُوا
بِمَآ جَاءَكُمْ مِنَ الْحَقِّ يُخْرِجُونَ الرَّسُولَ وَإِيَّاكُمْ أَنْ تَوْمِنُوا بِاللَّهِ رَبِّكُمْ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ حَرَجْتُمْ جِهَادًا
فِي سَبِيلِي وَابْتِغَاءَ مَرْضَاتِي تُسِرُّونَ إِلَيْهِم بِالْمَوَدَّةِ وَأَنَا أَعْلَمُ بِمَا أَخْفَيْتُمْ وَمَا أَعْلَنْتُمْ وَمَنْ يَفْعَلْهُ
مِنْكُمْ فَقَدْ ضَلَّ سَوَاءَ السَّبِيلِ *

O believers, do not take My enemy and your enemy for friends; would you offer them love while they deny what has come to you of the Truth, expelling the Apostle and yourselves because you believe in God, your Lord? If you go forth to struggle in My path and seek My good pleasure, would you show love for them in secret? And I know what you conceal and what you manifest, and whoever of you does this, he indeed has gone astray from the straight path. (60:1)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَتَّخِذُوا الْكَافِرِينَ أَوْلِيَاءَ مِن دُونِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ أُرِيدُونَ أَنْ تَجْعَلُوا
لِلَّهِ عَلَيْكُمْ سُلْطَانًا مُّبِينًا *

O believers, do not take the unbelievers for friends rather than the believers, do you desire that you should give to Allah a manifest proof against yourselves? (4:144)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَتَوَلَّوْا قَوْمًا غَضِبَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِمْ قَدْ يَتُوسُوا مِنَ الْآخِرَةِ كَمَا يَتَّسِرُ
الْكَفَّارِينَ أَصْحَابِ الْقُبُورِ*

O believers, do not make friends with a people with whom God is wroth; indeed they despair of the Hereafter as the unbelievers despair of those in graves. (60:13)

لَا يَتَّخِذِ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ الْكَافِرِينَ أَوْلِيَاءَ مِنْ دُونِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ وَمَنْ يَفْعَلْ ذَلِكَ فَلَيْسَ مِنَ اللَّهِ
فِي شَيْءٍ إِلَّا أَنْ تَتَّقُوا مِنْهُمْ تُقَةً وَيُحَذِّرْكُمْ اللَّهُ نَفْسَهُ وَإِلَى اللَّهِ الْمَصِيرُ*

Let not the believers take the unbelievers for friends rather than believers; for whoso does that belongs not to God in anything, unless you have a fear of them. God warns you that you beware of Him, and unto God is the eventual coming. (3:28)

In addition to the traits of the unbelievers enumerated earlier the following can also be inferred from the verses quoted above:

1. The unbelievers nurture malice towards the believers and do not spare anything for harming them in any possible way.
2. Their enmity of Muslims finds expression in what they say, but the intensity of their unexpressed enmity, hidden in their hearts, is far greater.
3. They can never accept your religion and they make fun of it.
4. They are enemies of Muslims and of God, and do not accept the Quranic teachings.

God, after warning us of the characteristics of the unbelievers, makes it explicit that they are not well-wishing friends of the believers and the believers should not consider them as their friends, guardians, and defenders, and should not reveal their secrets to them. They are untrustworthy and so are their pacts and promises. The Muslims should not allow them to plan on their behalf and to decide for them. They should not let the unbelievers take charge of their institutions and decide their policies and execute their programmes, and they should not let themselves be deceived by their apparently well-wishing but inwardly injurious suggestions. This point is repeatedly stressed, and finally it is declared that a Muslim who makes any pact of friendship and alliance with the unbelievers ceases to be one of the Islamic Ummah and the Party of God.

Friendship with unbelievers is considered even as a sign of

disbelief:

وَلَوْ كَانُوا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَالنَّبِيِّ وَمَا أُنزِلَ إِلَيْهِ مَا اتَّخَذُوهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءَ وَلَكِنَّ كَثِيرًا مِنْهُمْ

فَاسِقُونَ*

And had they believed in God and the Prophet (S) and what was revealed to him, they would not have taken them (the unbelievers) for friends, but most of them are transgressors. (5:81)

لَا تَجِدُ قَوْمًا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ يُوَادُّونَ مَنْ حَادَّ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ وَلَوْ كَانُوا آبَاءَهُمْ

أَوْ أَبْنَاءَهُمْ أَوْ إِخْوَانَهُمْ أَوْ عَشِيرَتَهُمْ.

You shall not find a people who believe in Allah and the Last Day befriending those who act in opposition to Allah and His Apostle, even though they were their [own] fathers, or their sons, or their brothers, or their kinsfolk. (58:22)

In these Quranic verses the basic guide-lines of an Islamic government's external policy in relation to the countries having no faith in God is clearly and explicitly laid down. Muslims are categorically commanded to guard and defend their independence and freedom, and not let the unbelievers to infiltrate and interfere in their internal affairs. Muslims are asked to be on guard against them. All relations and pacts which would ultimately lead to the increasing influence and domination of unbelievers over the affairs of Muslims are illegitimate and must be abstained from. The Quranic injunction in this regard is not only clear but also categorical:

...وَلَنْ يَجْعَلَ اللَّهُ لِلْكَافِرِينَ عَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِينَ سَبِيلًا*

... And Allah will by no means give the unbelievers a way against the believers [to dominate them]. (4:141)

Friendship with Unbelievers in Case of Emergency:

The Quran by forbidding allegiance to unbelievers aims at protecting independence of the Muslim Ummah. In accordance with this aim, if the interests of Islam and Muslims require, the Islamic government can establish friendly relations provisionally. For instance, if the Islamic government finds that it is unable to resist an infidel power, it can temporarily seek its friendship and conclude truce with it, in order to strengthen its position and defences. Similarly if the interests of Islam demand adopting a soft and liberal policy towards the

unbelievers with the purpose of propagating Islam among them and converting them to Islam, the Islamic State can have friendly relations with them. The Quran permits Muslims to have such relations with the unbelievers in special circumstances:

لَا يَتَّخِذِ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ الْكَافِرِينَ أَوْلِيَاءَ مِنْ دُونِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ وَمَنْ يَفْعَلْ ذَلِكَ فَلَيْسَ مِنَ اللَّهِ فِي شَيْءٍ إِلَّا أَنْ تَتَّقُوا مِنْهُمْ تُقَاةً وَيُحَذِّرُكُمُ اللَّهُ نَفْسَهُ وَاللَّهُ الْمَصِيرُ*

Let not the believers take the unbelievers for friends rather than believers; for whoso does that belongs not to God in anything, unless you have a fear of them. God warns you that you beware of Him, and unto God is the eventual coming. (3:28)

This verse forbids friendship with the unbelievers, but in exceptional circumstances dissimulation (*taqiyyah*) is permissible. The issue of dissimulation is confirmed by many authentic traditions. Of such reliable traditions is the one quoted by *Tafsir al-Sāfi*, under the commentary on the verse 3:28, from the book *al-'Ihtijāj*, that Amīr al-Mu'minīn 'Alī (A) said:

وَأَمَرَ أَنْ تَسْتَعْمِلَ التَّقِيَّةَ فِي دِينِكَ فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ يَقُولُ: وَإِيَّاكَ ثُمَّ إِيَّاكَ أَنْ تَتَعَرَّضَ لِلْهَلَاكِ، وَأَنْ تَتْرِكَ التَّقِيَّةَ الَّتِي أَمَرْتُكَ بِهَا فَإِنَّكَ شَائِطٌ بِدَمِكَ وَدِمَاءِ إِخْوَانِكَ، مُعَرَّضٌ لِزَوَالِ نِعْمِكَ وَنِعْمِهِمْ، مُذَلِّهُمُ فِي أَيْدِي أَعْدَاءِ دِينِ اللَّهِ وَقَدْ أَمَرَ اللَّهُ بِإِعْزَازِهِمْ.

God commanded you to observe *taqiyyah* so that you may follow this command in the matter of religion. God says: I commanded you to dissimulate, so do not give it up lest your life be endangered. Giving up this practice would result in shedding of your and your brothers' blood and in disappearance of your and their fortunes, and by violating the rule of dissimulation you will let your brothers be humiliated by the enemies of God's religion despite the fact that you are obliged to save their honour.²

Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (A) relates from Imam Muḥammad al-Bāqir (A) that,

قَالَ: كَانَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ (ص) يَقُولُ: لَا إِيمَانَ لِمَنْ لَا تَقِيَّةَ لَهُ، وَيَقُولُ: قَالَ اللَّهُ «إِلَّا أَنْ تَتَّقُوا مِنْهُمْ تُقَاةً».

... The Prophet (S) said that a man who does not dissimulate, has no faith (*īmān*), for God says, "... unless you have a fear of them...."³

Consider the following traditions:

قال الباقر(ع): التَّقِيَّةُ فِي كُلِّ شَيْءٍ يَضْطَرُّ إِلَيْهِ ابْنُ آدَمَ، فَقَدْ أَحَلَّهُ اللَّهُ لَهُ.

Imam Muḥammad al-Bāqir said: “Dissimulation is permissible in all the things in which a man is coerced. God has permitted it.”⁴

قال الحسن بن عليّ عليهما السلام: قال رسول الله (ص): إِنَّ الْأَنْبِيَاءَ إِنَّمَا فَضَّلَهُمُ اللَّهُ عَلَى خَلْقِهِ بِشِدَّةِ مُدَارَاتِهِمْ لِأَعْدَاءِ دِينِ اللَّهِ، وَحُسْنِ تَقِيَّتِهِمْ لِأَجْلِ إِخْوَانِهِمْ فِي اللَّهِ.

Al-Imām al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī (A) related from the Prophet (S) that he said, “God distinguished the prophets from other beings for they showed courtesy to enemies of God’s religion, and practised dissimulation for the sake of their brothers.”

قال الصادق عليه السلام في قول الله تعالى: «وَقُولُوا لِلنَّاسِ حُسْنًا» - أَي لِلنَّاسِ كُلِّهِمْ مُؤْمِنِهِمْ وَمُخَالَفِيهِمْ؛ أَمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ فَيَبْسُطُ لَهُمْ وَجْهَهُ، وَأَمَا الْمُخَالَفُونَ فَيَكْلِمُهُمْ بِالْمُدَارَاةِ لِاجْتِدَابِهِمْ إِلَى الْإِيمَانِ. فَإِنَّهُ بِأَيْسَرٍ مِنْ ذَلِكَ يَكْفُ شُرُورَهُمْ عَنْ نَفْسِهِ وَعَنْ إِخْوَانِهِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ. قَالَ الْإِمَامُ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: إِنَّ مُدَارَاةَ أَعْدَاءِ اللَّهِ مِنْ أَفْضَلِ صَدَقَةِ الْمَرْءِ عَلَى نَفْسِهِ وَإِخْوَانِهِ. كَانَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ فِي مَنْزِلِهِ إِذْ آسَأَذَنَ عَلَيْهِ عَبْدُ اللَّهِ بْنُ أَبِي سُؤْلٍ، فَقَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ: بِئْسَ أَخُو الْعَشِيرَةِ. إِذْ ذُتُوا لَهُ. فَلَمَّا دَخَلَ، أَجْلَسَهُ وَبَشَّرَ فِي وَجْهِهِ. فَلَمَّا خَرَجَ، قَالَتْ لَهُ عَائِشَةُ: يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ قُلْتَ فِيهِ مَا قُلْتَ وَفَعَلْتَ بِهِ مِنَ الْبَشْرِ مَا فَعَلْتَ، فَقَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ: يَا عُؤَيْشُ! يَا حُمَيْرَاءُ! إِنَّ شَرَّ النَّاسِ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ مَنْ يُكْرَمُ اتِّقَاءَ شَرِّهِ.

Imam Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq (A), referring to the Divine Utterance, “... And speak good to men....” (2:83), said, “[It means, speak kindly] to all people, whether believers or unbelievers; converse with the believers with warmth and cheer and with unbelievers with courtesy so that you attract them to the Islamic faith. Or at least you can protect yourself and your fellow believers from the harm that can be caused to you by the unbelievers.” The Imam said: “Showing courtesy to enemies of God is the best form of alms-giving as it saves you and your Muslim brothers from harm. Once the Prophet (S) was at his home, ‘Abd Allāh ibn Abī Sulūl came to see him. He said, ‘A bad one of his tribe. Let him come.’ Then he received him with courtesy and asked him to sit. When he departed, ‘Ā’ishah asked, ‘O Prophet (S) of God, after what you said about him, why did you show him so much courtesy?’ The Prophet (S) replied, ‘O ‘Uwaysh! O Ḥumayrā’! He would be regarded as the worst man on the Day of Judgement whom people pay respect due to the fear of his evil!”⁵

It is evident from the above-quoted Quranic verse and traditions that in case an Islamic government realizes that courtesy, benevolence and friendly relations with the unbelievers is the best policy for the existence and independence of the Muslim Ummah, they may provisionally adopt the policy of *taqiyyah*. Nevertheless the real objective, i.e. expansion, independence, and glory of Islam, should in no case be forgotten. It makes some adjustments only for protecting its position and power.

Pacts of Cooperation and Non-aggression with Unbelievers:

If unbelievers have no dishonest intentions of plotting and aggression against Muslims and are inclined to coexist with them in peace, an Islamic State, according to its diagnosis of the interests of Islam, can sign pacts of mutual coexistence with them. In the legitimate matters (permitted by the Shari'ah) that are beneficial for both the sides, they are permitted even to cooperate. The Quran says:

لَا يَنْهَى اللَّهُ عَنِ الدِّينِ لَمْ يُقَاتِلُوكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ وَلَمْ يُخْرِجُوكُمْ مِنْ دِيَارِكُمْ أَنْ تَبَرُّوهُمْ
وَتُقْسِطُوا إِلَيْهِمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُقْسِطِينَ * إِنَّمَا يَنْهَى اللَّهُ عَنِ الدِّينِ قَاتِلُوكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ
وَأَخْرَجُوكُمْ مِنْ دِيَارِكُمْ وَظَاهَرُوا عَلَىٰ إِخْرَاجِكُمْ أَنْ تَوَلَّوهُمْ وَمَنْ يَتَوَلَّهُمْ فَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ
الظَّالِمُونَ *

Allah does not forbid you respecting those who have not made war against you on account of [your] religion, and have not driven you forth from your homes, that you show them kindness and deal with them justly; surely Allah loves the doers of justice. Allah only forbids you respecting those who made war upon you on account of [your] religion, and drove you out from your homes and backed up [others] in your expulsion, that you make friends with them; and whoever makes friends with them, these are the unjust. (60:8-9)

Some of the verses of the Quran direct Muslims to make peace with the unbelievers in case they are inclined to accept peace:

وَإِنْ جَنَحُوا لِلسَّلْمِ فَاجْنَحْ لَهَا وَتَوَكَّلْ عَلَى اللَّهِ إِنَّهُ هُوَ السَّمِيعُ الْعَلِيمُ *

And if they incline to peace, then incline to it and trust in Allah; Surely He is the Hearing, the Knowing. (8:61)

The Quran bears witness to the concluding of the Prophet's pacts with the unbelievers:

إِلَّا الَّذِينَ عَاهَدْتُمْ مِنَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ ثُمَّ لَمْ يَنْقُصُوا شَيْئًا وَلَمْ يُظَاهِرُوا عَلَيْكُمْ أَحَدًا
فَاتِمُوا إِلَيْهِمْ عَهْدَهُمْ إِلَىٰ مُدَّتِهِمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُتَّقِينَ *

Except those of the idolaters with whom you made an agreement, then they have not failed in anything and have not backed up any one against you, so fulfil their agreement to the end of their term; surely Allah loves those who are God-fearing. (9:4)

If we refer to the history of Islam and the life of the Prophet (S), we see that during the period of his prophetic mission, he concluded treaties with the unbelievers and faithfully observed all the conditions agreed upon. A few instances may be referred to here:

A. The Pact with the Jews:

When the Prophet (S) migrated to al-Madinah, he concluded a treaty between the Jews and the Emigrants (*al-Muhājirūn*) and the Supporters (*al-'Anṣār*), whose text has been preserved in history. Some highlights of that treaty, relevant to our discussion, are given below:

(i) Every Jew who abides by this pact would benefit from our help and friendship and there would be no discrimination between him and Muslims, and nobody would be allowed to violate his rights and befriend his enemy.

(ii) At the time of war the Jews would be required to pay their share of the expenses incurred in war.

(iii) The Jews are free to act upon their faith, and Muslims upon their faith.

(iv) Anybody who declares war against any of the parties of this treaty would be fought against unitedly by both the Muslims and the Jews, and each of the allies would meet his part of the war expenditure.

(v) The Jews and Muslims declare to be committed to cooperate for the well-being and welfare of each other, but not in the matters of sin and evil.

(vi) The signatories of this treaty would defend al-Madinah unitedly.⁶

As we see the Prophet (S) made three kinds of pacts with the unbelievers in the light of this treaty:

- (1) A pact of mutual defence and sharing of the war expenditure.
- (2) Freedom of the performance of religious rites.
- (3) Mutual cooperation in matters of welfare and good deeds.

B. The Treaty of Hūdaybiyyah:

The highlights of the conditions of this truce, signed by the

Prophet (S) at a place called 'Hudaybiyyah', are as follows:

(i) The Muslims and the Quraysh are bound to cease all hostilities for a period of four (or ten) years, and would not attack each other.

(ii) They would respect each other's property and would not resort to cheating or theft.

(iii) Every Muslim arriving at Mecca with the purpose of the *Hajj* or *'Umrah*, or on his way to Yemen or Ṭā'if would be guaranteed safe passage and security by the Quraysh, and similarly every member of the Quraysh arriving at al-Madīnah on their way to Syria or the east would be guaranteed security.

(iv) Each of the two parties are free to conclude pact with any tribe they prefer, and this pact would be respected by the other party.

(v) The Muslims and the Quraysh promise to forget all malice, enmity, and grievance against each other and would not nurture in their hearts any feeling of betrayal.

(vi) Muḥammad (S) and his followers can enter Mecca to perform ceremonies of *Hajj* the year after, provided they do not have any kind of arms and their stay at Mecca does not exceed three days.⁷

C. The Treaty with Yūḥannā, the Governor of Aylah:

This assurance of security is made on behalf of God and His Prophet (S) in favour of Yūḥannā, son of Rubah, and the residents of Aylah. God and His Prophet (S) stand surety for the safety of their persons and their ships and their caravans on voyage by land or sea. Similarly the people from Syria, Yemen and Bahrain who pass through their land are promised security. The people of Aylah are bound to pay the *diyāh* (blood money) to the heirs of any person killed by them, and are bound not to prevent anybody from making use of the waters they take possession of, and would not prevent anybody from using the land and sea routes under their control.⁸

D. The Treaty with the Christians of Najrān:

(i) The residents of Najrān are bound to pay as taxes two thousand *ḥullah*'s (certain kind of garment) to the Muslims every year in two instalments.

(ii) The emissaries of Muḥammad (S) would be offered hospitality by them for one month or less, whereas the emissaries' stay there would not exceed one month.

(iii) In case of battle in the region of Yemen, the people of Najrān, as a token of friendship and cooperation, would make available 30 coats of mail, 30 horses and 30 camels as a guaranteed loan for the Muslim army.

(iv) The people of Najrān and their surrounding areas would be under the protection of God and His Prophet (S); their lives, property and places of worship would be also safe; and their bishops and priests would be free to continue performing their duties without any hindrance from anybody.

(v) No one is entitled to exile them from their land or extract tithe (*'ushr*) from them or launch a military attack against them.

(vi) Every person from among them who makes a legitimate claim would be treated with justice.

(vii) No person from among them would be held responsible for the crime committed by others of his faith.

(viii) The people of Najrān promise to abstain from usury (*ribā*), otherwise Muḥammad (S) would revoke terms of friendship with them and would not be bound to stick to the treaty.⁹

It is evident from the Prophet's (S) treaties with the unbelievers that the Islamic State, taking into consideration the interests of Islam and Muslims, can conclude treaties and pacts of friendship and cooperation with the unbelievers, polytheists and the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitāb) in matters of common welfare, such as exchange in spheres of science, agriculture, industry, commerce, economy and defence. Of course, such pacts should not pave way for the influence and interference of the unbelievers in the internal affairs of a Muslim State and should not hamper its independence and security, which is to be considered of the foremost importance at the time of concluding such pacts. In no way such pacts may be allowed to strengthen the position of the unbelievers and to endanger independence of Muslims. Islamic government in no case should ignore the hidden and inherent enmity and evil designs of the unbelievers; laxity can result in extending their influence on the Islamic State.

Loyalty to Pacts and Treaties:

If the Islamic government considers it desirable, without any force or pressure, to conclude pacts and treaties with other countries or individuals or companies, it ought to follow the conditions agreed upon. The Quran and the ḥadīth lay great stress upon keeping of promises. It is said in the Quran:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَوْفُوا بِالْعُقُودِ *

O believers! fulfil your bonds.... (5:1)

وَالَّذِينَ هُمْ لِأَمَانَاتِهِمْ وَعَهْدِهِمْ رَاعُونَ *

And those who preserve their trusts and their covenants. (23:8)

وَأَوْفُوا بِعَهْدِ اللَّهِ إِذَا عَاهَدْتُمْ وَلَا تَنْقُضُوا الْأَيْمَانَ بَعْدَ تَوْكِيدِهَا وَقَدْ جَعَلْتُمُ اللَّهَ عَلَيْكُمْ
كَفِيلًا إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَعْلَمُ مَا تَفْعَلُونَ *

Fulfil God's covenant, when you make covenant, and break not the oaths after they have been confirmed, and you have made God your surety; Surely God knows the things you do. (16:91)

Fulfilment of pacts and agreements, according to these verses, is considered to be a mark of faith (*īmān*) and is obligatory. These verses are also applicable to the unbelievers and the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitāb). In addition to these, some other verses are also explicit in respect to the pacts made with the unbelievers. The Quran says:

إِلَّا الَّذِينَ عَاهَدْتُمْ مِنَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ ثُمَّ لَمْ يَنْقُضُوا شَيْئًا وَلَمْ يُظَاهِرُوا عَلَيْكُمْ أَحَدًا
فَاتِمُوا إِلَيْهِمْ عَهْدَهُمْ إِلَىٰ مُدَّتِهِمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُتَّقِينَ *

... And give you tidings to the unbelievers of a painful chastisement; excepting those of the idolaters with whom you have a treaty, and who, thereafter, have abated nothing of your right nor have supported anyone against you. [As for these], fulfil their treaty till their term; surely God loves the God-fearing. (9:3,4)

In this context many traditions are related. Amir al-Mu'minin 'Ali (A), in his letter to Mālik al-'Ashtar, writes:

وَإِنْ عَقَدْتَ بَيْنَكَ وَبَيْنَ عَدُوِّكَ عَقْدَةً، أَوْ أَلْبَسْتَهُ مِنْكَ ذِمَّةً، فَحُطِّ عَهْدَكَ بِالْوَفَاءِ، وَأَزَعِ
ذِمَّتَكَ بِالْأَمَانَةِ، وَأَجْعَلْ نَفْسَكَ جُنَّةً دُونَ مَا أُعْطِيتَ، فَإِنَّهُ لَيْسَ مِنْ فَرَائِضِ اللَّهِ شَيْءٌ النَّاسُ
أَشَدُّ عَلَيْهِ اجْتِمَاعًا، مَعَ تَفَرُّقِ أَهْوَائِهِمْ، وَتَشْتِ آرَائِهِمْ، مِنْ تَعْظِيمِ الْوَفَاءِ بِالْعُهُودِ.

If you conclude an agreement between yourself and your enemy or enter into a pledge with him, then fulfil your agreement and discharge your pledge faithfully. Place yourself as a shield against whatever you have pledged, because among the obligations of Allah there is nothing on which people are more firmly united despite the difference of their ideas and variation of their views than respect for fulfilling pledges.¹⁰

The Prophet (S) said:

مَنْ كَانَ يُؤْمِنُ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ فَلْيَفِ إِذَا وَعَدَ.

One who believes in God and the Day of Judgement must fulfil his promises.¹¹

يَجِبُ عَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِ الْوَفَاءُ بِالْمَوَاعِيدِ وَالصِّدْقُ فِيهَا.

It is obligatory for a believer to fulfil his promises and to be sincere in his pledges.¹²

Fulfilment of promise is one of the highest virtues of man, whose nobility is confirmed by the human nature and is repeatedly stressed by Islam. Muslims are asked to remain faithful to the pacts and agreements they have signed even in case they may be harmful to their material gains. Muslims have to set an example of good and exemplary conduct so that people learn from them the value of humaneness and friendship.

If one studies the life and character of the Prophet (S), one will see that he strictly fulfilled all his promises and agreements unless the other party violated it or some of its clauses. For instance, the Prophet (S), according to the Treaty of Ḥudaybiyyah, had agreed to hand over any individual who defects to al-Madinah from Mecca over to the Quraysh. A newly converted Muslim, Abū Baṣīr, escaped from Mecca and entered al-Madinah just after the treaty was signed. The Quraysh sent an emissary asking the Prophet (S) to hand Abū Baṣīr over to them according to the treaty. The Prophet (S) told Abū Baṣīr, "I have to comply with the terms of the treaty and am bound to return any person coming from them. In my religion violation of a treaty is not permissible. You have to return with the emissaries of the Quraysh, and have confidence in God who will soon deliver you from captivity." Abū Baṣīr said, "O Prophet of God, are you surrendering me to the infidels who want me to give my faith up?" The Prophet (S) answered, "O Abū Baṣīr! I have to fulfil what I have promised according to the agreement; go with them and be sure that God would liberate you and all the oppressed from their oppression."¹³

During the battle of Ṣiffīn, Amir al-Mu'minin was forced, against his will, to make truce with Mu'āwiyah. After the proposed treaty was signed the Khawārij realized what blunder they had committed, and then proposed to 'Alī (A) not to follow the conditions of the treaty. But 'Alī (A) said to them, "Do you wish me to violate the treaty I have signed and turn back from the promise? Hasn't God commanded you to fulfil your pact and not to turn away from your oaths after they have been confirmed; and you have made God your surety; surely God knows the things you do."¹⁴

However, the Prophet (S) of God, the Caliphs, and the Imams of his family were always faithful to their promises and treaties, whether in individual matters or social commitments. As a matter of principle,

fulfilment of promises is one of the signs of Islam and *imān*. A pact can be broken only when the other party violates it, or resolves to do so, or is not true to it. This issue is discussed in the Quran in the following words:

وَأَمَّا تَخَافَنَّ مِنْ قَوْمٍ خِيَانَةً فَانْبِذْ إِلَيْهِمْ عَلَىٰ سَوَاءٍ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ الْخَائِنِينَ *

And if you fear treachery on the part of a people then throw it away at them on terms of equality; surely Allah does not love the treacherous. (8:58)

Again it is said:

وَإِنْ نَكَثُوا أَيْمَانَهُمْ مِنْ بَعْدِ عَهْدِهِمْ وَطَعَنُوا فِي دِينِكُمْ فَقَاتِلُوا أَتَمَّةَ الْكُفْرَانِهِمْ لَا أَيْمَانَ لَهُمْ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَنْتَهُونَ *

But if they break their oaths after their agreement and [openly] revile your religion, then fight the leaders of unbelief; surely they have no binding oaths; haply they will desist. (9:12) 2)

أَلَا تَقَاتِلُونَ قَوْمًا نَكَثُوا أَيْمَانَهُمْ وَهَمُّوا بِإِخْرَاجِ الرَّسُولِ وَهُمْ بَدُّوْكُمْ أَوَّلَ مَرَّةٍ آتَخَشَوْتُهُمْ
فَاللَّهُ أَحَقُّ أَنْ تَخْشَوْهُ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ مُؤْمِنِينَ *

What! Will you not fight a people who broke their oaths and aimed at the expulsion of the Apostle, and they attacked you first? Do you fear them? You would do better to be afraid of God, if you are believers. (9:13)

There is much evidence that the Prophet (S) and his successors acted upon this guide-line. In the case of the Treaty of Hudaibiyyah the Prophet (S) remained faithful to the conditions of the treaty as long as the unbelievers abode by the treaty; when the unbelievers violated some of its conditions, the Prophet (S) also annulled the treaty and declared war against them.

Frustrating the Enemies:

One of the important and salient features of the Islamic foreign policy concerns discouragement of enemies from aggression. It is the duty of the Islamic State to increase and enhance its military powers by equipping its army with all the necessary arms so that its strength and superiority is recognized by the world, and the enemies of Islam are discouraged to the extent that they cannot dare to think of committing transgression against it. The Quran says:

وَأَعِدُّوا لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِنْ قُوَّةٍ وَمِنْ رِبَاطِ الْخَيْلِ تُرْهَبُونَ بِهِ عَدُوَّ اللَّهِ وَعَدُوَّكُمْ
وَأَخْرَيْنَ مِنْ دُونِهِمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَهُمُ اللَّهُ يَعْلَمُهُمْ وَمَا تُنْفِقُوا مِنْ شَيْءٍ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ يُوَفَّ إِلَيْكُمْ وَأَنْتُمْ
لَا تُظْلَمُونَ *

Make ready for them whatever force and strings of horses you can, to frighten thereby the enemy of Allah and your enemy, and others besides them whom you do not know (but) Allah knows them. And whatever you expend in Allah's way, shall be repaid you in full, and you will not be wronged. (8:60)

In this verse God addresses all the Muslims and not just the Prophet (S), and commands them to strive to muster all the forces they can and to make all preparations and gather all necessary equipment so that their force is regarded as superior to all the other forces in the region in every respect; superior in war readiness, military experience, and strategic expertise, superior in the most advanced and sophisticated weapons, superior in the means of transportation on land, sea and air—so powerful that all the enemies of Islam recognize the Islamic State as militarily superior to them in all respects. The word ‘enemy’ does not include only those whom you know as enemies, but also those who are not identifiable but are nursing enmity in their hearts, and only God knows their evil designs: *وَأَخْرَيْنَ مِنْ دُونِهِمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَهُمُ اللَّهُ يَعْلَمُهُمْ* “whom you do not know, but Allah knows them”, is a clause of great significance in this verse and needs close attention. Muslims are commanded to be always in a state of preparation, fully armed and well-equipped, so that even those of whose enmity you are not aware are intimidated and discouraged from plotting and attacking you in any way. With such a superior force Muslims can check the aggressive designs of the imperialist powers and can uproot from the very foundation chaos, corruption, aggression, exploitation and oppression from the face of the earth. For this sacred cause, which is willed by God, all the energies and resources that are utilized, would be compensated by God, for your powers are directed toward the attainments of a sacred goal, significant from the Divine as well as human point of view. This effort is not aimed at attaining worldly power, wealth, and position. The Quran commands Muslims to be aware of the personal animosity, hidden malice, and sly conspiracies and strategies of the unbelievers, and that they should never forget that the enemies are awaiting an opportunity to encroach upon their lands, interfere in their affairs and finally to enslave them and subjugate their faith. Muslims are required to always pursue the Divine objectives and to remain firm against their enemies. They should never follow or pursue what is prohibited by the Islamic law. The Quran commands:

يَا أَيُّهَا النَّبِيُّ جَاهِدِ الْكُفَّارَ وَالْمُنَافِقِينَ وَاغْلُظْ عَلَيْهِمْ وَمَأْوَاهُمْ جَهَنَّمُ وَبِئْسَ

الْمَصِيرُ*

O Prophet! Strive hard against the unbelievers and the hypocrites and be hard against them; and their abode is hell—what an evil resort. (66:9)

مُحَمَّدٌ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ وَالَّذِينَ مَعَهُ أَشِدَّاءُ عَلَى الْكُفَّارِ رُحَمَاءُ بَيْنَهُمْ...

Muhammad, the Apostle of Allah, and those with him are hard against the unbelievers.... (48:29)

The Prophet (S) is ordered by God to struggle hard against the unbelievers and those who are enemies in the garb of friendship of Islam, and he is asked to be very firm in this matter. Here the verb *jāhid* (related to *jihād*) seems to be used not in the sense of holy war but in the sense of struggle or effort; for the Prophet (S) did not wage war, in the true sense of the word, against the *munāfiqūn* (hypocrites). It may be therefore conjectured that the Prophet (S) is commanded to make all efforts to advance his cause and to frustrate the designs and plots of the unbelievers and hidden enemies (*munāfiqūn*). He is asked to defeat them with the force of argument, exhortation, good counsel, proper guidance and preaching—in short all the appropriate means are to be availed of and all efforts to be put in against the enemies. He is asked to be ever vigilant, showing no signs of weakness against the enemies. The Quran says:

فَلَا تُطِيعِ الْمُكَذِّبِينَ * وَذُوا لَوْتُدْهِنُ فَيُدْهِنُونَ *

So obey not those who reject (the Divine message). They wish that you should be compromising so they [too] would compromise. (68:8-9)

فَلَا تُطِيعِ الْكَافِرِينَ وَجَاهِدْهُمْ بِهِ جِهَادًا كَبِيرًا *

So do not follow the unbelievers, and strive against them with a mighty striving. (25:52)

وَلَا تَهِنُوا وَلَا تَحْزِنُوا وَأَنْتُمْ الْأَعْلَوْنَ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ مُؤْمِنِينَ *

And be not infirm, and be not grieving; you shall have the upper hand if you are believers. (3:139)

فَلِذَلِكَ فَادْعُ وَاسْتَقِمْ كَمَا أُمِرْتَ وَلَا تَتَّبِعْ أَهْوَاءَهُمْ وَقُلْ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ مِنْ

كِتَابٍ وَأُمِرْتُ لِأَعْدِلَ بَيْنَكُمْ...

To this, then, go on inviting, and go on steadfastly on the right way as you are commanded, and do not follow their caprices, and say: "I believe in what Allah has revealed [to me] of the Book, and I am commanded to do justice with you...." (42:15)

فَاسْتَقِيمْ كَمَا أُمِرْتَ وَمَنْ تَابَ مَعَكَ وَلَا تَطْغَوْا إِنَّهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ بَصِيرٌ * وَلَا تَرْكَبُوا إِلَى
الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا فَتَمَسَّكُمُ النَّارُ وَمَا لَكُمْ مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ مِنْ أَوْلِيَاءَ ثُمَّ لَا تُنصَرُونَ *

Continue then in the right way as you and he who has turned (to Allah) with you were commanded, and be not inordinate [O men!], surely He sees what you do. And do not incline to those who are unjust, lest the fire touch you, and you have no guardians besides Allah, then you shall not be helped. (11:112-113)

إِنَّ الَّذِينَ قَالُوا رَبُّنَا اللَّهُ ثُمَّ اسْتَقَامُوا فَلَا خَوْفٌ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلَا هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ *

Surely those who say: "Our Lord is Allah," then they continue on the right way, they shall have no fear nor shall they grieve. (46:13)

The Islamic State's Relations with the Muslims of the World:

Islam considers all Muslims to be one ummah, a community whose basis is faith and common objectives, and among all its constituent units exists a deeper unity which does not allow the differences of region, race, language, and nation to disrupt and disintegrate it. The Quran declares:

إِنَّ هَذِهِ أُمَّتُكُمْ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً وَأَنَا رَبُّكُمْ فَاعْبُدُونِ *

Surely this community of yours is one community (ummah), and I am your Lord, therefore serve Me. (21:92)

According to this verse, Muslims are identified as one ummah, as parts of which they move towards a common goal, strive to realize their common objectives, worship one and the only God.

In many traditions Muslims are described as one body, and different units of the Muslim ummah are regarded as the organs of a single body. A few of the traditions are quoted here in order to substantiate the point.

Abū Sa'id narrates from the Prophet (S) that he said, "A believer's relationship to other believers is like that of the different parts of a building, each of which supports the other."¹⁵

The Prophet (S) said: "A believer with respect to other believers is related like the head is related to the body. A believer feels the pain of

other believers as the head feels the pain of the body.”¹⁶

The Prophet (S) said: “One who gets up in the morning and his mind is not preoccupied with the matters of Muslims, is not one of them.”¹⁷

Imam Ja‘far al-Şādiq (A) said: “Muslims are related to one another like the parts of a body; if a part of a body is in pain, other parts of it cannot remain unaffected.”¹⁸

Al-Imām al-Şādiq (A) said: “The believers are related to one another like brothers born of the same parents; if any one of them is injured, others are kept awake the whole night for his sake.”¹⁹

Al-Imām al-Şādiq (A) said further: “A Muslim is the brother of other Muslims; he is never unjust to them, never betrays them, and is never treacherous to them. He always strives to help them and treats them sympathetically and brotherly; and helps those among Muslims who are needy, and obeys the command of God for being merciful to one another. He remembers with compassion and grief his brother who has gone away—in the same way as the Helpers (al-’Anşār) of the Prophet (S) helped their brothers.”²⁰

All these traditions lead us to the conclusion that all Muslims are brothers and are like a single body, and therefore can never be indifferent towards one another. Among them should prevail the spirit of cooperation, brotherhood, fraternity, good will, love, sympathy, and unity of direction and purpose, and they should be always united for the defence of the Ummah. From this we can infer that the responsibility of the Islamic State is not confined to its boundaries only, but it is also responsible for and committed to all individuals of the Muslim Ummah. It should try to realize, as far as possible, the following objectives:

(1) Propagation of the genuine teachings of Islam among all the Muslims of the world by means of distribution of books, journals, and daily papers, sending preachers, arranging cultural exchange programmes, deputing teachers, establishing religious institutions like mosques and madrasah’s, chalking out effective programmes of religious instructions and making them accessible to all the believers, and making use of all other vehicles of propaganda.

(2) Full support to all Islamic movements and struggles for the freedom of the Muslims of the world.

(3) Economic aid to all the deprived, oppressed, and needy people of the world.

(4) Defence of all the victims of injustice and tyranny.

(5) Endeavour for promoting the cause of Muslim unity.

(6) Defence of the independence of the Muslims wherever and whenever their freedom is endangered by the aggression of the enemies.

The Islamic government has to fulfil these great responsibilities in accordance with its resources and strength with due consideration of its own interests with respect to other countries and nations and their varying conditions and circumstances. It is the Islamic State's duty to explore and investigate all the existing possibilities and conditions thoroughly, so that it is able to frame its foreign policy accordingly.

The Relations of the Islamic State with the Powers Ruling over Muslims:

What policy has the Islamic government to adopt vis-a-vis the governments which rule over a considerable number of Muslims? Should it be on a par with the policy in relation to other non-Muslim countries, or a different policy is to be adopted toward such States? Of course, all the States where Muslims live are not alike, and they can be divided into different categories:

First Category: A state's government is one hundred per cent Islamic if it has firm faith in the Islamic system and fully implements it in all of its dimensions.

Second Category: Those States which accept the Islamic faith in general, but which do not recognize fully the implications of the Islamic faith. In application, they confine Islam to the matters pertaining to the fundamental doctrines of the faith, prescribed forms of worship and some parts of Islamic ethics. They do not understand Islam as a comprehensive system that covers not only the matters of worship but also all the moral, political, and social aspects of human life. Such a government does not Islamize its governmental and social institutions, not because of any hostility but due to sheer ignorance.

Third Category: The States which claim to be Muslim but do not have any objective except remaining in power and ruling over Muslims under this pretext. All that matters to its officials is position, authority, and luxuries of life; they do not care for Islam or for anything else, and are not interested in following the teachings and laws of Islam.

Fourth Category: A government which is not only uncommitted to Islam, but is also installed in power by unbelieving and oppressive powers, receives their support, and acts as a puppet in the hands of oppressors and enemies of Islam.

In view of the above-mentioned categories, the foreign policy of an Islamic State cannot be uniform with respect to various States and governments. The Islamic government is committed to a particular ideology and certain specific aims, hence it has to choose the best policy which can be instrumental in reaching nearest to its goals in the best possible manner. An Islamic government is obliged to fulfil its commitments to all Muslims of the world. Such commitments are

enumerated in brief:

(1) It should make all efforts to awaken Muslims of the world and to arm them with the teachings, culture, and values of Islam.

(2) It should strive to create an atmosphere of cordiality, fraternity, and mutual understanding conducive to Islamic unity.

(3) It should try its best to eliminate from the Muslim countries all forms of influence and intervention of the unbelievers and the imperialists.

(4) An all-out effort for achieving complete independence and freedom of the Muslim Ummah.

(5) An attempt to establish Islamic rule and to implement Islamic laws all over the world.

(6) Defence of the oppressed and the exploited people and enforcement of social justice throughout the whole world.

(7) War against unbelief, materialism, and imperialism with a view to spreading *tawhīd* and Islam in the world.

Such is the scope of the responsibility of an Islamic government whose fulfilment is an extremely delicate and difficult task. The authorities of the Islamic State should frame their external affairs policies, keeping in view the targets mentioned above, in such a fashion that they are able to reach their objectives sooner and with efficiency. Naturally no uniform policy in relation to all the various States and governments can be adopted, for all of them are different from one another in many respects. In accordance with each country's pattern of government, and cultural traditions; the military, economic and political potentialities, of the Islamic State; different policies have to be pursued in the context of the general conditions and the historical course of the world events. It is important that the desired goal ought never to be let to slip out of our mind, and every possible opportunity and means accessible to us are to be tried for attaining it.

In some cases breaking of relations is the best policy, while in other cases complete mutual cooperation is required. Occasionally war is the best way of solving the problems, and sometimes truce is essential. It is up to the authorities of an Islamic government to decide which policy and what way can be adopted. We can only suggest briefly that, in general, maintaining good relations with certain countries is advantageous in some respects, as follows:

(1) A spirit of mutual understanding in relation to various States can provide better opportunities for establishing contacts with the people and for propagating the teachings and principles of Islam in order to awaken Muslims and acquaint them with the realities of Islam so that proper ground is prepared for implementation of the Islamic social system and its laws.

(2) Good relations with friendly States are conducive to seeking

their support and cooperation in the international organizations and forums in order to advance the interests of Islam.

(3) Good relations are more conducive to attainment of the desired goal of Islamic unity and liberation of nations from the clutches of the infidel imperialist powers. As the unbelievers and exploiters make attempt to sow the seeds of disunity among the Muslim countries in order to protect their own interests, breakdown of relations among Muslim States serves their purpose and is desired by them. Without harming the main objectives, if good relations with other Muslim countries are maintained and attempts are made to bring them closer, it would bring us closer to our goal. To whatever degree an Islamic State comes closer to other States, to the same extent they move away from the imperialist exploitative powers.

(4) If the Islamic State breaks its relations with some State, that State is forced to have closer alliance with the infidel imperialist powers for its own safety, with the probability that it shall fall totally into the hands of those powers. This would certainly damage the global cause of Islam.

(5) Relations of the Islamic State with such countries as mentioned above would be to the common benefit of the related nations from economic, cultural, and political points of view.

(6) Friendly relations can provide a safeguard against the hostility and conspiracy of other powers, or at least such relations can reduce the possibilities of opposition.

(7) The Islamic State, by maintaining friendly relations and promoting mutual understanding with all the Muslim countries, can meet its economic, cultural, scientific and military needs, and come closer to attaining self-sufficiency. In the same proportion it would lead the Muslim countries to reduce their dependence upon oppressive world powers, and thus would inflict a severe blow upon the forces of exploitation.

Nevertheless, all this depends upon the Islamic State's commitment to the message and goals of Islam, which should always be kept in sight, and all our attempts must be directed towards their realization. The course of action for attaining those objectives cannot always be one and the same; it would differ according to conditions and circumstances. The choice of the best course is a highly difficult, critical, and sensitive affair, and even a minor lapse can result in unamendable consequences, weakening the power and prestige of the Islamic State. Howsoever difficult and crucial the choice of policy for conducting foreign affairs and international relations may be, it is the responsibility of the officials of the Islamic State to adopt the best course with extreme care, acute insight, and faultless anticipation, in accordance with the existing conditions, in general, and the general

criteria laid down by Islam in particular. It is in this framework that sometimes a situation may arise in which breaking of relations with certain States, and even covert or open war against them is necessitated.

NOTES:

1. *Al-Tarātīb al-'idāriyyah*, vol. I, p. 194.
2. 'Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā'i, *al-Mizān fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, vol. 3, p. 162.
3. 'Allāmah Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, *Bihār al-'anwār*, vol. LXXV, p. 414.
4. *Ibid.*, vol. LXXV, p. 435.
5. *Ibid.*, vol. LXXV, p. 401.
6. Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat al-Rasūl*, vol. II, p. 147; and Abū 'Ubayd, *Kitāb al-'amwāl*, p. 290.
7. *Kitāb al-'amwāl*, p. 230; al-Ḥalabī, *Insān al-'uyūn fī sīrat al-'amin wa al-ma'mūn*, vol. III, p. 24.
8. *Kitāb al-'amwāl*, p. 287.
9. Al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā ibn Jābir, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 76; *Kitāb al-'amwāl*, p. 272.
10. *Nahj al-balāghah* (ed. Ṣubḥī al-Ṣāliḥ, Beirut 1387 A.H.), *Rasā'il*, No. 53, p. 442.
11. Al-Kulaynī, Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb, *al-Kāfī*, vol. II, p. 363.
12. Muḥammad Nūrī al-Māzandarānī al-Ṭabarī, *Mustadrak al-wasā'il wa mustanbat al-masā'il*, vol. II, p. 85.
13. Ibn Hishām, *op.cit.*, vol. II, p. 323.
14. Al-Munaqqarī, Naṣr ibn Muzāḥim, *Waq'at Siffīn*, p. 514.
15. Ibn Ḥajar, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Haythamī, *Majma' al-zawā'id*, vol. VIII, p. 87.
16. *Majma' al-zawā'id*, vol. VIII, p. 87.
17. *Al-Kāfī*, vol. II, p. 164.
18. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 166.
19. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 165.
20. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 174.

Islamic Government: Objectives and Hurdles*

by Sayyid 'Alī Khāmene'ī

translated from the Persian by Mahliqā Qarā'ī

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَالْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ وَالصَّلَاةُ وَالسَّلَامُ عَلَيَّ نَبِيِّنَا أَبِي الْقَاسِمِ
مُحَمَّدٍ (ص) وَعَلَى الْأَئِمَّةِ الطَّاهِرِينَ الظَّاهِرِينَ الْمُتَنَجِّبِينَ. قَالَ اللَّهُ الْحَكِيمُ فِي كِتَابِهِ الْكَرِيمِ،
بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَإِنْ أَحْكَمَ بَيْنَهُمْ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ وَلَا تَتَّبِعْ أَهْوَاءَهُمْ وَاحْذَرْهُمْ أَنْ
يَفْتِنُوكَ عَنْ بَعْضِ مَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ إِلَيْكَ فَإِنْ تَوَلَّوْا فَاعْلَمُوا أَنَّمَا يُرِيدُ اللَّهُ أَنْ يُصِيبَهُمْ بِبَعْضِ ذُنُوبِهِمْ
وَإِنَّ كَثِيرًا مِنَ النَّاسِ لَفَاسِقُونَ * أَفَحُكْمَ الْجَاهِلِيَّةِ يَبْغُونَ وَمَنْ أَحْسَنُ مِنَ اللَّهِ حُكْمًا لِقَوْمٍ
يُوقِنُونَ *

In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. Praise be to Allah, Lord of the worlds. May benedictions and peace be upon our Prophet, Abū al-Qāsim Muḥammad, and upon the Imams, the immaculate, infallible and select. Allah, the Wise, has said in the Book—in the Name of Allah the Beneficent, the Merciful: “So judge between them by that which Allah hath revealed, and follow not their desires, but beware of them lest they seduce thee from some part of that which Allah hath revealed unto thee. And if they turn away, then know that Allah’s will is to smite them for some sin of theirs. Indeed, many of mankind are evildoers. Is it a judgement of the time of [pagan] ignorance that they are seeking? Yet who is better than Allah for judgement to a people who have certainty?” (5:49-50)

Iwelcome the honoured guests of the Islamic Republic, and thank you for coming to attend this conference and participating in these discussions about the most significant issue in the world of Islam

*This address by Sayyid 'Alī Khāmene'ī, the present president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was delivered at the inaugural session of the Third Conference on Islamic Thought, Jamādī al-'awwal 7-9, 1405 (January 29-31, 1985). The general topic of the conference was “Islamic Government.”

today.

The issue of Islamic government is the subject of supreme importance not only in Islamic world, but even in the non-Islamic world as well. It is one of the most debated of contemporary issues. The very mention of Islam, especially when accompanied with the idea of Islamic government and socio-political structure, carries great interest and excitement for the Muslims, to the same extent as it is disturbing and alarming for the enemies of Islam. Since the time of Islamic resurgence—that is, early nineteenth century—the non-Islamic world and the big powers, which had gradually emerged, felt this danger. The thing that particularly scared them was the Islamic resurgence demanding establishment of Islamic government and social order. This clamour for the first time rose from the quarters where the control of the colonialists was tighter, and from regions with regard to which the political greed of the imperialists was fiercer than in any other part of the world.

In our recent history, for the first time, Islamic thinking infused with the demand for independence and formation of an Islamic State emerged in India, and then in several other oppressed countries of north Africa and the Middle East. These regions were more sensitive from the viewpoint of the colonialists.

Britain, an old hand in the field of colonial exploitation, in order to retain the Indian subcontinent under its domination, committed unprecedented crimes. Perhaps it is not an overstatement to say that Britain's acquisition of bases in certain African countries and the Middle East was for the sake of preserving its hold over India. Despite the circumspect attitude of the British in regard to India, the first brave cry of freedom and call to *jihād* and martyrdom was heard from the ranks of the religious leaders of that country during the early part of the nineteenth century. The British were disturbed, to the extent that even fifty years after the fire that was kindled by great Indian figures like Sayyid Aḥmad Barelawī and Shāh 'Abd al-'Aziz Dehlawī in the beginning of the nineteenth century was temporarily extinguished, they continued to defame these personalities. The officials of the British government still worked on in India to distort their public image, and degrade them in the eyes of the Muslim masses. They carried on all sorts of false propaganda against them and created obsequious religious institutions to counter them. So it doesn't seem strange, in this perspective, when we look at the extreme reaction of the colonialists of the time against Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī, when he launched an Islamic movement in Iran, India, Egypt, Europe and Turkey, and brought the people together under the banner of Islam. Did Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn do anything other than inviting the people in Egypt and other Islamic countries towards Islam and the Quran?

Suppression of Islamic Movements:

During the hundred years that followed the commencement of Islamic movement, every time wherever any movement was launched by any Muslim leader, with an Islamic motive and orientation, it was mercilessly crushed by global colonialism, whose champion was Britain. Instances of such suppression can be cited in the movements crushed in India, Egypt, and other Islamic countries. They show how the colonialists and world oppressors were apprehensive of the name of Islam, especially the Islam that advocates Islamic rule and believes in Islamic way of life.

There is of course a universal principle, according to which all those people who stand by their just demands ultimately win victory and their enemies are defeated. This has happened numerous times and the first example of such defeat can be seen in the course of Tobacco Movement, which was launched under the able leadership of Mīrzā Shīrāzī in Iran. We know how the people fought against the ruthless economic domination of Britain. The late Mīrzā Shīrāzī mobilized the Iranian nation and stimulated their religious sentiments for this purpose. Consequently the enemy had to yield.

Some years following this incident, the Constitution Movement started in Iran. The people followed the Muslim 'ulamā', and strived under the guidance of their *fatwā's*. The oppressive regime of the time was forced to yield, and the political forces which backed it were also defeated. They were able to install a constitutional government, which was based on Islamic principles. After its victory, this movement was also subdued from within due to all sorts of tricks and intrigues by the same imperialist forces.

After some more years, an armed struggle full of zeal again started in Iran under the leadership of a spiritual leader, and was supported by a group of Muslim militants and many 'ulamā': the Jungle Movement. At the same time, that is, after the first World War, the greatest struggle of the Iraqi 'ulamā' started against the British. This struggle was actually indicative of the great resistance of al-Ḥawzat al-'Ilmiyyah of Najaf against the British domination over Iraq.

There were victories during all these struggles and at every stage, and, of course, there were setbacks and failures also. But through these experiences the Muslims, as well as their opponents, came to know that whenever a movement is launched in any corner of the Islamic world for the purpose of establishing an Islamic government and enforcing the Islamic law in the society, it can mobilize and organize the masses and has the capacity to confront the colonial powers. This is an empirical truth. We have also observed the phenomena that whenever an Islamic movement comes into being, the world oppressors get extremely

nervous, and stand adamantly against it.

It is of course our faith that in the battle between truth and falsehood, the forces of truth always emerge as victorious, as God Almighty assures in the Quran:

أَمْ يَقُولُونَ نَحْنُ جَمِيعٌ مُنْتَصِرُونَ * سَيُهْزَمُ الْجَمْعُ وَيُوَلُّونَ الدُّبُرَ *

Or say they: "We are a host victorious?" The hosts will all be routed and will turn and flee. (54:44,45)

We have experienced the truth of this Divine assurance of help. When the enemies of Islam arrayed against Islam, and the Muslims put up an unyielding resistance, they gained victory.

In any case, the topic of Islamic rule is the subject of utmost importance for the Muslims. I would like to mention here some of the main points regarding Islamic rule.

Responsibility of the Muslim Thinkers:

The first and foremost point is that there are some within Islamic societies who believe in the Islamic doctrine, but under the influence of the long-term cultural indoctrination and insinuations of the enemies of Islam have been led to think that Islam does not present any political and public administration system. The manner of thinking of the majority of Muslims living in Islamic countries has been steered in the same direction.

The main duty of the Islamic thinkers is to eradicate this misconception from the minds of Muslims. The faith in God and *tawhīd* is a way of life for the mankind. To have faith in God and His messengers is to choose a specific kind of life for oneself by following the path of their guidance. In different verses of the Quran, this matter has been mentioned:

لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ....

We verily sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and sent down with them the Scripture and the Balance that mankind may uphold justice.... (57:25)

The purpose of sending of prophets and revealing of the Books was to establish justice and to make people stand for justice in human societies. The main body that serves as the centre and axis of collective life for the human society, that is, the State—on what kind of laws and criteria should it be based? This is an important question.

A State is the centre, axis, and backbone of social life. By what

sort of persons and on what sort of principles should it be organized, and on what source of inspiration should it be established? This is also one of the basic questions, answered variously by different schools of thought. Can it be imagined that the prophets of God have left this question unanswered? The Quran says:

وَأَنِ احْكُم بَيْنَهُم بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ وَلَا تَتَّبِعْ أَهْوَاءَهُمْ وَاحْذَرْهُمْ أَنْ يَفْتِنُوكَ عَنْ بَعْضِ مَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ إِلَيْكَ فَإِنْ تَوَلَّوْا فَاعْلَمْ أَنَّمَا يُرِيدُ اللَّهُ أَنْ يُصِيبَهُمْ بِبَعْضِ ذُنُوبِهِمْ وَإِنَّ كَثِيرًا مِنَ النَّاسِ لَفَاسِقُونَ * أَفَحُكْمَ الْجَاهِلِيَّةِ يَبْغُونَ وَمَنْ أَحْسَنُ مِنَ اللَّهِ حُكْمًا لِقَوْمٍ يُوقِنُونَ *

So judge between them by that which Allah hath revealed, and follow not their desires, but beware of them lest they seduce thee from some part of that which Allah hath revealed unto thee. And if they turn away, then know that Allah's will is to smite them for some sin of theirs. Indeed many of mankind are evil-doers. Is it a judgement of the time of [pagan] ignorance that they are seeking? Yet who is better than Allah for judgement to a people who have certainty? (5:49-50)

This is the solution of the problem offered by the prophets of God. It is not particular to Islam alone; all prophets came to give the same answer to the above-mentioned question, and in the same way as they answered other questions. The system which is established on the foundation of faith in God, its political structure is so framed that its economic structure is based on the imperative to establish justice in society, and it has an ethical foundation. Its political system, its legislative and legal systems, its administration, everything, is based on the Divine principle of justice. This is the Islamic State. The idea that Islam does not require the Muslims to establish an Islamic government, needs to be rooted out from the minds of Muslims. Every nation and people who believe in Islam should necessarily aspire for an Islamic State. It is absurd that there should be some people who should believe in Islam but not in the Islamic system of government. This is an evil prevalent throughout the Islamic world. The other great deception is the idea of pseudo-Islamic State. It has been put into circulation like forged currency issued instead of the genuine coin. Many of those who have until today ruled in the name of Islam, were actually a blemish on its repute. This needs to be proved before the world what real Islamic government is. If we are ignorant of this fact, it is possible that the enemies of Islam may succeed in deceiving us.

When in a rich country of the world like Iran, where the forces of global oppression, especially the U.S., had made huge investment, considering it as a stronghold wherein their interests were safeguarded, and whose people bring about a revolution based upon Islamic

principles, and consent to the formation of an Islamic State which draws inspiration from the Quran at every step—this is considered a grave danger for imperialism. Now imperialism cannot declare that religion is the opium of nations. These words have been, of course, repeated often for decades, and some people have even believed them. But today, who can believe that religion is the opium of the masses? While the most reactionary imperialist and capitalist forces have made the Islamic Republic the target of their most sophisticated weaponry, how can they accuse the Islamic Republic of being reactionary? The system which calls upon the people to freedom and independence, can the label 'reactionary' stick to it? Can our enemies allege that the system of the Islamic Republic, which is headed by a pious and righteous person, whose life is an image and model of the lives of prophets, is a *tāghūti* and dictatorial system? Can such a system be after the worldly objectives and gains? How can the enemies of Islam resist such a government which is formed with the support of the whole nation who have supported it with all their heart? There is the danger, perhaps, that they intend to create pseudo-Islamic governments. That is why today the danger of forming false Islamic governments in Islamic countries has increased, and all Muslims are required to be more aware of this danger. Therefore, I think it is necessary to clarify the concept of sovereignty from the Islamic point of view.

Islamic Sovereignty:

Basically, what is the meaning of sovereignty? Does it mean the rule of an absolute sovereign, the despotic rule of an individual or a group over the people, or is it the acceptance of a heavy responsibility by a person or group of persons who are legally equal to others? What is the origin and basis of such a sovereignty? If an individual or a group should be at the head of the Islamic State, what criteria or standards must they fulfil? Islam has given an answer to this question. For the officials of an Islamic State there are certain criteria and standards in Islam, according to which those who do not conform to those standards cannot be candidates for high offices.

It is not that any corrupt and licentious person and any cheat or gangster who can successfully manipulate public opinion to gain popular vote can be the head of an Islamic government. Public support is of course a determining factor, but the essential condition the candidate for this post has to fulfil is that he should be a pious and just person, having a good knowledge of Islam and Islamic teachings. The person who wishes to administer the affairs of an Islamic society should be well versed in Islamic teachings:

... أَفَمَنْ يَهْدِي إِلَى الْحَقِّ أَحَقُّ أَنْ يُتَّبَعَ أَمَّنْ لَا يَهْدِي إِلَّا أَنْ يُهْدَىٰ فَمَا لَكُمْ كَيْفَ تَحْكُمُونَ *

...And who is worthier to be followed—He Who guides to the truth, or he who guides not unless he is guided? What then ails you, how you judge? (10:35)

A ruler in an Islamic country should be an Islamologist, aware of contemporary realities. After a person fulfils these conditions and is also pious and righteous, it is the turn of the people who may accept or reject him. If the people do not elect him, then he has no legitimate right to authority. The notion of governing the people by force is completely alien to Islam. The sovereignty of God in an Islamic system is combined with the right of self-rule of the people. That is why we call it 'Islamic republic,' that is, in an Islamic system wherein loyalty to Islamic principles is not incompatible with the right of the people to choose and select as they do in a republic.

Now let us see what are the qualities of the Islamic ruler and the characteristic approach of an Islamic government. The Islamic ruler should be in direct contact with the public, well-acquainted with their problems, and should have the same standard of life as the public. Wherever there is mention of Islamic government we should try to search for these criteria. The degree of conformance to these criteria is proportional to the degree of proximity of that government with the Islamic ideal. Whenever the name of Islam is associated with the government of infidel and corrupt rulers and the domination of imperialism for the sake of retainment of its interests, it is nothing but a pretence of Islam. We cannot believe that in those Islamic countries where the U.S. or the Soviet Union or any other big power has domination, any true Islamic government does really exist. An Islamic government is one which is based upon Islamic policies, and it cannot form any alliance with governments hostile to Islam. The Quran says:

... وَلَنْ يَجْعَلَ اللَّهُ لِلْكَافِرِينَ عَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِينَ سَبِيلًا *

... and Allah will not give the disbelievers any way [of success] against the believers. (4:141)

Another political guide-line of the Quran is as follows:

وَأَعِدُّوا لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِنْ قُوَّةٍ وَمِنْ رِبَاطِ الْخَيْلِ تُرْهِبُونَ بِهِ عَدُوَّ اللَّهِ وَعَدُوَّكُمْ....

Make ready for them whatever force and strings of horses you can, to terrify thereby the enemy of God and your enemy,... (8:60)

The Islamic State's political policies should be in accordance with these principles. Only then it can be believed that it is really an Islamic government.

Another device which is used as a weapon against the effective sovereignty of Islam by the enemies of Islam and the imperialists is to drain Islam and Islamic thought of the characteristic Islamic sincerity and purity. Wherever a true Islamic movement based upon true Islamic doctrine and outlook comes into being, they create a parallel pseudo-Islamic current with a syncretic ideology but primarily based upon the ideas patronized and favoured by imperialism. Muslims should be cautious about this kind of thing. In the history of Islamic struggles, since the nineteenth century, such kind of perfidious movements have been numerous. For instance, in India the British established another institution in the name of Islam, with predominantly Western inclinations, to counter Madrasat Dār al-'Ulūm, which used to propagate true Islam. In our country also such efforts were made. The highlighting and magnification of pseudo-Islamic moves of some Western-educated persons, who mixed the Islamic principles with the products of Western culture and ideology, was undertaken for the benefit of those powers which were scared of pure Islam. Today the Islamic movement in this country, which is based upon the Book and the Sunnah, is under attack from all sides. A movement that is not authentically based on the Book and the Sunnah is not made the target of such attacks of the enemies.

Since the victory of our Islamic Revolution, we have been striving to preserve the legalist Islam in its purest form, and to protect it from deviations inspired by the East or the West. We do not accept the interpretations of such Muslim intellectuals who have concocted a mixture of alien thought and Islamic ideas. We know that such ideas will not pose any challenge to the global oppressors.

In any case, it is appropriate that today the Islamic world, with its approximately one billion population, should take up the idea of Islamic State seriously as a practical possibility.

The Islamic Republic—the Actualization of Islam:

Dear brothers, if some fifty years ago the Muslim thinkers cherished the hopes of establishing a few Islamic universities, if once they considered it sufficient to participate in some international conferences on Islam and discuss Islamic thought, if hardly ever it occurred to them that their desires would be once fulfilled, the conditions now have completely changed.

Today, in one of the most sensitive parts of the world, a government based upon principles of the Quran and the Sunnah has come into being. The hope of establishing an Islamic government is no

longer a distant dream. Today, if Muslim nations are asked to form an Islamic government, they are no longer justified in rejecting this demand and asking, "Is it possible?" Today all the poets, scholars, orators, writers and artists who have the Islamic spark in their heart, have no justification to take refuge anywhere else except in Islam, and to make use of no other source of inspiration except Islam, and to gratify their audience from any other source; since today it has been confirmed that the realization of Islam is practical, and the Islamic Republic is a living testimony of this claim.

Dear brothers, we do not claim to have established the Prophet's (S) system here, but we do claim to be on the path of achieving the Prophet's (S) system.

The modern world is a world of forums. Big powers and small countries feel that in order to promote their objectives it is essential to come together. For this reason, many federations and councils are organized and treaties and agreements are made. But the most ineffectual among them are those which have been formed by the Muslim States in the name of Islam. I, in the capacity of a president of a country which is a member of the Islamic Conference Organization, claim that it is one of the most inconsequential of the world bodies. This organization cannot safeguard the Muslims' rights. It does not give serious thought to solving the problems of the Islamic world. It does not take any explicit stand against the enemies of Islam. It does not do anything to propagate the teachings of Islam. Today this country is the only country in the world where a parliamentary bill is unhesitatingly rejected if it does not conform to Islamic fiqh. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the only country in the world where the laws are legislated according to the Book and the Sunnah. In the Islamic Consultative Assembly, any law which is not in conformity with the Islamic fiqh is not approved. Even if it is approved there, it is rejected by the Guardianship Council.

The Nature of the Islamic Conference Organization:

The Islamic Conference Organization, which comprises of a group of Islamic countries—including the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is in the process of implementing Islamic laws—in what way has this organization ever supported this Islamic Republic? What step could be more effective and better for defending Islam than defending a country which has founded a government on the basis of Islamic principles and moving resolutely in the direction of implementing them? Why doesn't this organization condemn those international propaganda machineries which are associated with the Zionists and are scheming against the Islamic Revolution? Nowadays, more than ninety per cent of the

famous news agencies and mass communication media of the world are in the hands of the Zionists, who spread poison against the Islamic Republic, and one of their main jobs, for which they are paid, is to carry on the propaganda against the Islamic Revolution. Switch on any world service on the radio, you will see how the facts are twisted and distorted. If the Islamic Conference Organization is formed for the purpose of defence of Islam, as some Islamic countries claim, why doesn't it contravene this venomous propaganda of the Zionists against the Islamic Republic of Iran? To oppose such propaganda should have been a matter of top priority for it. Why have the mass communication media and news agencies of majority of the Muslim countries joined in the chorus with the enemies and are engaged in propaganda against the Islamic Revolution?

All those who sympathize with and believe in the idea of the Islamic State are morally responsible for fighting these conspiracies in the Muslim world. You Muslim thinkers and scholars promulgate this message that it is an Islamic duty to oppose all conspiracies and plots against the Islamic Republic of Iran throughout the Muslim world. Of course, our primary reliance is on the righteousness of our cause. Moreover, had it been possible to annihilate the Islamic Republic through these conspiracies, we would have been liquidated long ago. Every day that this republic passes through, it gives it a new confidence and a new hope. We know it that it is because of the grace of the Almighty and the help and assistance of this brave people. Accordingly the belief in the sovereignty of Islam should be accompanied with the sense of duty to defend and protect the Islamic Republic of Iran by all means. I hope, my dear brothers, who are attending this conference, will, *in shā' Allāh*, reach some useful conclusions through it. This conference is an excellent place for discussing and studying different aspects of Islamic government. Even we who have succeeded in establishing an Islamic government, also need such discussions, and we hope that Islamic governments will be formed in other Muslim countries also. Ours is the first experiment in this field, and we hope that the experience of other Islamic States of near future will be helpful and enriching for us.

وَالسَّلَامُ عَلَيْكُمْ وَرَحْمَةُ اللَّهِ وَبَرَكَاتُهُ

Some Issues in the Present Islamic Resurgence*

by *Muhammad 'Umar Fārūq*

Introduction:

Establishment of Islamic Government as part of a comprehensive goal of founding Islamic society had been the most prominent feature of leading Islamic movements of this century, like *Jamā'at-e-Islāmī* and *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*, whose influence reached far beyond the national boundaries in which they originated. Other Islamic movements, mostly confined in their own national territories, as in Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria, etc., reflect a similar feature. These movements are not very young, and many of them have generated deep influence in the Muslim countries, but they seem to be yet far away from their goal. This paper, very briefly, sheds some light on the relationship between these Islamic movements and the awakening of the Muslim Ummah especially in the context of the Islamic Revolution.

Traditional Islamic Movements:

All the above-mentioned movements are Islamic in the sense that they accept inseparability of religion and politics, and thus are committed toward struggling for establishment of Islamic States in the Muslim countries. Basically all these movements are in the Sunni world. They speak in terms of Islamic revolution, and they were highly optimistic about it as a result of their decades-long efforts, at least in Pakistan and Sudan. Although each of them adopted quite different approaches, all of them emphasized the approach of *da'wah*, organization, training, and an all-out struggle to bring an Islamic revolution. While the *Ikhwān's* struggle took the form of *jihād* waged

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by limited number of cadres of the organization, Jamā'at-e-Islāmi adopted a constitutional approach to mould the public opinion and gradually Islamize the rotten *Jāhili* society without resorting to violence. Although these movements have to come to a dead-stop, there should not be any doubt that whatever Islamic awareness and fervour Muslims have developed which vibrates throughout these parts of the Muslim world, is due to the dedicated effort, leadership and struggles of the movements established and led by personalities like Shahid Imām Ḥasan al-Bannā, Shahid Sayyid Quṭb, Mawlānā Mawdūdī and others. Nevertheless, it is also an undeniable fact that none of these movements have been able to receive the support of their nations to offer a challenge to the entire *Jāhili* system and to bring it down. All these movements can be categorized as the 'traditional' Islamic movements belonging to the twentieth century 'tradition' of Islamic revival effort in the Sunnī world. Had the Muslim Ummah not been bestowed the Islamic Revolution by Allah *subhānahu wa ta'ālā*, probably the question as to 'why these traditional Islamic movements have not yet been able to make discernible progress toward their goal' would not have received serious consideration.

The Islamic Revolution:

The year 1979 changed the whole scenario of the Islamic movement in particular and the Muslim Ummah in general. A new era began with the victory of the Islamic Revolution to end the frustrations of the Muslim Ummah. Noticeably, the traditional Islamic movements were taken by a total surprise when the Islamic Revolution occurred in a country where they were not even aware that an Islamic movement existed. Furthermore, this revolution did not occur in the Sunnī world where the traditional Islamic movements operated, but in a country where the Muslim masses are predominantly Shī'ah. Unawareness of the traditional Islamic movements can be well substantiated in one of the most renowned works of Mawlānā Mawdūdī titled "A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam." The whole perspective was a Sunnī one, and the role and contribution of Shī'ism was totally ignored. Those who have been trained under these traditional Islamic movements, including this author, can well attest that none of them had even the least awareness of a possible Islamic movement in Iran. However, it will not be absolutely fair to blame the traditional Islamic movements for this unawareness, because historically for many centuries contact between the Shī'ah and Sunnī worlds was minimal, and the Shī'ah brothers, being minority in the Muslim world, many times preferred some sort of seclusion to preserve their own identity.

The Islamic Revolution created a new awareness, took a new lead

and added entirely a new dimension to the process of Islamic movement. The Islamic Revolution turned the Islamic movement into an integrated global phenomenon. Its uncompromising struggle and spirit of faith, its assurance for the oppressed world and threat to the *jāhiliyyah* is now shared worldwide, positively or negatively. *Jāhiliyyah*, *kufr* and imperialism have never been offered such a total and solid challenge during the entire history of the Muslim Ummah after the shahādah of al-Imām al-Husayn (A).

The Islamic Revolution has taken away the sleep and peaceful rest of the enemies of Islam and has offered a unique leadership for the Muslim Ummah. Leadership is an issue that has not been seriously and adequately examined by the traditional Islamic movements, although it is a crucial precondition for the unity of the Muslim Ummah.

The Global Islamic Movement:

Dr. Kalim Şiddiqi has made valuable contribution by conceptualizing the paradigm of the 'global Islamic movement' that has a leading edge over the traditional Islamic movements. The traditional Islamic movements are a disintegrating force now, because the context and approach of those movements are no longer relevant to and appropriate for the Muslim Ummah. Initially, it seemed that the traditional Islamic movements enthusiastically welcomed the Islamic Revolution. But as the new scenario of the global Islamic movement has come into shape rendering the approach and context of the traditional Islamic movements irrelevant, not willing to accept and be assimilated in the new context, it ultimately made them turn their backs on the Islamic Revolution. We are now in a transitional period of the emergence, growth, and consolidation of the global Islamic movement. It is of paramount importance to comprehend the new context and the transition. We will explore only a few related issues here.

The global Islamic movement as a result of the Islamic Revolution can be roughly characterized by (1) its total and uncompromising challenge to global *kufr*, *jāhiliyyah* and *istikbār*; (2) its centre is an Islamic state; (3) its cutting off all dependency relationship with the world of *jāhiliyyah*; (4) its methodology, based upon the movement led by Prophet Muhammad (S); (5) leadership of 'ulamā' and fuqahā'; (6) appropriate focus on the unity of the Muslim Ummah; (7) upholding Quranic humanitarianism, and righteousness and support of the oppressed on the basis of justice; (8) addressing the Muslim masses, not specific groups; (9) special focus on the role of *masjid* in organizing Islamic movement and Islamic society; (10) establishment of leadership of the "*Uli al-'amr minkum*" and (11) the predominant emphasis on

shahādah (martyrdom).

The awareness, recognition, and acceptance of the global Islamic movement, in no way, should mean denial of the role and contribution of the traditional Islamic movements in the Islamic reawakening of the Muslim Ummah in this century. However, it must be understood that the scenario and context has changed to which the traditional Islamic movements are no longer relevant. Furthermore, there were serious shortcomings in the traditional Islamic movements that rendered them barren and incapable of awakening the Muslim masses in their societies and mobilizing them to engage in struggle with world-*kufr*, let alone the possibility of victory out of that struggle. Failure to realize these now crystal clear issues has caused the traditional Islamic movements to distance themselves from the Islamic Revolution and the first Islamic State, which actually should be considered the end-product of all contemporary Islamic movements to date.

In this connection, I would like to share a viewpoint here that I feel is of tremendous importance.

An Implicit Assumption:

The traditional Islamic movements held an implicit assumption that Islamic revolutions are going to occur separately (to be more precise, independently of each other) in different countries, and there are going to be as many independent Islamic States as there are Muslim countries now. Later they might form some kind of Islamic federation to fulfil the requirements of unity of Muslim Ummah. Four points heavily discount such an assumption. Firstly, many of the general essential conditions (even those not peculiar to Iran) for an independent Islamic revolution do not exist, or not adequately, in the countries in which traditional Islamic movements operate. Detachment of the 'ulamā' from the real problems, sufferings, agony and frustration of the Muslim masses of these countries is a good example here. In these countries, it seems that the 'ulamā' have to be awakened first before they awaken others. Traditional Islamic movements in general have suffered due to lack of backing from the 'ulamā'.

Secondly, the traditional Islamic movements turning their back on the Islamic Revolution has created a vacuum and they are treading on a reactionary path now. They are not capable of bringing an independent Islamic revolution. On the other hand, those who are filling the gap by coming under the banner of the global Islamic movement are obviously very much linked with the Islamic Revolution.

Thirdly, the unity of the Muslim Ummah, which is of crucial importance, cannot emerge from the bottom and without addressing the question of leadership. That the traditional Islamic movements have

been unable to preserve the internal unity of the respective movements; have failed to provide a proper focus on the issue of unity, achieving little success in integrating the traditional Islamic movements; and finally have turned against the first (and probably, in the contemporary stage, the last) independent Islamic Revolution, precludes the possibility that they will be able to integrate and unify the Islamic movements.

Fourthly, *kufr*, *jāhiliyyah* and *istikbār* are a well-knit world-wide phenomenon which is united to contain and confront the Muslim Ummah. The Muslim countries and their societies are not truly independent to admit the possibility of bringing isolated Islamic revolutions in their countries within the framework of the traditional Islamic movements.

These observations have very important implications. Firstly, the Islamic Revolution has greater responsibility in awakening the Muslim Ummah and leading the global Islamic movement. It does not exclude the responsibility of others, but evidently, 'leadership' has to 'lead'. Secondly, those who recognize and accept the global Islamic movement, must accept the 'leading edge' of the Islamic Revolution and the leadership of the Islamic Revolution as the leadership of Muslim Ummah. As the world-*kufr* has to be confronted with the concerted effort of the Ummah, the Islamic State established after the Islamic Revolution must be considered as the centre of Ummah in this battle. Hence, stabilizing, safeguarding and strengthening the Islamic State must be given due priority. The third implication is also of equal importance, and the rest of this paper will concentrate on this implication.

It is unfortunate and regrettable, but a reality that historically Muslims have been divided as Sunnī and Shi'ah. The traditional Islamic movements have been operating mostly in the Sunnī part of the world. To their utter surprise, the Islamic Revolution took place in Iran. The traditional Islamic movements did not have any bias against Shi'ism. On the contrary, the ranks of Jamā'at-e-Islāmī included and absorbed both. The Ikhwān's leadership went even further under Shahīd Imām Ḥasan al-Bannā to reduce the gap between the two groups. The case of the Islamic Revolution, however, was different to them. They thought that the Islamic Revolution of Iran was an irregular, accidental one that did not follow a concrete, systematic methodology. Internally they even considered that ultimately they would be able to straighten the irregularity of the Islamic Revolution and mend it to align with them as soon as possible. Actually the whole perception was wrong. Their attachment with and passive attitude toward the reactionary anti-Islamic regimes who viciously fomented the Shi'ah-Sunnī controversy soon entrapped the traditional Islamic movements. Significant

dependence on these regimes combined with other issues soon involved the traditional Islamic movements to tune themselves with the on-going vicious propaganda. Now they are branding the Islamic Revolution as a Shi'ite one, denying its uniqueness, and going even to the extent of leading the propaganda in some countries. The Islamic movements could have been of immense help not only in countering the propaganda of the enemies of Islam, but also fostering better, congenial atmosphere in the Muslim world. Surprisingly enough, the traditional 'ulamā' are coming closer toward the global Islamic movement. This Shi'ah-Sunni aspect would significantly determine the course of global Islamic movement in future because now the Islamic Revolution has to work among and with the Sunni world, which numerically constitutes the vast majority of the Muslim Ummah.

Strong and vicious propaganda by the enemies of Islam; ignorance and passivity of the Muslim masses toward their own history; the fact that the 'leading edge' of the global Islamic struggle now comes from Shi'ah minority whose very emergence was related to challenging the legitimacy of the Khulafā'-i-rāshidūn, whom the Sunnis consider to be their leaders and source of inspiration; and historical dependence of the 'ulamā' on un-Islamic rulers and systems, and their general complicity with them, pose great difficulty in overcoming these obstacles. Nevertheless, assumption of active role by some 'ulamā', such as Hāfizjī Huzūr in Bangladesh and Mawlānā 'Abd Allāh Bukhārī of India, indicates a new trend which undoubtedly will be of special help to overcome this problem.

In this context, I would like to make a few observations which should receive serious consideration at least of the concerned Muslims. Two facts must always be borne in our mind. Firstly, the Shi'ah and Sunnis are not so because of their own conscious choice. Their self-identification as such merely reflects the fact that they were born either in a Shi'ah or Sunni family, which determined their attachment and sense of belonging. Secondly, it can hardly be disputed that the Shi'ah are going to remain Shi'ah and the Sunnis as Sunni. Any effort to promote either one of them and trying to impress either of 'isms' on each other is neither desirable nor useful. Therefore, both sides need to realize that: (1) working together, they need to delineate Shi'ism proper and Sunnism proper, so that knowledge and understanding of historical developments are brought into appropriate perspective and romanticization of history or deviation from actual teaching of al-Qur'ān and al-Sunnah is minimized; (2) despite many disagreements, mutual tolerance, recognition and respect must be promoted.

It may be appropriate at this point to offer a few humble suggestions for consideration of both sides. As a Sunni, I would like to draw attention of Sunni brothers to the following points. We must

identify, recognize and accept Sunnism proper. If we believe that the Khulafā'-i-rāshidūn are the true successors of our beloved Prophet Muhammad (S), then we must follow their examples faithfully that will be in accordance with the dictates and spirit of the Quran and the Sunnah. The period of the Khulafā'-i-rāshidūn crystalizes the fact that there must be a single and unified leadership of the Muslim Ummah, and the candidates for such leadership, those who qualify to be *Uli al-'amr*, must possess at least the following qualifications: (a) he must not be power-hungry nor inclined to impose his leadership by force; (b) he must be the best person available in *'ilm*, *'amal* and *taqwā*; (c) he must possess the capability of *ijtihād* and a passion for implementation of justice (*'adālah*); (d) he must be committed to the mission of the Islamic movement; and (e) he must reject all forms of hereditary monarchy, or systems that do not carry the consent of the Muslim masses.

We, the Sunnis, must realize that Sunnism does not harmonize with monarchical rule as started from the father of Yazid. Sunnism does not mean compromise at the expense of principles. Sunnism does not mean passivism. It cannot mean strengthening the hands of the enemies of Islam. Sunnism does not mean tolerance of *ẓulm* and *jāhiliyyah*, of secularism and nationalism, of capitalism and communism. Sunnism does not mean indifference to human misery and the plight of the Muslim Ummah in particular and all *mustaḍ'afūn* (oppressed) in general.

If Sunnism does not mean deviation from the Quran then we must offer our allegiance (*iṭā'ah*) only to true *Uli al-'amr*. We must endeavour and struggle to establish Islamic society of which the Islamic State is a concrete form, following the example of Khulafā'-i-rāshidūn. If we accept Abū Ḥanīfah, al-Shāfi'ī and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal as our religious authority, then we must also accept the following aspects of their lives: They did not cooperate in any way with un-Islamic rulers; we must not do it either. They lent support to the forces who were fighting the contemporary un-Islamic forces of *kufr*, *ẓulm*, and imperialism; we must lend our support, too, to the appropriate forces. They did not compromise their principles for worldly gains or due to fear of anything other than Allāh; we must not compromise either. These observations make it crystally clear that Sunnism proper makes it incumbent upon us to accept the leadership of the Islamic Revolution as the leadership of the Muslim Ummah and, joining shoulder to shoulder to form the basis of the unity of the Muslim Ummah, struggle to establish Islamic society and repel the evil forces of Zionism, Western imperialism, both the capitalist and the communist, and their puppets. Otherwise, Sunnism will merely become 'what is not Shi'ism.'

It was mentioned earlier that if 'leadership' has to 'lead' then the responsibility of the Islamic Revolution is greater. It needs to be clearly

recognized that Sunnis are going to remain Sunnis. Therefore, to broaden the base of the Islamic Revolution and to undercut the roots of disunity, Sunnis have to be communicated as Sunnis. The Islamic Revolution can urge the Sunnis to follow Sunnism proper, which surely can provide a framework for political unity of the Muslim Ummah. Significant contributions have been made by the leaders of Islamic Revolution to reduce the gap. However, at least in the following areas improvement has become essential: (1) It seems that most of the propagation material from the core of the Islamic Revolution is reaching the rest of the Muslim world (which is basically Sunni), as if the purpose of that literature is primarily to promote Shi'ism. Both sides need to be educated about each other, but to represent the leadership of the Muslim Ummah, both Sunnis and Shi'ah are to be represented. Sunnis have to be encouraged and enlightened in the Sunnism-proper framework. For example, magazines like *Echo of Islam* can contain articles on the lives of Khulafā'-i-rāshidūn based on Sunni sources. Then question can be posed to the Sunnis, that if in their time there was only one leader for the Ummah, how do we accept multiplicity now. If they are the example for the Sunnis, how do the Sunnis comply with or condone the secular, corrupt, oppressive, deviant, un-Islamic or anti-Islamic leaderships? If 'Umar (R.A) was concerned even about a hungry dog under his leadership, how do they condone the rule or systems that do not do anything to alleviate the people's problems, or rather even cause them? If Muslims at those times could stop the khalifah during his *khutbah*, how do the Sunnis today go along with the kind of leadership which is ready and willing to chop the heads of those who struggle in the path of Islam?

Similarly, the Sunni world cannot be successfully communicated with if while discussing exemplary Muslim women only Fāṭimah (R.A) and Khadijah (R.A) are focused, but other personalities like 'Ā'ishah (R.A) are totally ignored. Also, the Sunni world needs to be familiarized with the Islamic personalities and literature of the Shi'ah world. But very frequently, particular personalities are promoted in many books heavily discounting the personalities who are unanimously respected by the Sunnis. A good example is al-Shaykh al-Mufīd's *Kitāb al-'Irshād*. In this respect, communication with the Sunni world would be much more easier and effective if movement-oriented Sunni books are utilized by the Islamic Revolution.

A fundamental problem in the contemporary Sunni world is lack of leadership and the major task is to expand the global Islamic movement in this part of the Muslim world.

The framework of global Islamic movement presented earlier can easily fit Sunnism proper, except for the lack of leadership. The leadership of Imam Khumaynī uniquely bridges that gap. Beyond these

aspects, if serious considerations are not given to address these crucial issues, and effective measures are not taken without delay, then as time passes, the unique opportunity of reducing the gap to the desired level may be significantly lost.

Conclusion:

The global Islamic movement reflects strong potential to awaken, organize and unite the Muslim Ummah to engage it in the on-going struggle between Islam and *kufr*. The global Islamic movement has reached the horizon where issues related to the Shi'ah-Sunni context have to be addressed more concretely without delay. Similarly, the Sunni world must not lose this unique opportunity to unite itself around the core of the Islamic Revolution and the unique leadership of Imam Khumayni to get rid of the chains of un-Islamic socio-political systems, and join hands together in furthering the cause of Islam, a true opportunity which has appeared for all of us. Let us unchain ourselves, so that we can hold one another's hand warmly and firmly and raise the flag of Islam high.

ANNOUNCEMENT

With the aim of promotion of Islamic values and to provide guiding assistance, the Islamic Propagation Organization has formed The International Inquiry Unit to answer all kinds of questions and inquiries which are directed to this unit about doctrinal, legal, social, political, and economic issues of Islam and the Muslim world.

Muslims from any part of the world may direct their questions on any of the above-mentioned topics in any of these three languages: English, Arabic, and Urdu, to *The International Inquiry Unit, Islamic Propagation Organization, P.O.Box No. 1784-14155, Tehran, The Islamic Republic of Iran*, or contact Telex No. *IRO/IR 213980*.

The sender of the inquiries is requested to mention his: (1) complete name; (2) educational qualifications; (3) complete address, so as to assist this unit in proper and speedy processing of the inquiries sent.

The International Inquiry Unit

**The Islamic Propagation Organization
P.O.Box 1784-14155, Tehran,
The Islamic Republic of Iran**

Introduction to Imāmiyyah Scholars: Al-Kulaynī and His Works: *Part 2*

by Dr. Wahīd Akhtar

REASON AND KNOWLEDGE IN ISLAM: AL-KULAYNĪ 'S EMPHASIS:

It is one of the great mysteries of history how a people as backward in all the spheres of knowledge as the Arabs could master all contemporary sciences and cultural refinements in less than a century after embracing Islam. There are some instances in history of nations or tribes storming culturally advanced nations and great empires crumbling down in the face of the hordes of invading armies arising from some lesser known part of the world. But such conquering forces destroyed both civilization and knowledge, and the vanquished were destroyed totally. On the contrary, the conquest of the known world by the Arabs brought for the conquered people a kind of renaissance in its wake. They did never destroy any culture or its accomplishments in different fields of knowledge, but rather gave them a new impetus and energy by substituting obsolete notions about reality with new notions far more inspiring and dynamic than old ones. The stories concocted by the historians with bias against Islam narrating burning of libraries and destruction of institutions of culture and learning by the Muslims do not stand serious and critical scrutiny, which actually proves the opposite. How could a nation unknown for its love of knowledge and culture come to respect alien cultures and knowledge? Any answer to this question cannot be satisfactory without taking into consideration different dimensions of the miracle Islam performed in transforming illiterate people into a body of knowledge seekers. No other religion put so much stress on reasoning and knowledge as Islam did. It is a very popular notion among the secular intellectuals that religion is born of ignorance and prospers in ignorance. The Quran falsifies this notion. People were not invited to accept Islam with any kind of threat or force, but they were asked to think and ponder on the signs of God in the nature and all its phenomena. The first verse of the Quran revealed to the Prophet (S) begins with the command to read in the name of God (*اقْرَأْ بِاسْمِ رَبِّكَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ* *). Knowledge is one of the attributes of Divine

Being, and it is considered the highest virtue of human beings according to the Holy Book and the prophetic tradition (ḥadith). What encouraged and stimulated Muslims to respect and acquire knowledge and spread it among the masses is this emphasis on the value of knowledge in Islam. It is, therefore, no wonder that the Arabs, proud of their ignorance (*jāhiliyyah*) before appearance of Muḥammad (S), turned to be lovers of knowledge after coming into the fold of Islam. Islam generated in them a spirit of enquiry and rational thinking, which they brought with them to all parts of the world conquered by them. They destroyed only that part of others' faith which was irrational and conflicted with the Quranic teachings, but at the same time made full use of various sciences developed by different people. Both the Quran and the prophetic tradition enjoin the believers to gain knowledge from each and every source, for it is the lost paradise and ought to be regained, wherever its traces are found, they should be picked up and woven together to suit the body of the believers.

In the Quran alone there are 704 verses in which either the word *'ilm* or words of the same derivation are used. These words occur in the Quran in the following order: *a'lam* 49 times, *al-'ilm* 80 times, *a'lamu* 11 times, *'alim* 162 times, *'ālim* 13 times, *'ilman* 14 times, *i'lamū* 27 times, *ma'lūm* and *ma'lūmāt* 13 times, *ya'lamūn* 85 times, *ya'lamu* 93 times, *ta'lamūn* 56 times. Pen and book are essential aids of knowledge, of them *qalam* occurs 2 times and *al-kitāb* occurs 230 times. Moreover, a number of words related to 'writing, like *katāba*, *katābnā*, *kutiba*, *kātib*, *yaktubu*, *naktubu*, are used in a number of verses. The total number of the Quranic verses using the words related to 'writing' is 319. The word *'kitāb*' for the Quran is used on 81 different occasions.¹ This is enough to show to what extent knowledge and the means of its acquisition are emphasized in the Quran. How could a people believing in the Divine origin of the Quran ignore the value of knowledge. Muslim historians concede that the second caliph was opposed to preserving the Prophet's traditions in writing for some reasons, but it was he who started the practice of keeping records of the citizens of the Muslim state and accounts of *bayt al-māl* (public treasury) and asked his governors to do the same. The Prophet (S) himself asked many of his Companions to write down the Quranic verses, and several *Ṣaḥābah* served as his *kātib*s for official correspondence. Among them the most prominent is 'Alī (A), who is also reported to have compiled a collection of aḥādīth. According to the authentic Shi'i sources, Fāṭimah (A), the daughter of the Prophet (S), is the first person to have kept a written record of the sayings of the Prophet (S) during his own lifetime. These two, the dearest and nearest to the Prophet (S), in reality acted upon the advice or rather command of the Prophet (S), who asked his followers to "preserve

knowledge in written form." In all the collections of ḥadīth compiled by various *muḥaddithūn* belonging to different Muslim sects, there are a large number of traditions emphasizing the great value of knowledge and its accessories.

Besides the Quran, the prophetic traditions also give great importance to knowledge as well as reason. Accordingly al-Kulayni devoted the first chapter of the *Uṣūl al-Kāfī* to reason and ignorance, *Kitāb al-'aql wa al-jahl*. Al-Kulayni, in accordance with the Shi'i faith, regards reason as the essential prerequisite of *īmān*. He has narrated a ḥadīth according to which the Prophet (S) advised the believers to evaluate one's reason if they wanted to estimate the worth of his good deeds, for one would be judged (by God) keeping in view his power of intellect.²

In order to elaborate the meaning of this ḥadīth, al-Imām Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (A), the sixth Imam of the Prophet's lineage, said that one would be rewarded or punished on the day of retribution in accordance with his rational faculty. Aṣḥab ibn Nabātah narrates from Imam 'Alī (A), Amīr al-Mu'minin, that: Jibra'il (A) came to Adam, and told him that he was assigned (by God) to award him one thing of his choice from among three things. Adam asked him to enumerate those three things. Jibra'il said, 'They are: reason (*'aql*), modesty (*ḥayā'*) and faith (*dīn*).' Adam chose reason. Jibra'il addressed himself to modesty and faith, 'Adam has chosen reason and rejected you.' Both of them said, 'O Jibra'il, we have been ordered to stay with reason.' Jibra'il told them to look after their affairs, and returned to the Heaven.³ This story narrated by 'Alī (A) has great symbolic significance. It means that, in Islam, reason, modesty—which is the basis of morality—and faith are inseparable, and that reason is the binding force.

That is why al-Imām al-Riḍā (A) said: 'Reason is the friend of every human being and ignorance is his worst enemy.'⁴ The Prophet's emphasis on reason is more explicitly stated in the following tradition:

God has not conferred any thing better on His creatures than reason (wisdom). Sleep of a wise man is better than awakening of an ignorant; rest of a wise man (in a place) is better than a journey performed (for *ḥajj* and *jihād*) by an ignorant. God did not appoint His messengers but for the sake of perfecting human reason, and their reason is superior to that of the whole ummah. And what is wished by prophets is preferable to *ijtihād* of *mujtahidūn*. Man cannot fulfil his obligations unless he rationally estimates their worth. All the worshippers weighed together cannot be equal to the dust of a wise man's foot.⁵

Al-Imām Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (A) was asked to explain what reason is. He said: 'It is the means through which we worship God and attain Heaven.'⁶ He said on another occasion: 'He who is wise is a true believer.' The fourteenth ḥadīth of the *Uṣūl al-Kāfī* gives an elaborate

account of reason's attending virtues and ignorance's attending vices, each of them has a body of 75 forces to combat the other.⁷ This and other traditions of the Prophet (S) and Imams of his lineage place reason higher than all virtues, and regard morality as well as faith inseparable parts of it.

It is evident from al-Kulayni's arrangement of the traditions that he believes reason is not only the source of knowledge but also fountainhead of moral strength. The message of God which prophets are responsible for conveying to human beings aims at nothing but inviting people to follow the dictates of reason. Reason is the essence of religion and religion is the embodiment of reason.

Reason is empty without knowledge and knowledge is blind without reason. Islam, therefore, considers knowledge to be the highest virtue, and it is made obligatory for every Muslim to acquire it from all sources, irrespective of their religious character. Knowledge is universal and all believers have to attain it, for knowledge, in the words of the Prophet (S), is the property of the believers. The Prophet (S) defines knowledge as that which is essentially useful.⁸ Many centuries before the advent of any philosophy of pragmatism, Islam anticipated the principle of the utility of knowledge, and stressed upon the instrumentality of knowledge in changing and moulding the social and physical environment for the betterment of humanity. Thus, it is Islam which for the first time in the history of ideas advanced the utilitarian and humanitarian conception of knowledge. No branch of knowledge is prohibited for Muslims. Some orthodox Muslim scholars have made distinction between useful and useless kinds of knowledge, but we have to scrutinize the prophetic traditions forwarded in their support very cautiously. Those forms of knowledge which are considered as useless or rather harmful, in my view, do not actually deserve to be called knowledge at all. Such types of the so-called knowledge are mere illusory constructions of some illusion or superstition, like astrology, palmistry, etc. Knowledge is in no case useless, howsoever remote and far-fetched it may seem apparently. For instance, fundamental researches in theoretical physics or pure mathematics or logic, formal or symbolic, or metaphysical speculations appear to be useless and futile exercises at a superficial glance, but in reality they ultimately lead to far-reaching results highly useful for humanity, and make invaluable contributions to human understanding of reality. Al-Ghazali's criticism of some branches of physics or mathematics or some other branches of knowledge is, therefore, not only misconceived but also contrary to the Islamic attitude towards knowledge. His repudiation of certain sciences in general, and his destruction of philosophy in particular, in the long run proved to be disastrous for the Muslim world. So far as Muslims pursued knowledge with religious devotion, they ruled the world and

remained at the helm of world politics, but as soon as their progress in this field was hindered by misconceived notions, their politico-economic decline set in along with intellectual degeneration. It is not unjustifiable to suppose that alien influences played an important role in bringing about such a radical and reactionary change in the attitude of Muslims towards knowledge. Islam had placed knowledge higher than all other virtues, and never asked its followers to believe in irrational doctrines and behave blindly. The Prophet (S) and his spiritual successors encouraged Muslims to pursue knowledge unceasingly and they were advised to acquire it even from non-Muslims. The true teachers of Islam made it obligatory on a learned person to disseminate his knowledge among his fellow believers. There are many traditions criticizing the scholars who keep their knowledge to themselves and do not benefit their fellow beings. Life of a recluse is not considered good for any individual. Asceticism is strictly prohibited in Islam. The main reason for this Islamic teaching is that an ascetic is of no use to society. Another condition for a scholar is that he ought to act according to his knowledge, and must not teach others that upon which he does not act himself. Practicability is the test of the validity of knowledge, and he who has knowledge but does not act accordingly is not a wise person; he cannot be even considered a knowledgeable person. A scholar alienated from society is as useless as a pious person estranged from others. Knowledge has a social as well as a spiritual value, it is rather "the value of all values."

According to al-Kulaynī, the Prophet (S) divided knowledge into three kinds: strong signs of reality (*āyah-ye muḥkamah*); just obligation (*farīdah-ye 'ādilah*); and right tradition (*sunnat-e qā'imah*). It is said in the interpretation of this ḥadīth that knowledge has three meanings; in one sense it is opinion unconfirmed empirically; in the second sense it is information, which is opposite of ignorance; and in the third sense it is awareness of the general laws and principles governing a particular aspect of reality. In the above-quoted ḥadīth, knowledge refers to the last two senses of the word. *Āyah-ye muḥkamah* (perhaps in the sense of self-evident undisputable verses of the Quran) is the knowledge concerning fundamentals of the faith, which have their origin in the Quran; *farīdah-ye 'ādilah* concerns individual and social ethics, which helps us in discriminating between the attendant virtues of reason and accompanying vices of ignorance, it is a knowledge which particularly requires to be acted upon; *sunnat-e qā'imah* is the law of Shari'ah.⁹ What is here important to be noted is that Islam does not exclude any aspect of life and human activity from the fundamentals of faith, ethics and Shari'ah; these three combined together embrace all spheres of life. Hence it can be concluded that the Islamic concept of knowledge is vast enough to accommodate all forms and levels of

knowledge. Knowledge being an indivisible whole is intuitive as well as rational, *a priori* as well as *a posteriori*, deductive as well as inductive—no level of knowledge excludes other levels. The generally accepted classification of knowledge, viz. natural sciences, social sciences, humanities and fine arts, is nothing but a convenient arrangement for making the study of various aspects of reality and different levels of intellectual activity possible. It was this conception of reason and knowledge which transformed the lives of Muslims within a short span of time and made them masters of all available knowledge. Another significant point to be made note of is concerning Islamic notion of reason. Sometimes reason and knowledge are used as synonyms. Usually reason includes intuition and mystic or creative experience as well. Hence the traditional dichotomies of epistemology, that create problems in different theories of knowledge, are automatically resolved in the Islamic view of knowledge.

It may be summed up that knowledge, according to Islam, has five constituents: revelation (*wahy*) as the guiding principle of all knowledge; tradition (*sunnah*) as an ideal of all moral and intellectual activity; ratiocination (*ta'qqul*) or philosophization as the means of systematization of knowledge; scientific induction as the basis of empirical knowledge of reality; and last but not the least in importance is exercise of reason in the matters of religious affairs, for which the proper Islamic term is *ijtihad*. This all-embracing conception of knowledge inspired the Muslims to acquire all types of knowledge with a view to mould them according to the Islamic ideals.

Reason (*'aql*) is the source and test of knowledge; though subordinated to the dictates of revelation, it fulfils the function of enquiry and thought. It arranges all the impressions and informations gathered from different sources, viz. sense-perception, revelation, tradition, intuition, etc., and formulates the laws of the association of ideas for inferring general principles and universal concepts and notions from the cognized data, and then by applying those general principles to particular cases arrives at definite conclusions. Reason's function is induction as well as deduction, analysis as well as synthesis. Its scope is much wider than that of logic, for it also discriminates between good and evil (morality), beauty and ugliness (aesthetics), and serves as a test of right and wrong (Shari'ah law). This broad concept of reason evolves from the *ahadith* of the Prophet (S) and the *A'immah* (A) in conformity with the Quran. The early Imamiyyah scholars remained content with narrating the traditions, and did not make any attempt to define and determine the role of reason. Historically speaking, al-Shaykh al-Mufid (d. 413/1022) is the first Imamiyyah scholar who referred to reason (in the sense of both *nazar* and *'aql*) as one of the grounds (*adillah*) of *fiqh*. He also advanced a general definition of

reason in the following words : 'Reason is a means of cognizance of the authenticity of the Quran and Sunnah.' Al-Shaykh al-Mufīd wrote a treatise (*risālah*) on *uṣūl al-fiqh*. 'Alam al-Hudā al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā (355-436/967-1044) and al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, popularly known as Shaykh al-Ṭā'ifāh, (385-460/995-1067-68) pursued the work initiated by their teacher and compiled works on *uṣūl al-fiqh* (the principles of jurisprudence in Islam), emphasizing and making use of 'aql or *nazar* in the matters of legislation. Due to the paucity of independent writings of the Imāmiyyah scholars in *ilm al-kalām* and *uṣūl al-fiqh* it is conjectured, of course, unjustifiably, on the basis of some scattered and scanty evidence, that they were opposed to the exercise of reason ('aql) in religious affairs. Dr. Dhabiḥ Allāh Ṣafā, in his *Tārīkh-e 'ulūm-e 'aqlī dar tamaddun-e Islāmī* and *Tārīkh-e adabiyyāt-e Iran*¹⁰, and Martin J. Mcdermott, in his *The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd*¹¹, have subscribed to this view on the ground that the Shi'ah scholars along with *Ahl al-ḥadīth* and *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* opposed and criticized Mu'tazilah theologians. Dhabiḥ Allāh Ṣafā's conjecture is implicit and indirect, while Mcdermott's is explicit and direct. Though Mcdermott concedes that a Mu'tazilite school founded by al-Mu'tamir (d. 210/825) in Baghdad was pro-'Alid (i.e. pro-Shi'ah), he conveniently ignores the attitude of early Mu'tazilite thinkers, who were influenced by the Shi'ah on the issues of the Divine Essence and Attributes (*Dhāt wa Ṣifāt*), 'adl (justice), freedom of will (*qadar* or *ikhtiyār*) and the *Imāmah* (spiritual leadership of 'Alī and his descendants). Al-'Ash'arī's claim that the early Shi'ī scholars held anthropomorphism, and much later they accepted the Mu'tazilite theses on God's Unity (*tawḥīd*), and Ibn Taymiyyah's judgement that the Shi'ah borrowed important doctrines from the Mu'tazilites towards the end of the third century (A.H.) are accepted by Mcdermott uncritically. The significance of the *Uṣūl al-Kāfi* lies in the fact that al-Kulaynī compiled the tradition of the Prophet (S) and the Imams (A) highlighting the value of reason, and thus supporting rationalism in theology, which falsifies all such claims and conjectures. In this context Murtaḍā Muṭahharī has made a valuable contribution to the understanding of the actual position of the Imāmiyyah Shi'ah through his small but significant book *Introduction to 'Ilm al-Kalām*.¹² The following passages from this book bring to light the importance of the Shi'ī ḥadīth literature in general, and the *Uṣūl al-Kāfi* in particular, in the emergence of the Shi'ite *kalām*:

The Shi'ite *kalām*, on the one hand, emerges from the core of Shi'ite ḥadīth, and, on the other, is mixed with Shi'ite philosophy. We have seen how in the early centuries, *kalām* was considered to be inimical to the Sunnah and the ḥadīth by the *Ahl al-Sunnah*. But the Shi'ite *kalām* not only does not come into conflict with the Sunnah and the ḥadīth, it is firmly rooted in the Sunnah and the ḥadīth. The reason is that the Shi'ite ḥadīth, contrary to the

Sunni corpus on ḥadīth, consists of numerous traditions in which profound metaphysical or social problems have been dealt with logically and analyzed rationally. But in the Sunni corpus such analytic treatment of these subjects is missing. For instance, if there is any mention of such problems as that of Divine providence and predetermination, the all-embracing Will of the Almighty, the Divine Names, Attributes, or such topics as the soul, the life after death, the final reckoning, the *Ṣirāt*, the Balance, or such issues as (the) *Imāmah*, *Khilāfah*, and the like, there is no argument or rational explanation of the topics mentioned. But in the Shī'ah corpus on ḥadīth all such issues have been dealt with in a rational and discursive manner. A comparison between the list of the chapters of the six *Ṣiḥāḥ* and that of al-Kulaynī's *al-Kāfi* will make this quite clear.

Accordingly, *kalām*, in the sense of rational and analytical treatment of problems, is found in the Shī'ah ḥadīth. This is the reason why the Shī'ah were not divided into two groups, like the Sunnis were, into 'Ahl al-ḥadīth' and 'Ahl al-kalām'.¹³

Muṭahhari, justifiably, holds that many notions and issues, which were later taken up by different schools of *kalām*, were advanced by 'Alī (A) in his sermons and discussions with profound rational and demonstrative arguments. He refers to such problems as Divine Essence and Attributes, temporality (*ḥudūth*), pre-eternity (*qidam*), simplicity (*basāṭah*), compositeness (*tarkīb*), unity (*waḥdah*) and plurality (*kathrah*).¹⁴ In his view, the first Shī'ah writer to compile a book on the doctrines of faith was 'Alī ibn Ismā'il ibn Mitham al-Tammār, the grandson of Mitham, a close companion of 'Alī (A), and was a contemporary of Abū al-Hudhayl al-'Allāf, generally supposed to be the founder of *i'tizāl* (Mu'tazilah school) during the first half of the second century.¹⁵ Muṭahhari also refers to a group of *mutakallimūn* during the same period:

Among the companions of al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A), there is a group of individuals referred to as '*mutakallimūn*' by the Imam (A) himself, such as Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam, Hishām ibn Salīm, Ḥumrān ibn A'yan, Abū Ja'far al-'Aḥwal—known as 'Mu'min al-Ṭāq'—Qays ibn Māsar, and others.

Al-Kāfi relates the story of a debate between this group and an opponent in the presence of al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A), which pleased him. This group lived during the first half of the second century, and was trained by al-Imām al-Ṣādiq (A).¹⁶

It is further stated that Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam was treated by the Imam with more respect than those who distinguished themselves in *tafsīr*, *fiqh* or *ḥadīth*.¹⁷

In the light of the above-quoted passages from Muṭahhari's book, the *Uṣūl al-Kāfi* establishes itself as one of the earliest and the most authentic sources of rational *kalām* also, and all the conjectures regarding a transition from traditionism to a later rationalism in the Shī'ī thought are dispelled and refuted. It is now clear why al-Kulaynī,

despite being a *muḥaddith*, accorded the position of honour to the traditions praising knowledge and reason and defining their role in both the worldly and other-worldly matters. Being a great scholar of his time, al-Kulayni could not have been unaware of the discussions prevalent in *kalām* and philosophy; contrarily he should have been conscious of all the developments made in these fields. If not taken as a conclusive proof of al-Kulayni's knowledge of the philosophical and dialectical controversies, the *Uṣūl al-Kāfi* deserves to be treated as an indicator of the Shi'i Imāmiyyah rational approach to religion and theology. A cursory glance at the traditions collected in the *Kitāb al-'aql wa al-jahl* is sufficient to substantiate this point. Reason, according to al-Kulayni, seems to fulfil a twofold function: on the one hand it is a source of authenticating and interpreting the two primary sources of Shari'ah, i.e. the Quran and the Sunnah, on the other, it has to traverse its path in the light of the Quran and the Sunnah.

In the *Uṣūl al-Kāfi*, besides the traditions quoted above, there are a number of significant traditions which highlight the worth and function of reason. In the tradition No. 12, narrated from al-Imām Abū al-Ḥasan Mūsā ibn Ja'far (A), it is stated :

O Hishām! It is through reason and understanding that God has completed evidence and proof (in respect of Himself and His religion) for mankind. He has helped His prophets and messengers by endowing them with the gift of elocution and guided them to comprehend His Overlordship through reason and understanding. As He Himself has said:

وَالْهُكْمُ إِلَهٌ وَاحِدٌ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ الرَّحْمَنُ الرَّحِيمُ * إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ وَالْفُلْكِ الَّتِي تَجْرِي فِي الْبَحْرِ بِمَا يَنْفَعُ النَّاسَ وَمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مِنْ مَاءٍ فَأَحْيَا بِهِ الْأَرْضَ بَعْدَ مَوْتِهَا وَبَثَّ فِيهَا مِنْ كُلِّ دَابَّةٍ وَتَضْرِبِ الرِّيحِ وَالسَّحَابِ الْمُسَخَّرِينَ السَّمَاءِ وَالْأَرْضِ لآيَاتٍ لِقَوْمٍ يَعْقِلُونَ *

*And your God is One God! There is no god but He, the All-merciful, the All-compassionate. Surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of night and day, and the ship that sails in the sea with profit to men, and the water God sends down from the heaven therewith reviving the earth after it is dead, and His scattering abroad in it all kinds of crawling creatures, and the turning about of the winds and the clouds suspended between the heaven and earth—surely there are signs for a people who think and understand.*¹⁸ (2: 163, 164)

In the same tradition, al-Imām Mūsā ibn Ja'far further quotes the following Quranic verses: 16:12; 40:67; 45:5; 57:17; 13:4; 30:24;

6:152; 30:28; 6:32; 37:136-138; 29:34,35; 29:43; 2:170; 21:171; 10:42; 25:44; 59:14; 2:44; 6:116; 31:25; 29:63; 34:13; 38:24; 40:28; 11:40; 6:37; 7:131; 8:34; 10:55; 27:61; 28:57; 39:49; 44:39; 52:47; 5:103; 10:60; 27:73; 2:269; 3:7; 3:190; 13:19; 39:9; 38:29; 40:53,54; 51:55; 50:37; 31:12; 3:8.

This tradition is actually a treatise on reason and its various functions in the light of the Quran. It emphasizes the value of observation, experience, understanding, and even scientific induction. Iqbāl, in the *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, quotes a few Quranic verses to show that it is the Quran which laid down the basic principles of scientific induction for the first time, but the tradition, quoted here, refers to a greater number of the Quranic verses for making out this point, without using philosophical or logical terms. Moreover, certain checks and balances on the use of reason, are also suggested:

O Hishām! One who allows a set of three things to be dominated by another set of three things has actually undone his reason. The first thing is to allow the reason to be dominated by excessive hopes and expectations. The second thing is to allow the highest of wisdom to be dominated by excessive utterances. The third thing is to allow his admonitory light to be extinguished by carnal desires. In fact, such a person undoes his reason by his carnal desires. And one who destroys his reason, also destroys both his worldly life and faith.¹⁹

There are many other significant points made out in this tradition: there are two proofs of God—explicit and implicit: the explicit proof is embodied in prophets and Imams, while the implicit proof is represented by the faculty of reasoning; virtuous conduct of a learned man, howsoever limited, is more valuable, in the eyes of God, than virtuous conduct of an ignorant person; limited material possessions with sound wisdom are perfectly acceptable to a man of reason; a man of reason prefers the life of the Hereafter to the worldly life.

Reason, in the light of the tradition under discussion, is a guide in the matters of morality also. Al-Imām Mūsā ibn Ja'far (A) refers to Amīr al-Mu'minīn 'Alī (A) as saying:

Of all the observances and devotions offered to God the best one is of and by (the people of) reason. Reason of a person does not reach perfection unless it possesses some specific characteristics. The characteristics are: (1) it gives immunity against disbelief and evil; (2) virtue and true guidance are expected to flow from such a man; (3) he expends his superfluous wealth in good deeds; (4) he protects himself from irresponsible gossip; (5) his share in the worldly life confines to what is required for his subsistence; (6) he is never fed up with knowledge throughout his life; (7) humiliation in pursuit of God is dearer to him than any honour in pursuit of things other than God; (8) humility is dearer to him than any dignity; (9) he regards the little good of

others to him as much, and the good from him to others as little; (10) he evaluates all other persons as better than himself, and regards himself in the heart of his heart as of little consequence.

.... Amīr al-Mu'minīn 'Alī (A) used to say: 'Of the signs of a man of reason, one is that he has got three characteristics: (1) he replies only when he is questioned; (2) speaks when all others fail; and (3) advises what is suitable for the good of a person. One who has none of the three said qualities is stupid.'²⁰

At the end of this tradition al-Imām Mūsā ibn Ja'far (A) also refers to al-Imām al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī (A) and al-Imām 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn (A); the former defines competence in terms of reason, and the latter says that the company of the learned improves our reason.

A full discussion of the tradition under study requires a lengthy thesis. In short it can be said that this tradition covers all the facets and aspects of theoretical as well as practical reason—which, according to Kant, is the source of all morality; it is also the source of authenticity, the innermost experience. In this context, aḥadīth Nos. 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, and 25 from the *Kitāb al-'aql wa al-jahl* may be studied in detail. Hadīth No. 35, narrated from Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Imām Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (A), which throws light on various functions of reason, may be quoted here in parts:

The initiation, fulfilment and completion of anything or any task that is beneficial cannot be undertaken without reason, which has been designed by God as the light and ornament for all the creation. It is through reason that man recognizes his Creator. It is through reason that they recognize themselves to be not self-created, but realize that God is their Disposer and that they are at His disposal. It is through reason that they comprehend the purpose behind the creation of the heavens, the earth, the sun, the moon, the night and the day. It is through reason that they realize that there is a Creator and Disposer of them, and of all the universe, Who has always been and will always be. It is through reason that they discriminate between good and bad. It is through reason that they understand that darkness (evil) lies in ignorance and the light (good) lies in knowledge. All these facts are known to men through reason.

It was asked of the Imam (A), 'Is it possible for the people to be content with their reason leaving every other thing aside?' The Imam (A) replied, 'Lo! Reason, which is designed by God to be foundation, ornament and guidance, is a lighthouse for wise men, who recognize that God is the Truth and He is the Sustainer of human beings. They realize their Creator has His likes and dislikes and He could be obeyed and disobeyed. They also recognize that they cannot understand the manner in which His likes and dislikes operate with the help of mere reason. Hence, in this respect, it is essential for them to seek the help from knowledge. It means that they are not benefited from reason (alone). It is, therefore, imperative for men of reason to acquire knowledge and learn proper manners, without which meaning cannot be rendered to life.'²¹

This and other traditions collected in the *Uṣūl al-Kāfi*, despite emphasizing the value and significance of reason for understanding natural phenomena, and realizing God and His Will, and knowing the laws of morality, do not specifically mention it as a source of legislation. Al-Kulayni, and even his successor Ibn Bābawayh (d. 381/991-92)²², did not record their own comments or interpretations of the traditions, for in those days the traditions were regarded as self-sufficient because of their rational and analytical content. Even the early *mufassirūn* of the Imāmiyyah school, were content to quote the traditions of the Prophet (S) and the Imams for the interpretation of the Quran, and did not express their own views.²³ The early Imāmiyyah interpreters of the Quran were also strict traditionists, in a specific sense which does not exclude rationalism. That is why al-Kulayni and his immediate successors did not make any attempt to go beyond quoting and collecting the traditions. The task of developing a systematic science of *uṣūl al-fiqh* was taken up later. But al-Kulayni may be credited for collecting the valuable body of the traditions, and placing the traditions concerning reason (*'aql*) and knowledge (*'ilm*) at the head of all the traditions. With the decline of the Mu'tazilah school, Imāmiyyah scholars made greater efforts to emphasize the importance of reason, which was being isolated or being maligned and attacked by the Ashā'irah, and they made full use of reason as a source and instrument of legislation. However, the credit goes to al-Kulayni for providing a considerable number of aḥādīth substantiating the approach of the Imams of the Prophet's family toward knowledge and reason, emphasizing its value as a reliable instrument of understanding the socio-physical as well as Divine reality. By giving priority to the aḥādīth concerning reason over the fundamental tenets of the faith, al-Kulayni bridged the gap between the traditionists and the rationalists, and saved Imāmiyyah theology and *fiqh* from falling in the hands of irrationalism and blind traditionism. It is because of the high place accorded to reason in the Imāmiyyah tradition that the Imāmiyyah scholars and thinkers did not let the standard of rationalism and philosophization fall down even after "the destruction of philosophy" at the hands of al-Ghazālī; and philosophy, along with rational theology (*kalām*), continued to prosper in the Shi'ī world through the works of Mullā Ṣadrā up to Sabzawārī and the contemporary *fuqahā'* like Imam Khumaynī, Martyr Sayyid Bāqir al-Ṣadr and Martyr Murtadā Muṭahharī. Al-Kulayni's successors, within less than a century after his death, made full use of *'aql wa naẓar* (al-Mufīd's term for intellectual insight) in the matters of *fiqh*. This notion of *'aql wa naẓar* did not emerge in the works of Imāmiyyah *fuqahā'* and 'ulamā' as a result of some alien influence through *kalām* or philosophy, but arose from the corpus of Shi'ah ḥadīth. Al-Kulayni's arrangement of aḥādīth in a logical order,

at the very outset of the systematization of Imāmiyyah thought, dispelled all possibilities of a breach between Revelation and reason.

to be continued--'inshā' Allāh

NOTES:

1. Refer to *al-Mu'jam al-mufahras li-alfāz al-Qur'ān al-karim*, Muḥammad Fu'ād 'Abd al-Bāqī, Intishārāt-e Ismā'ilyān, Tehran, & Maṭba'at Dār al-kutub al-Miṣriyyah, Cairo.

2. *Uṣūl al-Kāfī* (The Persian translation), vol. 1, p. 13.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

4. *Ibid.*, pp.11-12.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-26.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38, also refer to the translator's commentary on the same pages.

10. Ṣafā, Dr. Dhabīh Allāh, *Tārīkh-e 'ulūm-e 'aqli dar tamaddun-e Islāmī*; Intishārāt-e Amir Kabīr, Tehran, fourth edition, 1356 Shamsī, pp. 131, 145; *Tārīkh-e Adabiyyāt dar Irān*, vols. I & II, Intishārāt-e Ibn Sinā, Tehran, 1347 Shamsī; refer to the chapters dealing with 'aqā'id wa madhāhib and waq'-'e 'ulūm till the beginning of the fifth century A.H.

11. Mcdermott, J. Martin, *The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufid* (d. 413/1022), Persian studies series No. 9, Dār el-Machreq Éditeurs, Beirut, 1978; with reference to al-'Ash'arī and Ibn Taymiyyah, the Rāfiḍites' opposition to the Mu'tazilites is mentioned (p.3). With reference to Ibn Bābūya (Ibn Bābawayh) he relates a ḥadīth from al-Imām Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, which forbids disputation (*jadāl*) about God and threatens the theologians (*aṣḥāb al-kalām*) with ruin, according to it Ibn Bābawayh allows controversy only in the form of quoting and explaining the words of God, the Prophet (S) and the Imams (p. 315). On other occasions, too, Mcdermott has emphasized this point. He, however, accepts that even early Shi'ite traditionists were closer to the Mu'tazilah than Sunnī traditionists. (pp. 4-5).

12. The English translation from the Persian work of Martyr Murtaḍā Muṭahhari by 'Alī Qulī Qarā'i has been published in *al-Tawḥīd* (English), vol. II, No. 2, Rabī' al-Thānī, 1405, pp. 51-92.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

18. *Uṣūl al-Kāfī* (the English translation), Book 1, Part 1, p. 32. This ḥadīth spreads over 18 pages, from p. 31 to p. 48.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

22. In *al-Tawḥīd*, which is regarded as a work of Ibn Bābawayh's later years, he has occasionally made his own comments on certain aḥādīth, for he had to refute some allegations made by the opponents and critics of the Imāmiyyah faith.

23. Mahmoud M. Ayoub, *the Quran and its Interpreters*, State University of

NOTE: While referring to the English translation of the *Uṣūl al-Kāfī*, the author changed some phrases and words which seemed to him to be inadequate or incorrect.

اسلامی، علمی، فکری سہ ماہی رسالہ

توحید آردو

بدل اشتراک

فی تجدہ	ملک
۱۵۰ ریال	ایران
۱۵ روپیہ	پاکستان
۱۵ روپیہ	ہندوستان
۱۵ روپیہ	بنگلہ دیش
۸ درہم	متحدہ عرب امارات
۸ ریال	سعودی عرب
۸ ریال	قطر
۶۵۰ فلس	کویت
۳ ڈالر	افریقہ
۲ پونڈ	برطانیہ
۳ ڈالر	امریکہ
۴ ڈالر	کینیڈا

ترسیل زر کا پتہ

اکاؤنٹ نمبر ۹۰۰۲۵
سازمان تبلیغات اسلامی (مطبوعات فاؤنڈیشن)
بانک ملی ایران شعبہ خنیاار ۵۴۴
خیابان طالقانی نبش فرصت
تہران - اسلامی جمہوریہ ایران

مقاصد

کلمۃ التوحید

و

توحید الکلمہ

قرآن و سنت و سیرت پر نئے زاویوں سے بحث اور علمی و عملی پہلوؤں کی تلاش۔ علمی سطح پر علماء و محققین امت میں اتحاد و ہم آہنگی۔

اسلامی تعلیمات میں آج کے مسائل کا حل دریافت کرنا۔

فلسفہ مشرق و مغرب سے فلسفہ اسلام کا امتیاز۔

عالمی سطح پر ابھرتے ہوئے اسلامی فکری و سماجی انقلاب و تباہی پر گفتگو۔

ارباب نظر و صاحبان قلم

سے تعاون کی آرزو ہے۔

by Martyr Murtaḍā Muṭahharī

translated from the Persian by 'Alī Qulī Qarā'i

2. THEOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS OF THE NAHJ AL-BALĀGHAH

One of the fundamental issues dealt with in the *Nahj al-balāghah* relates to theological and metaphysical problems. In all, there are about forty places in the sermons, letters, and aphorisms where these matters are discussed. Some of these pertain to the aphorisms, but more often the discussion is longer, covering sometimes several pages.

The passages on *tawḥīd* (Divine Unity) in the *Nahj al-balāghah* can perhaps be considered to be the most wonderful discussions of the book. Without any exaggeration, when we take into account the conditions in which they were delivered, they can almost be said to be miraculous.

The discussions on this theme in the *Nahj al-balāghah* are of a varied nature. Some of them constitute studies of the scheme of creation bearing witness to Divine creativity and wisdom. Here, 'Alī speaks about the whole system of the heaven and the earth, or occasionally discusses the wonderful features of some specific creature like the bat, the peacock or the ant, and the role of Divine design and purpose in their creation. To give an example of this kind of discussion, we may quote a passage regarding the ant:

«... أَلَا يَنْظُرُونَ إِلَى صَغِيرٍ مَّا خَلَقَ، كَيْفَ أَحْكَمَ خَلْقَهُ، وَأَتَقَنَ تَرْكِيبَهُ، وَفَلَقَ لَهُ السَّمْعَ وَالْبَصَرَ، وَسَوَّى لَهُ الْعَظْمَ وَالْبَشْرَ! أَنْظُرُوا إِلَى النَّمْلَةِ فِي صِغَرِ جُثَّتِهَا، وَلَطَافَةِ هَيْئَتِهَا، لَا تَكَادُ تُنَالُ بِلِخْظِ الْبَصْرِ، وَلَا بِمُسْتَدْرَكِ الْفِكْرِ، كَيْفَ دَبَّتْ عَلَى أَرْضِهَا، وَصَبَّتْ عَلَى رِزْقِهَا، تَنْقُلُ الْحَبَّةَ إِلَى جُحْرِهَا، وَتُعِدُّهَا فِي مُسْتَقَرِّهَا. تَجْمَعُ فِي حَرِّهَا لِبُرْدِهَا، وَفِي وَرْدِهَا لِصَدْرِهَا،

*This part consists of the second section of Martyr Muṭahharī's work *Sayrī dar Nahj al-balāghah*, and deals with the theological and metaphysical ideas of the *Nahj al-balāghah*.

مَكْفُولٌ بِرِزْقِهَا، مَرْزُوقَةٌ بِوَفْقِهَا، لَا يُغْفَلُهَا أَلْمَانُ، وَلَا يَحْرِمُهَا الدَّيَّانُ، وَلَوْ فِي الصِّفَا أَلْيَابِسِ،
وَأَلْحَجْرِ أَلْجَامِسِ! وَلَوْ فَكَّرْتَ فِي مَجَارِي أَعْيُنِهَا، فِي غُلُوبِهَا وَسُفْلِهَا، وَمَا فِي أَلْجَوْفِ مِنْ
شَرَّاسِيفٍ بَطْنِهَا، وَمَا فِي الرَّأْسِ مِنْ عَيْنِهَا وَأَذُنِهَا، لَقَضَيْتَ مِنْ خَلْقِهَا عَجَبًا...»

Have you observed the tiny creatures that He has created? How He has made them strong and perfected their constitution and shaped their organs of hearing and sight, and how He has styled their bones and skin? Observe the ant with its tiny body and delicate form. It is so small that its features can hardly be discerned by the eye and so insignificant that it does not enter our thoughts. See how it roams about upon the ground and arduously collects its livelihood. It carries the grain to its hole and deposits it in its store. It collects during the summer for the winter and, when winter arrives, it foresees the time to reemerge. Its livelihood is guaranteed and designed according to its built. The Benefactor and the Provider does not forget or forsake it. He does not deprive it, even though it should be in hard and dry stones and rocks. You will be amazed at the delicate intricacy of its wonderful constitution if you investigate the structure of its alimentary canals, its belly, and its eyes and ears which are in its head....¹

However, most of the discussions about *tawḥīd* in the *Nahj al-balāghah* are rational and philosophical. The rare sublimity of the *Nahj al-balāghah* becomes manifest in these discourses. In these philosophical and rational discourses of the *Nahj al-balāghah* on *tawḥīd* what constitutes the focus of all arguments is the infinite, absolute and self-sufficing nature of the Divine Essence. In these passages, 'Alī (A) attains to the heights of eloquence, and none, neither before him nor after him, has approached him in this aspect.

Another issue dealt with is that of the absolute simplicity (*al-basāṭat al-muṭlaqah*) of the Divine Essence and negation of every kind of multiplicity, divisibility in the Godhead and refutation of separability of the Divine Attributes from the Divine Essence. This theme occurs repeatedly in the *Nahj al-balāghah*.

Also discussed is a series of other profound problems which had never been touched before him. They are: God being the First while also being the Last; His being simultaneously the Manifest and the Hidden; His priority over time and number, i.e. His pre-eternity is not temporal and His Unity is not numerical; His Supremacy, Authority, and Self-sufficiency; His Creativeness; that attendance to one affair does not prevent Him from attending to other affairs; the identity of Divine Word and Act; the limited capacity of human reason to comprehend His reality; that gnosis (*ma'rifah*) is a kind of manifestation (*tajallī*) of Him upon the intellects, which is different from conception or cognition by the mind; the negation of such categories and qualities as corporeality, motion, rest, change, place, time, similarity, opposition, partnership, possession of organs or instruments,

limitation and number; and a series of other issues which we shall, God willing, mention later and give examples of every one of these. Even a thinker well-versed in the beliefs and views of ancient and modern philosophers would be struck with wonder to see the wide range and scope of the problems propounded in that wonderful book.

An elaborate discussion of the issues raised and dealt with in the *Nahj al-balāghah* would itself require a voluminous book and cannot be covered in one or two articles. Unavoidably, we shall be brief; but before we commence our brief survey, we are compelled to mention certain points as an introduction to our discussion.

A Bitter Fact:

We, the Shi'ah Muslims, must confess that we have been unjust in regard to our duty with respect to the man whom we, more than others, take pride in following; or, at the very least, we must admit falling short in our duty towards him. In substance, any kind of failure in fulfilling our responsibility is an act of injustice on our part. We did not want to realize the significance of 'Alī (A), or we had been unable to. All our energy and labour were devoted to proclaiming the Prophet's statements about 'Alī and to denouncing those who ignored them, but we failed to pay attention to the intellectual side of Imam 'Alī's personality.

Sa'di says:

مشک آن است که بیوید، نه آنکه عطار بگوید

*The reality of musk lies in its scent,
Not in the perfumer's advice.*

Applying Sa'di's words to our attitude regarding Imam 'Alī's personality, we did not realize that this musk, recommended by the Divine Perfumer, itself carried its pleasant aroma, and before everything else we should have tried to know its scent and become familiar with it. That is, we should have familiarized ourselves and others with its inner fragrance. The counsel of the Divine Perfumer was meant to acquaint the people with its pleasant redolence, not for the purpose that they may believe that it is musk and then devote all their energies trying to convince others by arguing with them, without bothering to acquaint themselves with its real fragrance.

Had the *Nahj al-balāghah* belonged to some other people, would they have treated it in the way we treated this great book? The country of Iran is the centre of Shi'ism and the language of its people is Persian.

You have only to examine the translations and commentaries on the *Nahj al-balāghah* to make a judgement about what our accomplishment amounts to.

To take a more general case, the Shī'ī sources of ḥadīth (tradition) and texts of *du'ā'* (prayers) are incomparable to the texts of the non-Shī'ī works in the same field. This is also true of Divine teachings and other subjects. The problems and issues discussed in works like al-Kulaynī's *al-Kāfī*, or al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq's *al-Tawḥīd*, or *al-Iḥtijāj* of al-Ṭabarsī are nowhere to be found among the works of the non-Shī'īs. It can be said that if occasionally similar issues are dealt with in the non-Shī'ī books, the material is unmistakably spurious, for it is not only opposed to the prophetic teachings but is also contradictory to the Quranic fundamentals. There is a strong smell of anthropomorphism which hangs around them. Recently, Hāshim Ma'rūf al-Ḥasani, in his book *Dirāsāt fī al-Kāfī li al-Kulaynī wa al-Ṣaḥīḥ li al-Bukhārī*, which is an original but a brief comparative study of *al-Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bukhārī and al-Kulaynī's *al-Kāfī*, has dealt with the traditions related to the problems of theology.

Shī'ī Rationalism:

The discussion of theological problems and their analysis by the Shī'ī Imams, of which the *Nahj al-balāghah* is the earliest example, was the main cause of the emergence of rationalistic approach and philosophic outlook in the Shī'ī intellectual world from the earliest days of Islam. This cannot be labelled as an innovation in Islam; rather, its basis was laid down by the Quran itself. It was in accordance with the approach of the Quran and for the purpose of its interpretation that the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt (A) expounded such issues. If anybody can be reproached in this matter, it is those who did not adopt this method and abandoned the means to follow it.

History shows that from the earliest Islamic era, the Shī'ah, more than any other sect, were interested in these problems. Amongst the Ahl al-Sunnah, the Mu'tazilites, who were nearer to the Shī'ah, did possess similar inclinations. But, as we know, the general view predominant among the Ahl al-Sunnah did not welcome it, and as a result the Mu'tazilite sect became extinct about the end of the 3rd/9th century.

Aḥmad Amin, the Egyptian writer, confirms this view in the first volume of his *Zuhr al-Islām*. After discussing the philosophic movement in Egypt during the reign of the Fāṭimids, who were a Shī'ah sect, he writes:

وَلِذَلِكَ كَانَتْ أَلْفَلَسَفَةُ بِالتَّشْيِيعِ الصَّوْقُ مِنْهَا بِالتَّسْنَنِ نَرَى ذَلِكَ فِي الْعَهْدِ الْفَاطِمِيِّ

وَالْعَهْدِ الْبُونِيَّي، وَحَتَّى فِي الْعُصُورِ الْأَخِيرَةِ كَانَتْ فَارِسُ أَكْثَرَ الْأَقْطَارِ عِنَايَةً بِدِرَاسَةِ
 الْفَلَسَفَةِ الْأِسْلَامِيَّةِ وَتَشْرِكِتِهَا، وَلَمَّا جَاءَ جَمَالُ الدِّينِ الْأَفْغَانِي مِضْرَفِي عَضْرِنَا الْحَدِيثِ
 وَكَانَ فِيهِ نَزْعَةٌ تَشِيْعٌ وَقَدْ تَعَلَّمَ الْفَلَسَفَةَ الْأِسْلَامِيَّةَ بِهَذِهِ الْأَقْطَارِ الْفَارِسِيَّةِ وَكَانَ هُوَ الَّذِي نَشَرَ
 هَذِهِ الْحَرَكَةَ فِي مِضْرَ.

Philosophy is more akin to Shi'ism than it is to the Sunni Islam, and we witness the truth of this in the era of the Fāṭimid rule [in Egypt] and in that of the Būyids [in Iran]. Even during the later ages Iran, which is a Shi'ite country, has paid more attention to philosophy than any other Islamic country. In our own times, Sayyid Jamāl al-Din al-'Asadābādī, who had Shi'ite inclinations and had studied philosophy in Iran, created a philosophic movement in Egypt when he arrived here.

Curiously, Aḥmad Amin in his explanation of why the Shi'ah showed more inclination towards philosophy, commits an error, willfully or otherwise. According to him, "the reason for greater inclination on the part of the Shi'ah towards rational and philosophical discussions is to be found in their esotericism and their flair for *ta'wil*.² They were compelled to seek the assistance of philosophy for defence of their esotericism. That is why the Fāṭimid Egypt and Būyid Persia, and Iran during the Ṣafawid and Qājār periods, were more disposed towards philosophy than the rest of the Islamic world."

This is sheer nonsense on the part of Aḥmad Amin. It was the Imams (A) of the Shi'ah who for the first time introduced philosophical approach, and it was they who introduced the most profound and intricate concepts with regard to theological problems in their arguments, polemics, sermons, aḥādīth, and prayers, of which the *Nahj al-balāghah* is one example. Even with regard to the prophetic traditions, the Shi'ah sources are far more sublime and profound than the traditions contained in the non-Shi'i sources. This characteristic is not confined to philosophy only, but is also true of *kalām*, *fiqh*, and *uṣūl al-fiqh*, in which the Shi'ah enjoy a position of distinction. All this owes its origin to one and same source: stress on rationalism.

Some others have tried to trace the origin of this difference [between the Shi'i and the Sunnī intellects] in the concept of "the Shi'ite nation". According to them, since the Persians are Shi'ite and the Shi'ah are Persian, and as the Persians are a people with a philosophical temperament, fond of the intricacies of speculation and pure thought, with the help of their rich and strong philosophical tradition, they succeeded in raising the level of Shi'i thought and gave it an Islamic colour.

Bertrand Russell, in *A History of Western Philosophy*, expresses a similar view based on the above-mentioned argument. With his habitual

or inherent impoliteness he puts forth this opinion. However, Russell lacks the capacity of vindicating his claim, since he was totally unfamiliar with Islamic philosophy and basically knew nothing about it. He was not qualified to express any informed opinion about the origins of Shī'ah thought and its sources.

Our rejoinder to the upholders of this view is: first of all, not all Shī'ah were Iranian, nor all Iranians were Shī'ah. Were Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb al-Kulaynī, Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn Bābawayh al-Qummi and Muḥammad ibn Abī Ṭālib al-Māzandarānī Persian, but not Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl al-Bukhārī, Abū Dāwūd al-Sijistānī and Muslim ibn Ḥajjāj al-Nishābūrī? Was al-Sayyid al-Raḍī, the compiler of the *Nahj al-balāghah*, of Persian origin? Were the Fāṭimids of Egypt of Persian descent?

Why was philosophic thought revived in Egypt with the inception of Fāṭimid rule and why did it decline with their fall? And why was it revived later, after a long interval, only through the influence of an Iranian Shī'ah?

The truth is that the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt (A) were the only real dynamic force behind this mode of thinking and this kind of approach. All scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah admit that among the Prophet's Companions only 'Alī (A) was a man of philosophic wisdom, who had an altogether distinct rational approach. Abū 'Alī ibn Sīnā is quoted as having remarked:

«كَانَ عَلِيٌّ (ع) بَيْنَ أَصْحَابِ مُحَمَّدٍ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ كَالْمَعْقُولِ بَيْنَ
الْمَخْسُوسِ.»

'Alī's position among the Companions of Muḥammad (S), was that of the "rational" in the midst of the "corporeal."

Obviously, the intellectual approach of the followers of such an Imam as 'Alī (A) should be expected to be radically different from that of those who followed others. Moreover, Aḥmad Amīn and others have been susceptible to another similar misunderstanding. They express doubts with regard to the authenticity of ascription of such philosophic statements [as exist in the *Nahj al-balāghah*] to 'Alī (A). They say that the Arabs were not familiar with such kind of issues and such arguments and elaborate analyses as are found in the *Nahj al-balāghah* before their acquaintance with Greek philosophy, and evidently, according to them, these discourses should have been composed by some later scholars familiar with Greek philosophy, and were attributed to Imam 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (A).

We also accept that the Arabs were not familiar with such ideas and

notions. Not only the Arabs, the non-Arabs, too, were not acquainted with them, nor were those notions familiar to the Greeks and Greek philosophy. Aḥmad Amīn first brings down 'Alī (A) to the level of such Arabs like Abū Jahl and Abū Sufyān and then he postulates his minor and major premises and bases his conclusion on them: The Arabs were unfamiliar with philosophical notions; 'Alī was an Arab: therefore 'Alī was also unfamiliar with philosophical notions. One should ask him whether the Arabs of the *Jāhiliyyah* were familiar with the ideas and concepts that were propounded in the Quran. Had not 'Alī (A) been brought up and trained by the Messenger of Allah himself? Didn't the Prophet (S) introduce 'Alī (A) to his Companions as the most learned and knowledgeable amongst them? Why should we deny the high spiritual status of someone who enriched his inner self by drawing on the bounteous wealth of Islam in order to protect the prestige of some of the Prophet's Companions who could never rise above the ordinary level?

Aḥmad Amīn says that before acquaintance with Greek philosophy the people of Arabia were not familiar with the ideas and concepts found in the *Nahj al-balāghah*. The answer to this is that the Arabs did not become acquainted with the ideas and notions propounded in the *Nahj al-balāghah* even after centuries of familiarity with Greek philosophy. Not only the Arabs, even the non-Arab Muslims were not acquainted with these ideas, for the simple reason that there is no trace of them in Greek philosophy itself! These ideas are exclusively special to Islamic philosophy. The Islamic philosophers gradually picked these ideas up from the basic Islamic sources and incorporated them in their thought under the guidance of revelation.

Philosophical Notions Concerning Metaphysics

As mentioned before, the *Nahj al-balāghah* adopts two kinds of approach to the problems of theology. The first kind of approach calls attention to the sensible world and its phenomena as a mirror reflecting the Knowledge and Perfection of the Creator. The second approach involves purely rationalistic and philosophical reflections. The latter approach accounts for the greater part of the theological discussions of the *Nahj al-balāghah*. Moreover, it is the only approach adopted in regard to the discussion about the Divine Essence and Attributes.

As we know, the value of such discussions and the legitimacy of such reflections have been always questioned by those who consider them improper from the viewpoint of reason or canon, or both. In our own times, a certain group claims that this kind of analysis and inference does not agree with the spirit of Islam and that the Muslims were initiated into such kind of speculations under the influence of

Greek philosophy and not as a result of any inspiration or guidance effused from the Quran. They say that if the Muslims had adhered closely to the Quranic teachings they would not have entangled themselves with these tortuous debates. For the same reason, they view with suspicion the authenticity of such speculations found in the *Nahj al-balāghah* and their ascription to Imam 'Alī (A).

In the second and third centuries a group of people opposed such kind of discussions and questioned their legitimacy, raising doctrinal objections. They insisted that it is obligatory for Muslims to be satisfied with the literal and commonly understood meaning of the words of the Quran, and regarded every kind of inquiry into the meaning of the Quran as an innovation (*bid'ah*) in religion. For instance, if someone inquired about the meaning of the Quranic verse الرَّحْمَنُ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ اسْتَوَى. "The All-compassionate sat Himself upon the Throne" [20:5], he was confronted by the displeasure of those who regarded such questions as not only improper but distasteful. He would be told: الْكَيْفِيَّةُ مَجْهُولَةٌ. "The exact meaning is unknown and questioning is heresy."³ وَالسُّؤَالُ بَدْعٌ.

During the 3rd/9th century, this group, which later came to be called Ash'arites, overwhelmed the Mu'tazilites, who considered such speculations to be within the bounds of legitimacy. This victory of the Ash'arites delivered a severe blow to the intellectual life of Islam. The Akhbāris, who were a Shi'i school which flourished during the period between the 10th/16th and the 14th/20th centuries—and particularly during the 10th/16th and 11th/17th centuries—followed the Ashā'irah in their ideas and beliefs. They raised doctrinal objections against ratiocination. Now we shall proceed to discuss the objections raised from a rationalist point of view.

As a result of the triumph of the empirical and experimental method over the deductive approach in Europe, especially in the physical sciences, the view began to prevail that rational speculation was unreliable not only in the physical sciences but also in all scientific disciplines and that the only reliable method was that of empirical philosophy. The result of it was that the problems of theology were viewed with doubt and suspicion, because they lay beyond the domain of experimental and empirical observation.

The past victories of the Ash'arites, on the one hand, and the amazing triumphs of the empirical method, which followed one another in quick succession, on the other hand, drove some non-Shi'ite Muslim writers to the extremes of excitement. The outcome was the eclectic opinion that from the religious (*Shar'i*) as well as the rational point of view the use of deductive method even in problems of theology should be discarded. From the *Shar'i* viewpoint, they made the claim that

according to the outlook of the Quran the only approach valid in theology was the empirical and experimental method and the study of the natural phenomena and the system of creation; the rest, they declared, is no more than an exercise in futility. They pointed out that in scores of its verses, the Quran in most unequivocal terms has invited human beings to study the phenomena of nature; it considers the keys to the secrets of the origin and workings of the universe to be concealed within nature itself. In this way they echoed, in their writings and speeches, the ideas expressed by the European proponents of empirical philosophy.

Farīd al-Wajdī in his book *'Alā atlāl al-madhhab al-māddī* (On the Ruins of Materialism), and Sayyid Abū al-Ḥasan al-Nadawī, in his *Mādhā khasira al-'ālam bi-inḥitāṭ al-Muslimīn* ("What the World Lost Through the Decline of Muslims") and the writers belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*) such as Sayyid Quṭb and others, have supported this view, vehemently attacking the opposite viewpoint.

Al-Nadawī, in his above-mentioned book, says:

The prophets informed men about the existence of God and His Attributes and informed them about the origin and beginning of the world and the ultimate destiny of man, putting this free information at his disposal. They relieved him of the need to understand and discuss these problems the basics of which lie beyond our reach (because these problems belong to the sphere of the supra-sensible, and our knowledge and experience is limited to the physical and the sensible). But men did not value this blessing and entangled themselves in debates and speculations about these problems, and strode into the dark regions of the hidden and the unknowable.⁴

The same author, in another chapter of the same book, where he discusses the causes of the decline of Muslims, under the heading "The Neglect of Useful Sciences," criticizes the Muslim 'ulamā' in these words:

The Muslim scholars and thinkers did not give as much importance to practical and experimental sciences as they gave to debating about metaphysics, which they had learnt from Greek philosophy. The Greek metaphysics and theology is nothing more than Greek's polytheistic mythology presented in a philosophical outfit, and is no more than a series of meaningless conjectures expressed in an absurd jargon. God has exempted Muslims from debate, speculation and analysis in these matters, which are not much different from the analytic pursuits of the Alchemists. But out of ingratitude for this great blessing, the Muslims wasted their energy and genius in problems of this sort.⁵

Without doubt, the views of the like of Farid al-Wajdi and al-Nadawī should be regarded as a kind of return to Ash'arism, though dressed in contemporary style akin to the language of empirical philosophy.

Here, we cannot enter into a philosophic discussion about the value of philosophic reflection. In the chapters entitled "The Value of Information" and "Origin of Multiplicity in Perception" of the book *The Principles and Method of Realism*, we have discussed the matter in sufficient detail. Here, we shall confine ourselves to the Quranic aspect of this problem, and investigate whether the Holy Quran considers the study of nature to be the only valid method of inquiry into theological problems, or whether it allows for another approach besides the above-mentioned.

However, it is essential to point out that the disagreement between the Ash'arites and the non-Ash'arites is not about the legitimacy of the use of the Book and the Sunnah as sources in the problems of theology; rather, the disagreement concerns the manner of their utilization. According to the Ash'arites, their application should not exceed mute acceptance. According to them, we assign the various Attributes like Unity, Omniscience, Omnipotence and the rest to God because they have been ascribed to Him by the Shari'ah, otherwise we would not know whether God is such or not, because the basic principles and essentials dealing with God are beyond our reach. Therefore, according to them, we are forced to accept God as such, but we cannot know or understand that God is such. The role of the religious texts is that they prescribe for us the way we ought to think and believe so that we may follow it in our thought and beliefs.

According to the contestants of this view, these issues are amenable to human understanding, like any other rational concept or idea. That is, there exist certain principles and essentials which if known properly enable man to understand them. The role of the religious texts lies in their capacity to inspire, motivate, and guide human reason by putting understandable principles and essentials at its disposal. Basically servitude in intellectual matters is absurd. It is like ordering one to think in a certain fashion, and asking him to derive certain prescribed conclusions. It is like ordering someone to see a thing in a certain fashion and then asking him, "How do you see it? Is it big or small? black or white?" Servitude in thinking does not mean anything other than absence of thinking and acceptance without reflection.

In short, the question is not whether it is possible for man to go beyond the teachings of the Revelation. God be our refuge, there is nothing that lies beyond them; because that which has reached us

through Revelation and the Household of the Revelation (i.e. the Ahl al-Bayt [A]) is the utmost limit of perfection concerning knowledge of the Divine. Here our debate centres upon the capacity of human thought and reason, whether it can, when supplied with the basic principles and essentials, undertake an intellectual journey through the world of theological problems or not.⁶

As to the invitation of the Quran to study and inquiry about the phenomena of creation, and its emphasis on nature as a means for attaining the knowledge of God and the supra-natural, it should be said that it is, indubitably, a basic principle of the Quranic teachings. It is with extraordinary insistence that the Quran asks human beings to inquire into the nature of the earth, the sky, the plants and animals, and man himself, and urges them to study them scientifically. It is also indubitable that the Muslims did not take enough worthy steps in this direction. Perhaps the real reason behind it was Greek philosophy, which was deductive and based on pure speculation, and they used this approach even in the field of the physical sciences. Nevertheless, as the history of science bears testimony, the Muslim scientists did not altogether abandon the experimental method in their studies like the Greeks. The Muslims were the pioneers of the experimental method, not the Europeans, as is commonly thought, who followed on the tracks first laid by the Muslims.

The Value of Study of the Natural Phenomena:

Aside from all of this, the question worthy of consideration is whether the Quran, besides its emphasis on the study of the creatures of earth, water, and air, allows other ways of approaching the issue, or if it closes all other doors. The question is whether the Quran, even as it invites people to study the signs of God (*āyāt*), also welcomes other modes of intellectual endeavour. Basically, what is the value of inquiry into the works of creation (an inquiry which the Quran urges us, explicitly or implicitly, to undertake), from the viewpoint of initiating us into the awareness and consciousness which this heavenly Book aims to cultivate?

The truth is that the measure of assistance provided by the study of the works of the creation in understanding the problems explicitly pointed out by the Holy Quran is quite restricted. The Quran has propounded certain problems of theology which are by no means understandable through the study of the created world or nature. The value of study of the system of creation is limited only to the extent to which it proves that the world is governed by a Power which knows, designs, plans, and administers it. The world is a mirror, open to empirical experiment, only to the extent that it points towards some-

thing that lies beyond nature and discloses the existence of a Mighty Hand which runs nature's cosmic wheels.

But the Quran is not content that man should only know that a Mighty, Knowing, and Wise Power administers this universe. This may perhaps be true of other heavenly scriptures, but is by no means true of the Holy Quran, which is the final and ultimate heavenly message and has a great deal to say about God and the reality transcending nature.

Purely Rationalistic Problems:

The most basic problem to which the mere study of the world of creation fails to provide an answer is the necessity of existence and uncreatedness of the Power which transcends nature. The world is a mirror in the sense that it indicates the existence of a Mighty Hand and a Wise Power, but it does not tell us anything more about Its nature. It does not tell us whether that Power is subservient to something else or not, or if it is self-subsisting. And if it is subject to something else, what is that? The objective of the Quran is not only that we should know that a Mighty Hand administers the world, but that we may know that that Administrator is "Allah" and that "Allah" is the indefinable: *لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ* (There is nothing like Him), whose Essence encompasses all perfection, or in other words, that "Allah" signifies Absolute Perfection and is the referent of *وَلَهُ الْمَثَلُ الْأَعْلَى* (His is the loftiest likeness). How can the study of nature give us an understanding of such notions and concepts?

The second problem is that of the Unity of God. The Quran has stated this issue in a logical form and used a syllogistic argument to explain it. The method of argument it has employed in this regard is what is called 'exclusive syllogism' or '*reductio ad impossibile*' (*burhān al-tamānu*). On occasion it eliminates the possibility of multiplicity in the efficient cause as in the following verse:⁷

لَوْ كَانَ فِيهِمَا آلِهَةٌ إِلَّا اللَّهُ لَفَسَدَتَا....

If there had been (multiple) gods in them (i.e. the earth and the heaven) other than God, they would surely go to ruin.... (21:22)

At other times it argues by eliminating the possibility of multiplicity in the final cause:

مَا اتَّخَذَ اللَّهُ مِنْ وَلَدٍ وَمَا كَانَ مَعَهُ مِنْ إِلَهٍ إِذَا لَدَّهَبَ كُلُّ إِلَهٍ بِمَا خَلَقَ وَلَعَلَّ بَعْضُهُمْ عَلَى بَعْضٍ....

God has not taken to Himself any son, nor is there any god besides Him; for then each god would have taken off that he created and some of them would have risen up over others;.... (23:91)

The Quran never suggests that the study of the system of creation can lead us to the knowledge of the Unity of the Godhead so as to imply that the essential knowledge of the transcendental Creator be considered attainable from that source. Moreover, such a suggestion would not have been correct.

The Quran alludes to various problems as indicated by the following examples:

... لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ....

... No thing is like Him;.... (42:11)

... وَلِلَّهِ الْمَثَلُ الْأَعْلَى....

... And God's is the loftiest likeness; (16:60)

... لَهُ الْأَسْمَاءُ الْحُسْنَى*

... To Him belong the Names most Beautiful. (20:8)

... وَلَهُ الْمَثَلُ الْأَعْلَى فِي السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ....

... And His is the loftiest likeness in the heavens and the earth; (30:27)

هُوَ اللَّهُ الَّذِي لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ الْمَلِكُ الْقُدُّوسُ السَّلَامُ الْمُؤْمِنُ الْمُهَيَّمِنُ الْعَزِيزُ الْجَبَّارُ الْمُتَكَبِّرُ....

He is God; there is no god but He. He is the King, the All-holy, the All-peaceable, the All-faithful, the All-preserver, the All-mighty, the All-compeller, the All-sublime.... (59:23)

... وَلِلَّهِ الْمَشْرِقُ وَالْمَغْرِبُ فَأَيُّمَا تُوَلُّوا فَثَمَّ وَجْهُ اللَّهِ....

And to God belong the East and the West; whithersoever you turn, there is the Face of God; (2:115)

... وَهُوَ اللَّهُ فِي السَّمَوَاتِ وَفِي الْأَرْضِ يَعْلَمُ سِرَّكُمْ وَجَهْرَكُمْ....

And He is God in the heavens and the earth; He knows your secrets, and what you publish;.... (6:3)

هُوَ الْأَوَّلُ وَالْآخِرُ وَالظَّاهِرُ وَالْبَاطِنُ وَهُوَ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَلِيمٌ *

He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the Inward; He has knowledge of everything. (57:3)

... هُوَ الْحَيُّ الْقَيُّومُ....

... He is the Living, the Everlasting.... (2:255)

اللَّهُ الصَّمَدُ * لَمْ يَلِدْ وَلَمْ يُولَدْ * وَلَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُ كُفُوًا أَحَدٌ *

God, is the Everlasting, [Who] has not begotten, and has not been begotten; and equal to Him is not any one. (112:2-4)

Why does the Quran raise such issues? Is it for the sake of propounding mysterious matters incomprehensible to man—who, according to al-Nadawī, lacks the knowledge of its essential principles—and then asking him to accept them without comprehending their meaning? Or, the Quran actually does want him to know God through the attributes and descriptions that have come in it? And, if this is true, what reliable approach does it recommend? How is it possible to acquire this knowledge through the study of the natural phenomena? The study of the creation teaches us that God has knowledge of the things; that is, the things that He has made were created knowingly and wisely. But the Quran expects us not only to know this, but also stresses that:

... إِنَّ اللَّهَ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَلِيمٌ *

... Indeed God has the knowledge of everything. (2:231)

And:

... وَمَا يَعْزُبُ عَنْ رَبِّكَ مِنْ مِثْقَالِ ذَرَّةٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَلَا فِي السَّمَاءِ وَلَا أَصْغَرَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ وَلَا أَكْبَرَ
إِلَّا فِي كِتَابٍ مُبِينٍ *

... And not so much as the weight of an atom in earth or heaven escapes from thy Lord, neither is aught smaller than that, or greater, but in a Manifest Book. (10:61)

And:

... فَلَنْ لَوْ كَانَ الْبَحْرُ مِدَادًا لِكَلِمَاتِ رَبِّي لَنَفِدَ الْبَحْرُ قَبْلَ أَنْ تَنفَدَ كَلِمَاتُ رَبِّي وَلَوْ جِئْنَا بِمِثْلِهِ

Say: "If the sea were ink for the Words of my Lord, the sea would be spent before the Words of my Lord are spent, though We brought replenishment the like of it." (18:109)

This means that God's knowledge is infinite and so is His power. How and wherefore is it possible through perception and observation of the world of creation to reach the conclusion that the Creator's Knowledge and Power are infinite? The Quran, similarly, propounds numerous other problems of the kind. For instance, it mentions *al-lawḥ al-maḥfūz* (the Protected Tablet), *lawḥ al-maḥw wa al-'ithbāt* (The Tablet of Expunction and Affirmation), *jabr* and *ikhtiyār* (determinism and free will), *waḥy* (revelation) and *ilhām* (intuition), etc.; none of which are susceptible to inquiry through the empirical study of the world of creation.

It must be admitted that the Quran, definitely, has raised these problems in the form of a series of lessons and has emphasized their importance through advice and exhortation. The following verses of the Quran may be quoted in this connection:

أَفَلَا يَتَدَبَّرُونَ الْقُرْآنَ أَمْ عَلَى قُلُوبٍ أَقْفَالُهَا*

What, do they not meditate in the Quran? Or is it that there are locks upon their hearts? (47:24)

كِتَابٌ أَنْزَلْنَاهُ إِلَيْكَ مُبَارَكٌ لِيَدَّبَّرُوا آيَاتِهِ وَلِيَتَذَكَّرَ أُولُوا الْأَلْبَابِ*

(This is) a Scripture that We have revealed unto thee, full of blessing, that they may ponder its revelations, and that men of understanding may reflect. (38:29)

Inevitably, we are forced to accept that the Quran assumes the existence of a reliable method for understanding the meaning of these truths, which have not been revealed as a series of obscure incomprehensibles which lie beyond the reach of the human mind.

The scope of problems propounded by the Quran in the sphere of metaphysics is far greater than what can be resolved or be answered through the study of physical creation. This is the reason why the Muslims have pursued these problems, at times through spiritual and gnostic efforts, and at other times through speculative and rational approach.

I wonder whether those who claim that the Quran considers the study of nature as the sole, sufficient means for the solution of

metaphysical problems, can give a satisfying answer in regard to the multifarious problems propounded by it—a characteristic which is special to this great heavenly Book.

‘Alī’s sole source of inspiration in his exposition of the problems mentioned in the previous chapters is the Holy Quran, and the sole motive behind his discourses is exegetical. Perhaps, had it not been for ‘Alī (A) the rationalistic and speculative aspects of the Quran would have forever remained uninterpreted.

After these brief introductory remarks on the value of these issues, we shall go on to cite some relevant examples from the *Nahj al-balāghah*.

The Divine Essence and Attributes:

In this section we shall cite some examples of the *Nahj al-balāghah*’s treatment of the problems of theology related with Divine Essence and Attributes. Later we shall make a brief comparative study of the issue in various schools and conclude our discussion on this aspect of the *Nahj al-balāghah*.

However, before proceeding further, I ask for the reader’s pardon that the discussion in the last three sections became a bit technical and philosophical, which is not very welcome for those not used to it. But what is the remedy? Discussion on a book such as the *Nahj al-balāghah* does entail such ups and downs. For this reason, we shall limit ourselves to giving only a few examples from the book on this subject, and refrain from any elaborate discussion. Because, if we were to comment on every sentence of the *Nahj al-balāghah*, the result will be, as is said:

مثنوی هفتاد من کاغذ شود

My mathnawī requires seventy maunds of paper.

The Divine Essence:

Does the *Nahj al-balāghah* have anything to say about the Divine Essence and how to define it? The answer is, Yes, and a lot. However, much of the discussion revolves around the point that the Divine Essence is Absolute and Infinite Being, without a quiddity. His Essence accepts no limits and boundaries like other beings, static or changeable, which are limited and finite. A changeable being is one which constantly transcends its former limits and assumes new ones. But such is not the Divine Essence. Quiddity, which may qualify and confine Him within limits of finitude, is not applicable to Him. None of the aspects of being are devoid of His Presence, and no kind of imperfection is

applicable to Him, except absence of any imperfection whatsoever : the only thing amiss in Him is absence of defect or inadequacy of any kind. The sole kind of negation applicable to Him is the negation of all negations. The only kind of non-being attributable to Him is the negation of any kind of imperfection in relation to Him. He is free from all shades of non-being which characterize the creatures and effects. He is free from finitude, multiplicity, divisibility, and need. The only territory that He does not enter is that of nothingness and non-being. He is *with* every thing, but not *in* any thing, and nothing is *with* Him. He is not *within* things, though not *out* of them. He is over and above every kind of condition, state, similarity, and likeness. For, these qualities relate to limited and determinate beings characterized by quiddity:

مَعَ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ لَا بِمُقَارَنَةٍ، وَغَيْرُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ لَا بِمُرَابَلَةٍ....

He is with everything but not in the sense of [physical] nearness. He is different from every thing but not in the sense of separation.⁸

«لَيْسَ فِي الْأَشْيَاءِ بِوَالِحٍ وَلَا عَنْهَا بِخَارِجٍ.»

He is not inside things in the sense of physical [pervasion or] penetration, and is not outside them in the sense of [physical] exclusion [for exclusion entails a kind of finitude].⁹

«بَانَ مِنَ الْأَشْيَاءِ بِالْقَهْرِ لَهَا، وَالْقُدْرَةَ عَلَيْهَا، وَبَانَتِ الْأَشْيَاءُ مِنْهُ بِالْخُضُوعِ لَهُ»...

He is distinct from things because He overpowers them, and the things are distinct from Him because of their subjection to Him.¹⁰

That is, His distinctness from things lies in the fact that He has authority and control over them. However, His power, authority and sovereignty, unlike that of the creatures, is not accompanied with simultaneous weakness, subjugation, and subjection. His distinction and separateness from things lies in the fact that things are totally subject to His power and authority, and that which is subject and subordinated can never be like the one who subjugates and commands control over it. His separateness from things does not lie in physical separation but is on account of the distinction which lies between the Provider and the provided, the Perfect and the imperfect, the Powerful and the weak.

These kind of ideas are replete in 'Ali's discourses. All the problems which shall be discussed later are based on the principle that Divine Essence is Absolute and Infinite, and the concepts of limit, form and condition do not apply to it.

Divine Unity an Ontological, not a Numerical Concept:

Another feature of *tawḥīd* (monotheism) as propounded by the *Nahj al-balāghah* is that Divine Unity is not numerical, but something else. Numerical unity means the oneness of something which has possibility of recurrence. It is always possible to imagine that the quiddity and form of an existent is realizable in another individual being. In such cases, the unity of an individual possessing that quiddity is numerical oneness and stands in opposition to duplicity or multiplicity. 'It is one,' means that there is not another like it, and inevitably this kind of unity entails the quality of being restricted in number, which is a defect; because one is lesser in number as compared to two or more of its kind. But, if a being be such that assumption of recurrence with regard to it is impossible, since it is infinite and unlimited, and if we assume another like it to exist, it will follow that it is the same as the first being or that it is something which is not similar to it and therefore cannot be called a second instance of it. In such a case, unity is not numerical. That is, this kind of unity is not one opposed to duplicity or multiplicity, and when it is said 'It is one,' it does not mean that 'there are not two, three or more of its kind,' but it means that a second to it is unconceivable.

This notion can further be clarified through an example. We know that the astronomers and physicists are not in agreement about the dimensions of the universe, whether it is limited in size or infinite. Some scientists have favoured the idea of an unlimited and infinite universe; others claim that the universe is limited in dimensions so that if we travel in any direction, we shall reach a point beyond which there is no space. The other issue is whether the universe in which we live is the only universe in existence, or if there are other universes existing besides it.

Evidently, the assumption of another physical world beyond our own is a corollary to the assumption that our universe is not infinite. Only in this case it is possible to assume the existence of, say, two physical universes each of which is limited and has finite dimensions. But if we assume that our universe is infinite, it is not possible to entertain the assumption of another universe existing beyond it. For, whatever we were to assume would be identical with this universe or a part of it.¹¹

The assumption of another being similar to the Being of the One God—like the assumption of another physical universe besides an infinite material universe—amounts to assuming the impossible, for the Being of God is absolute: Absolute Selfhood and Absolute Reality.

The notion that Divine Unity is not a numerical concept, and that

qualifying it by a number is synonymous with imposing limits on the Divine Essence, is repeatedly discussed by the *Nahj al-balāghah*:

الْأَحَدِ بِلَا تَأْوِيلِ عَدَدٍ

He is the One, but not in a numerical sense.¹²

لَا يُشْمَلُ بِحَدٍّ، وَلَا يُحَسَبُ بِعَدِّ

He is not confined by limits nor counted by numbers.¹³

وَمَنْ أَشَارَ إِلَيْهِ فَقَدْ حَدَّهُ، وَمَنْ حَدَّهُ فَقَدْ عَدَّهُ

He who points to Him, admits for Him limitations; and he who admits limitations for Him has numbered Him.¹⁴

مَنْ وَصَفَهُ فَقَدْ حَدَّهُ، وَمَنْ حَدَّهُ فَقَدْ عَدَّهُ، وَمَنْ عَدَّهُ فَقَدْ أَبْطَلَ أَرْزَلَهُ

He who qualifies Him limits Him. He who limits Him numbers Him. He who numbers Him denies His pre-eternity.¹⁵

كُلُّ مُسَمًّى بِالْوَحْدَةِ غَيْرُهُ قَلِيلٌ

Everything associated with unity is deficient except Him.¹⁶

How beautiful, profound, and full of meaning is the last sentence. It states that everything except the Divine Essence is limited if it is one. That is, every thing for which another of its kind is conceivable is a limited being and an addition of another individual would increase its number. But this is not true of the Unity of the Divine Essence; for God's Unity lies in His greatness and infinity, for which a like, a second, an equal or a match is not conceivable.

This concept that Divine Unity is not a numerical notion is exclusively an Islamic concept, original and profound, and unprecedented in any other school of thought. Even the Muslim philosophers only gradually realized its profundity through contemplating the spirit of the original Islamic texts and in particular the discourses of 'Alī (A), and ultimately formally incorporated it in the Islamic metaphysical philosophy. There is no trace of this profound concept in the writings of the early Islamic philosophers like al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Only the later philosophers ushered this concept into their philosophic thinking calling it «الْوَحْدَةُ الْحَقَّةُ الْحَقِيقِيَّةُ» "Really True Unity," in their terminology.

God, the First and the Last; the Manifest and the Hidden:

Of the many issues discussed by the *Nahj al-balāghah* is the notion that God is the First and the Last, the Hidden and the Manifest. Of course this, too, like other notions, has been deduced from the Holy Quran; though here we are not going to quote the verses from the Quran. God is the First, but His precedence is not temporal so as to be in contradiction with His being the Last. He is the Manifest, but not in the sense of being physically visible or perceptible to the senses; His Manifestness does not contradict His Hiddenness. In fact His Firstness is identical with His Lastness and similarly His Manifestness and Hiddenness are identical; they are not two different things:

الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ الَّذِي لَمْ تَسْبِقْ لَهُ حَالٌ خَالٍ، فَيَكُونُ أَوَّلًا قَبْلَ أَنْ يَكُونَ آخِرًا، وَيَكُونُ ظَاهِرًا قَبْلَ أَنْ يَكُونَ بَاطِنًا،.... وَكُلُّ ظَاهِرٍ غَيْرُهُ بَاطِنٌ، وَكُلُّ بَاطِنٍ غَيْرُهُ ظَاهِرٌ.

Praise be to Allah, for whom one condition does not precede another, so that He may be the First before being the Last or may be Manifest before being Hidden.¹⁷

لَا تَصْحَبُهُ الْأَوْقَاتُ، وَلَا تَرْفِدُهُ الْأَدْوَاتُ؛ سَبَقَ الْأَوْقَاتَ كَوْنُهُ وَالْعَدَمَ وَجُودُهُ، وَالْإِبْتِدَاءَ أَرْزُلُهُ.

Time is not His accomplice, nor does He need the assistance of tools and agents. His Being transcends time. His Existence transcends nothingness and His pre-eternity transcends all beginning.¹⁸

The Divine Essence's transcendence over time, nothingness, beginning, and end is one of the most profound concepts of *al-hikmah* philosophy. God's pre-eternity does *not* mean that God has always existed. Certainly God has always existed but Divine pre-eternity (*azaliyyah*) is something greater in meaning than 'existence at all times'; because, 'existing at all times' assumes existence *in* time; but God's Being has not only been at all times, It precedes time itself. This is the meaning of Divine pre-eternity. This shows that His precedence is something other than temporal precedence.

الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ الدَّالِّ عَلَى وُجُودِهِ بِخَلْقِهِ، وَبِمُخْدَتِ خَلْقِهِ عَلَى أَرْزُلِيَّتِهِ؛ وَبِاشْتِبَاهِهِمْ عَلَى أَنْ لَا شَبَهَ لَهُ. لَا تَسْتَلِمُهُ الْمَشَاعِرُ، وَلَا تَحْجُبُهُ السَّوَاتِرُ.

Praise be to God, whose creation bears testimony to His Existence; temporality (*hudūth*) of whose creation is the evidence of His pre-eternity; the similarity and likeness amongst whose creation proves that He is unique. The senses do not perceive Him and nothing can conceal Him.¹⁹

That is, God is both Hidden and Manifest. By Himself He is Manifest but is Hidden from the human senses. His Hiddenness from the senses is due to man's own limitations and not on account of Him.

It needs no proof that existence is synonymous with manifestation; the more powerful the existence of a being, the more manifest it would be. Conversely, the weaker its being is and the more intermingled it is with non-being, the less manifest it is to itself and others.

For everything, there are two modes of being: its being-in-itself (*wujūd fi nafsih*), and its being-for-others. The being of every thing for us depends upon the structure of our senses and certain special conditions. Accordingly, the manifestation of a thing is also of two kinds: its manifestation-in-itself (*zuhūr fi nafsih*) and its manifestation-for-others.

Our senses, on account of their limitations, are able to perceive only a limited number of finite objects possessing the characteristics of similarity and opposition. The senses can perceive colours, shapes, sounds, etc., which are limited temporally and spacially; that is, their existence is confined within a particular time and place. Now if there existed a uniform light, always and everywhere, it would not be perceptible. A continuous monotonous sound heard always and everywhere would not be audible.

The Being of God, which is absolute being and absolute reality, is not confined to any particular time and place, and is hidden from our senses. But God in Himself is absolutely manifest; the perfection of His manifestness, which follows from the perfection of His Being, is itself the cause of His hiddenness from our senses. The two aspects of His manifestness and hiddenness are one and the same in His Essence. He is hidden because He is perfectly manifest, and this perfect manifestness conceals Him.

يَا مَنْ هُوَ اخْتَبَى لِفَرْطِ نُورِهِ الظَّاهِرُ الْبَاطِنُ فِي ظُهُورِهِ

*Thou, who art hidden on account of Thy perfect brilliance,
Thou Art the Manifest, hidden in Thy manifestness.*

حجاب روی تو هم روی تو است در همه حال

نهان ز چشم جهانی ز بس که پیدائی

*The veil on Thy face is also Thy face,
So manifest Thou art, Thy manifestness conceals Thee from the
world's eyes.*

An Appraisal

An appraisal however brief of the approach of the *Nahj al-balāghah* and its comparison with that of other schools of thought is essential for discovering the true worth of its views on the problems of theology. We shall confine ourselves to the brief, though not quite sufficient, examples quoted in the foregoing pages and proceed to evaluate them.

The subject of the Divine Essence and Attributes is one which has been discussed a lot by the ancient and modern philosophers, mystics and Ṣūfis of the East and the West. But in general their method and approach is totally different from that of the *Nahj al-balāghah*, whose approach is highly original and unprecedented. Only in the Holy Quran can be found a precedent for the *Nahj al-balāghah*. Apart from the Holy Quran, we do not find any other source that provides some ground for the discourses of the *Nahj al-balāghah*.

As pointed out earlier, some scholars, because of their failure to trace back to some earlier source the notions elaborated in the *Nahj al-balāghah*, have questioned the authenticity of ascription of these discourses to 'Alī (A). They have supposed that these discourses appeared in a later period, after the appearance of the Mu'tazilites and assimilation of Greek thought, heedless of the saying:

«چه نسبت خاک را با عالم پاک؟!»

The mean earth with the sublime heaven does not compare!

What ignorance to compare the Mu'tazilite and Greek ideas with the teachings of the *Nahj al-balāghah*!

The Nahj al-Balāghah and the Notions of Kalām:

The *Nahj al-balāghah*, while it ascribes all the Attributes of perfection to God, the Exalted, negates any separation of these Attributes from His Essence and does not consider them as an appendage of Divine Essence. On the other hand, the Ash'arites, as we know, consider the Divine Attributes to be additional to Essence and the Mu'tazilites negate all Attributes.

وَقَالَ بِالتَّيَابَةِ الْمُعْتَزِلَةُ

الْأَشْعَرِيَّ بِازْدِيَادِ قَائِلِهِ

The Ash'arite believes in Separation [of the Attributes from the Essence]

The Mu'tazilite speaks of subservience [of the Attributes to the Essence].

This has led some to imagine that the discourses found in the *Nahj al-balāghah* on this topic are fabrications of a later period under the influence of Mu'tazilite views; whereas, anyone with some insight can readily perceive that the Attributes negated by the *Nahj al-balāghah* with respect to Divine Essence are qualities of imperfection and limitation; for the Divine Essence, being infinite and limitless, necessitates identity of the Attributes with the Essence, not negation of the Attributes as professed by the Mu'tazilites.²⁰ Had the Mu'tazilites reached such a notion they would never have negated the Divine Attributes considering them subservient to the Essence.

The same is true of the views on the createdness or temporality (*ḥudūth*) of the Quran in the sermon 184. One may, possibly, imagine that these passages of the *Nahj al-balāghah* relate to the latter heated controversies among the Islamic theologians (*mutakallimūn*) regarding the eternity (*qidam*) or temporality (*ḥudūth*) of the Holy Quran, and which might have been added to the *Nahj al-balāghah* during the latter centuries. However, a little reflection will reveal that the discourses of the *Nahj al-balāghah* related to this issue have nothing to do with the debate on the Quran being either created or uncreated, which was a meaningless controversy, but relates to the creative command (*amr takwīnī*), and Will of the Almighty. 'Alī (A) says that God's Will and His command represent Divine Acts and, therefore, are *ḥādith* and posterior to the Essence; for if the command and Will were co-eternal and identical with His Essence, they will have, necessarily, to be considered His associates and equals. 'Alī (A) says:

يَقُولُ لِمَنْ أَرَادَ كَوْنَهُ: «كُنْ فَيَكُونُ»، لَا بِصَوْتٍ يَفْرَعُ، وَلَا بِبَدَأٍ يُسْمَعُ، وَإِنَّمَا كَلَامُهُ سُبْحَانَهُ
فِعْلٌ مِنْهُ أَنْشَأَهُ وَمَثَلَهُ، لَمْ يَكُنْ مِنْ قَبْلِ ذَلِكَ كَائِنًا، وَلَوْ كَانَ قَدِيمًا لَكَانَ إِلَهًا تَانِيًا.

When He decrees the creation of a thing, He says to it, "Be", and it assumes existence; but not through an audible voice which strikes the ear or a cry that can be heard. Indeed the speech of God, glory be to Him, is but His created Act, which did not exist before [it came into existence]. Had it (Divine speech) been itself eternal, it would be another god besides Him.²¹

In addition, there are other *musnad* traditions on this subject related from 'Alī (A), only some of which have been collected in the *Nahj al-balāghah*, and can be traced back to his time. On this basis, there is no room for doubting their genuineness. If any superficial resemblance is observed between the statements made by 'Alī (A) and some views held by the Mu'tazilah, the probability to be allowed in this

connection is that some of his ideas were adopted by the Mu'tazilah.

The controversies of the Muslim theologians (*mutakallimūn*), both the Shi'ah and the Sunnī, the Ashā'irah as well as the Mu'tazilah, generally revolved around the doctrine of rational basis of ethical judgement concerning good and evil (*al-ḥusn wa al-qubḥ al-'aqliyyān*). This doctrine which is not other than a practical principle operating in human society, is considered by the *mutakallimūn* to be also applicable to the Divine sphere and govern the laws of creation; but we find no trace of it in the *Nahj al-balāghah*, similarly there is no sign of it in the Quran. Had the ideas and beliefs of the *mutakallimūn* found their way into the *Nahj al-balāghah*, first of all the traces of this doctrine should have been found in that book.

The Nahj al-balāghah and Philosophical Concepts:

Some others, on coming across certain words such as 'existence' (*wujūd*), 'non-existence' (*'adam*), 'temporality' (*ḥudūth*) and 'pre-eternity' (*qidam*), and so on in the *Nahj al-balāghah*, have been led to assume that these terms entered the Muslim intellectual world under the influence of Greek philosophy and were inserted, unintentionally or intentionally, into the discourses of 'Alī (A). If those who advocate this view had gone deeper into the meanings of these words, they would not have paid heed to such a hypothesis. The method and approach adopted in the arguments of the *Nahj al-balāghah* is completely different from that of the philosophers who lived before al-Sayyid al-Raḍī or during his time, or even those born many centuries after the compilation of the *Nahj al-balāghah*.

Presently, we shall not discuss the metaphysics of Greek or Alexandrian (Neo-Platonic) philosophy, but shall confine ourselves to the metaphysical views propounded by al-Fārābī, Ibn Sinā and Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. Undoubtedly Muslim philosophers brought new problems into philosophy under the influence of Islamic teachings which did not exist before, and in addition to them, introduced radically original ways of demonstration and inference to explain and argue their point with regard to some other problems. Nevertheless, what we learn from the *Nahj al-balāghah* is obviously different from this approach. My teacher, 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'i, in the preface to his discourse on the traditions of Islamic scholarship, writes:

These statements help in resolving a number of problems in the theological philosophy. Apart from the fact that Muslims were not acquainted with these notions and they were incomprehensible to the Arabs, basically there is no trace of them in the writings and statements of pre-Islamic philosophers whose books were translated into Arabic, and, similarly, they do not appear in the works of Muslim philosophers, Arab or Persian. These problems

remained obscure and unintelligible, and every commentator discussed them according to his own conjecture, until the eleventh century of the Hijrah (17th century A.D.). Only then they were properly understood for the first time; namely, the problem of the True Unity (*al-wahdat al-ḥaqqah*) of the Necessary Being (*wājib al-wujūd*) (a non-numerical unity); the problem that the proof of the existence of the Necessary Being is identical with the proof of His Unity (since the Necessary Being is Absolute Existence, His Being implies His Unity); the problem that the Necessary Existent is the known-in-His-Essence (*ma'lūm bil-dhāt*); that the Necessary Being is known directly without the need of an intermediary, and that the reality of every thing else is known through the Necessary Being, not vice versa....²²

The arguments of the early Muslim philosophers like al-Fārābī, Ibn Sinā and Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī—such as the discussions on the Divine Essence and Attributes, such as Unity, Simplicity (*basāṭah*), Self-Sufficiency, Knowledge, Power, Will, Providence, and so on—revolve around the conception of the necessity of existence (*wujūb al-wujūd*), from which all of them are derived, and the necessity of existence itself is deduced indirectly. In this fashion it is demonstrated that the existence of all possible existents (*mumkināt*) cannot be explained without assuming the existence of the Necessary Being. Although the argument used for proving the truth of this cannot be called demonstration per impossible (*burhān khulf*) in view of its indirect mode of inference, it resembles *burhān khulf* and hence it fails to provide completely satisfactory demonstration, for it does not explain the necessity of existence of the Necessary Being. Ibn Sinā in his *al-'Ishārāt* claims that he has succeeded in discovering “the Why?” (*lima*) of it and hence chooses to call his argument “*burhān al-ṣiddiqīn*” (*burhān limmī*, i.e. causal proof). However, the latter philosophers considered his exposition of “the Why?” (*lima*) as insufficient.

In the *Nahj al-balāghah*, necessity of existence is never used to explain the existence of the possible beings (*mumkināt*). That on which this book relies for this purpose is the real criterion of the necessity of existence, that is, the absolute reality and pure being of the Divine Essence.

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, in the above-mentioned work, while explaining a ḥadīth of ‘Alī (A) found in *al-Tawḥīd* of al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, says:

The basis of our discussion rests upon the principle that Divine Being is a reality that does not accept any limits or restrictions whatsoever. Because, God, the Most Exalted, is Absolute Reality from Whom is derived the existence of all other beings within the ontological limits and characteristics peculiar to themselves, and their existence depends on that of the Absolute Being.²³

In the *Nahj al-balāghah* the very basis of all discussions on Divine

Essence rests on the position that God is Absolute and Infinite Being, which transcends all limits and finitude. No point of space or time, nor any thing is devoid of Him. He is with everything, yet no thing is with Him. Since He is the Absolute, and the Infinite, He transcends all time, number, limit and proximity (all kinds of quiddities). That is, time and space, number and limit are applicable to a lower stage i.e. stage of Divine Acts and creation. Everything is from Him and returns unto Him. He is the First of the first and the Last of the last. He precedes everything and succeeds everything.

This is the idea that forms the axis of all discourses of the *Nahj al-balāghah*, and of which there is no trace in the works of al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazālī, and Khwājah Naṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.

As pointed out by 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī, these profound discussions of theology proper (*ilāhiyyāt bil-ma'nā al-'akhaṣṣ*) are based on a series of inter-related problems which have been posited in metaphysics (*al-'umūr al-'āmmah*).²⁴ An elaborate discussion of those theological problems and their relevant issues mentioned above is outside the scope of our present discussion.

There are two reasons for rejecting the claims that the theological discussions of the *Nahj al-balāghah* were inventions of later writers familiar with philosophical notions. Firstly, the kind of problems discussed in the *Nahj al-balāghah* were not at all raised by any philosopher till the time of al-Sayyid al-Raḍī, the compiler of the *Nahj al-balāghah*. That the Unity of the Necessary Being is not of the numerical kind and that Divine Essence precedes number; that the existence of the Necessary Being implies Its Unity; the simple reality of the Necessary Being; His immanence and other such notions were not known to philosophy during or before al-Sayyid al-Raḍī's times. Secondly, the axes of arguments presented in this book are altogether different from the axes of philosophical discussions which have been prevalent throughout history until the present day.

The *Nahj al-balāghah* and Western Philosophic Thought:

The *Nahj al-balāghah* has played a great role in the history of Eastern Philosophy. Mullā Ṣadrā, who brought a revolution in theological thought (*al-ḥikmat al-'ilāhiyyah*), was under profound influence of 'Alī's discourses. His method of argument with regard to the problems of *tawḥīd* is the method of inferring the Essence from the Essence, and also deducing the Attributes and Acts from the Essence, and all these arguments are based on the belief that there exists the Necessary Being only. These arguments are based on radically different general principles, which are elaborated in his system of metaphysics.

Eastern theological thought (*al-ḥikmat al-'ilāhiyyah*) attained

fruition and strength from the sources of Islamic teachings and was firmly established on unviolable foundations. However, theological philosophy in the West remained deprived of such source of inspiration. The widespread philosophical malaise of inclination towards materialism in the West has many causes whose discussion is outside the scope of our discourse. But we believe that the major cause of this phenomenon is the weakness and insufficiency of theological conceptions of Western religious thought.²⁵ Anyone interested in making a comparative study of the approaches pointed out in these chapters, should first study the arguments advanced by Western philosophers such as Anselm, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant and others for proving the existence of God and their discussions about acceptance or rejection of various arguments, then he should compare them with the *burhān al-ṣiddiqīn* argument advanced by Mullā Ṣadrā under the inspiration of 'Alī's words. He would see for himself the wide chasm that separates the one from the other.

To be continued—'in shā' Allāh

NOTES:

1. *Nahj al-balāghah*, (ed. Dr. Subḥī al-Ṣāliḥ, Beirut 1387 A.H.), *Khutab*, No. 185, p. 270.

2. The term *ta'wil* has been defined variously, but generally when used in opposition to *tafsir* (which is applied to the explanation of the literal and explicit meanings of the Quranic texts) it is applied to interpretation of the Quranic verses which goes beyond the apparent literal meaning. According to the Imāmiyyah Shī'ah, no one except the Prophet (S) and the twelve Imams (A) is entitled to draw the *ta'wil* of the Quranic verses. To illustrate what is meant by *ta'wil*, consider these examples: (1) According to a Shī'ah ḥadīth, the verse 2:148 (*أَيْنَ مَا تَكُونُوا يَأْتِ بِكُمْ اللَّهُ جَمِيعاً*) "Wherever you may be, God will bring you all together," pertains to the 313 companions of al-Imām al-Mahdī (A) whom God will gather in a certain place from various parts of the earth in a single night. (2) According to another ḥadīth the verse 67:30 (*قُلْ أَرَأَيْتُمْ إِنْ أَصْبَحَ مَاؤُكُمْ غَوْرًا فَمَنْ يَأْتِيكُمْ بِمَاءٍ مَعِينٍ* *) "Say: 'What think you? If your water (in wells) should have vanished into the earth, then who would bring you running water?'" pertains to the *ghaybah* (occultation) of al-Imām al-Mahdī (A.F.). Such interpretations, which obviously go beyond the apparent meaning of the Quranic verses, are called *ta'wil*.

3. See 'Allāmah S.M.H. Ṭabāṭabā'i, *Uṣūl-e falsafah wa rawish-e riyālism* ("The Principles and Method of the Philosophy of Realism"), Introduction to vol. V.

4. Muḥammad Sulaymān Nadawī, *Mādhā khasara al-'ālam bi-inḥitāt al-Muslimīn*, vol. IV, p. 97.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

6. See 'Allāmah S.M.H. Ṭabāṭabā'i, *op. cit.*

7. *Ibid.*, vol. V.

8. *Nahj al-balāghah*, *Khutab*, No. 1, p. 40.

9. *Ibid.*, *Khutab*, No. 186, p. 274.

10. *Ibid.*, *Khutab*, No. 152, p. 212.

11. The author's argument that if our universe were assumed to be infinite, it

precludes the assumption of another universe, finite or infinite, does not seem to be valid. An infinite number of straight lines of infinite length can be drawn on an infinite plane; an infinite space of three dimensions contains an infinite number of infinite planes, an infinite space of four dimensions contains an infinite number of infinite three-dimensional spaces. Similarly, an infinite universe of five dimensions will contain an infinite number of infinite four-dimensional universes, such as our universe, with three spatial dimensions and one dimension of time. (Tr.)

12. *Nahj al-balāghah*, *Khutab*, No. 152, p. 212.
13. *Ibid.*, *Khutab*, No. 186, p. 273.
14. *Ibid.*, *Khutab*, No. 1, p. 40.
15. *Ibid.*, *Khutab*, No. 152, p. 212.
16. *Ibid.*, *Khutab*, No. 65, p. 96.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, *Khutab*, No. 186, pp. 272-3.
19. *Ibid.*, *Khutab*, No. 152, pp. 211-12.
20. In the first *khutbah* of the *Nahj al-balāghah*, the statement *الَّذِي لَيْسَ لِصِفَتِهِ حَدٌّ مَخْدُودٌ، وَلَا نَعْتٌ مَوْجُودٌ*, is preceded by the statement *وَكَمَالٌ إِلَّا خَلَاصٌ لَهُ نَفْسِي الصِّفَاتِ عَنْهُ*
21. *Nahj al-balāghah*, *Khutab*, No. 186, p. 274
22. *Maktab-e tashayyu'*, No. 2, p. 120.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
25. See Murtaḍā Muṭahhari, *Ilal-e garāyesh beh māddigari* ("The causes of inclination towards materialism"), under the chapter, "*Nāresā'ihā-ye mafāhī m-e falsafī*" ("The inadequacies of [Western] philosophical ideas").

Modern Islamic Political Thought: A Review Article

by Dr. Wahīd Akhtar

Modern Islamic Political Thought ;

Ḥamid Enāyet, Macmillon Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke, 1982 ;

This book is much talked about in the circles interested in the Islamic studies because of its subject. Ḥamid Enāyet is one of the few Iranian writers known outside Iran. He was a professor of political science at Tehran University from 1971 to 76. He had also served at Khartoum University, Sudan, and St. Antony College, England. He lectured on modern Middle Eastern history at Oxford University. His untimely death grieved the academic circles, for he was expected to do more valuable work in the field of Islamic political thought. He is among a small coterie of scholars who are well versed in Western modes of thought and idiom with good knowledge of Arabic and Persian. His first book *Sayrī dar andīshah-ye siyāsī 'Arab* was acclaimed as the best on the subject all over Persian knowing world and secured him a place of eminence in the Muslim academic circles. He translated Aristotle's *Politics* and Hegel's *Reason in History* into Persian along with many other books and articles. He contributed articles to Persian papers and journals besides writing dissertations on political and ideological trends in English. He seems to have a wide circle of friends and admirers in Iran. Many letters that we received from his fans who defended him against adverse reviews published in Iranian and foreign journals showed that he enjoyed popularity among both the students and teachers. *Modern Islamic Political Thought* attracted much attention all over the world, for it dealt with a subject of burning interest, i.e. political thinking in the Muslim world. His relation to Iran made the book more important. This is the first book which gives an authentic account of Shī'ī thought regarding politics. All the books written so far have dealt with one aspect of Islamic thought only, i.e. the majority Sunnī view. The Shī'ī outlook was ignored both by the Muslim and Western scholars. Ḥamid Enāyet compared and contrasted the Shī'ī views on state and politics with those of Sunnis, both in historical perspective and the contemporary situation.

The book consists of five chapters and one long introduction dealing with the relevance of the past. The first chapter, under the title "Shi'ism and Sunnism: Conflict and Concord," explains the spirit of Shi'ism and gives a separate account of Shi'i-Sunni polemics. The second chapter throws light on the controversy over the caliphate, with particular reference to Turkish caliphate. The concept of the Islamic state is discussed in the third chapter under two headings: "Muhammad Rashid Ridā and fundamentalism." The fourth chapter takes into account the development and impact of the concepts of nationalism, democracy, and socialism in the Muslim world. The fifth chapter is exclusively devoted to aspects of Shi'i modernism with special reference to the movement of constitutionalism in Iran and the notions of *taqiyyah* and martyrdom. The discussions about the Shi'i milieu and its role in moulding special Shi'i concepts assume greater importance due to the Islamic Revolution of Iran and its influence on the contemporary Muslim world. Just a glance at the contents of the book is enough to realize its academic value.

At the very outset it is emphasized that any attempt to understand the true nature of political thought in the contemporary Muslim world ought to take into account two basic factors: the inherent link between Islam as a comprehensive scheme for ordering human life, and politics as an indispensable instrument to secure universal compliance with the scheme. It is also indicated that in no case Muslims have had a unified and monolithic perception of their faith. The main differences centre around the issue of the caliphate, which divided Muslims into two major schools, i.e. Sunni and Shi'ah. It is rightly pointed out that Muslims, for the greater part of their history, lived under regimes which had only the most tenuous link with Islamic norms, and observed Shari'ah only to the extent that it legitimized their power in the eyes of the faithful. The author has given sufficient evidence of inseparability of religious faith and politics in Islam. Firstly, *jihād* is one of the basic tenets of the Muslim faith—which is wrongly translated as 'holy war', for the term covers a wider range of meanings; secondly, the principle of 'enjoining the good and forbidding the evil' (*al-'amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar*) requires every Muslim to see that socio-political justice is enforced in the society. These principles not only politicized the Muslim mind, but also determined their attitude towards the rulers. The author explains the absence of independent political thought in Islamic history in the light of Muslim view which rarely treated politics in isolation from related disciplines. It is why the concept of secular state and society remained alien to the majority of Muslims, both literate and illiterate.

While giving a brief account of the basic strands of tradition,

Ḥamid Enāyet points out that, though always subsumed under some other discipline, classical Islamic thought represents a fascinating mosaic of divergent schools. The first and the most lasting controversy arose regarding the choice of the Prophet's successor. Two opposing views were presented, but it would be an oversimplification if one credits one view to be democratic and the other to be undemocratic. There is a very big question mark yet now before all Muslims as to what is the proper method of selecting a ruler, and as to what is the place of what we call democratic method today. Another related question: Can we apply modern Western criteria to medieval Muslim society? The book does not pass any judgement on any of the above-mentioned two views. The author, though a Shī'ī, has remained neutral. But it may be pointed out that his attempt to confine Shī'ī view to *Imāmah*, *wilāyah* and *'iṣmah*, and Sunnī view to *khilāfah*, *ijmā'* and *bay'ah* leads a student of Islamic thought nowhere, it rather creates a confusion. This issue has been rightly discussed by the reviewer of the book in *Jumhūrī Islāmī*. Another point of contention is the author's description of the Khawārij as a revolutionary force in the body of Muslim polity. Accepting the fact that the Khawārij were pious people, devoted to the ideals of Islam, one should not forget that their naivety combined with the lack of political insight paved the way for the defeat of Islamic political ideals, and proved to be instrumental in inflicting the heaviest blow to Islamic democratic values by martyring 'Alī (A) and indirectly strengthening the hands of unscrupulous monarchical aspirations. Thus their role was negative and retrogressive. Ḥamid Enāyet, being a professor of political science, was expected to know the difference between a rebel and a revolutionary; while the former has no well thought out programme, the latter follows a well-knit ideology. The Khawārij, at the most, can be described as rebels without political insight. Moreover, their piety was also misconceived, for they refused to listen to 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Abbās' argument in favour of arbitration (*taḥkīm*), and betrayed the man whom they had accepted as their Imām. Ḥamid Enāyet describes the Khawārij as a third force or trend in the 'first four decades of Islamic history'. Apart from the ambiguity of 'the first four decades of Islamic history', he seems to attach too much importance to a trend which soon died its natural death. The Mu'tazilite doctrine of *tawḥīd*, freedom and *'aql* is discussed by the author, but strangely the political implications of the doctrine of free will are not discussed, which are more relevant to political thought than other purely metaphysical notions. Anyhow, the author has rightly described Mu'tazilism and the movement of Ikhwān al-Ṣafā as intellectual catalytic agents in the politics of early Islam.

The most important part of the introduction concerns the development of the Sunnī view of the caliphate, which he describes as

'Sunni realism'. He selects three thinkers, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and Badr al-Dīn ibn Jamā'ah (d. 732/1332) to discuss this realism. At a time when the Sunni Ghaznavids wielded the real power, and the authority of Abbāsīd caliph was just nominal, al-Māwardī defended the supremacy and indivisibility of the caliphate, but he justified the legitimacy of the transfer of power to rulers other than caliphs. Al-Ghazālī took the next step. At a time when the caliphate had lost its credentials to confer authority on rulers, and was reduced to merely an instrument of legitimizing power acquired by force, he provided the powerful with a religious justification for gaining power by force with the condition that he ought to declare allegiance to the caliph. What was anticipated by al-Māwardī was realized by al-Ghazālī. With the overthrow of the Abbāsīd caliphate the stage was set for further change in the attitude of Sunni theologians, and Ibn Jamā'ah fully legitimized the right of military power to rule. This realism or flexibility reached a point at which maintenance of security was considered to be the only function of the state. Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) declared that even an unjust ruler could be accepted, if the alternative was chaos. Thus, what is called 'realism' ends in legitimization of unjust rule too. All the three thinkers, al-Māwardī, al-Ghazālī and Ibn Jamā'ah were high functionaries at one time or another in the administration of the 'Abbāsīds, Saljūqs and Mamlūks. For their masters they had to bend the yard-stick of the caliphate to the extent of breaking it. The development or rather deterioration of the concept of the caliphate virtually separated rulership from religious obligations. Ḥamīd Enāyet calls it conservative realism at another place, which means willingness to forgo all principles for the sake of adjusting to ephemeral conditions. This flexibility was criticized by some later Sunni scholars, who wished to adhere to the Islamic ideals of social justice. This indignation was expressed in the writings of 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Badrī, himself a victim of official displeasure because of his fundamentalist views. H.A.R. Gibb says that 'in the Sunni community there was no one universally accepted doctrine of the caliphate'. But he adds that Sunni thought 'excludes the acceptance of any one theory as definitive and final. What it does lay down is a principle: that the caliphate is that form of government which safeguards the ordinances of the Shari'ah and sees that they are put into practice'. Because of this disagreement among Sunnis, the Turks could abolish the caliphate, and all opposition to the abolition proved futile. Some Arab states, particularly Sa'ūdī Arabia and Egypt, tried to acquire the status of the caliphate, but in vain. The Sa'ūdīs were supported by the British empire for its own ends. As the Sa'ūdī kingdom was a creation of the imperialist interests, it could have served its cause faithfully. All such attempts to revive the caliphate were doomed to fail because of two

reasons: firstly, the changing conditions rendered the caliphate redundant, and secondly, the very notion of the caliphate had been diluted so much that it had lost all religious and political relevance. In India the Khilāfat Movement was not actually motivated by any genuine religious sentiment for the Turkish caliph, but was mainly directed against the British rule in India. Ḥamid Enāyet, in the second chapter of his book, has dealt with this issue in depth. The author says that Āzād was in favour of retaining the caliphate for the sake of providing spiritual leadership to the Muslim Ummah, while Iqbāl agreed with Muṣṭafā Kamāl and supported his arguments for the abolition of the caliphate. Ḥamid Enāyet is of the view that Āzād reproduced Māwardī's theory with some alterations, but he was aware of the necessity of the reconstruction of Islamic thought. On the whole, Enāyet's comments are well thought out. The point which he misses is the basic difference between the approaches of the two Indian thinkers. Āzād was in the front rank of the nationalist leaders of the Indian freedom movement and subscribed to the secular policy of the Indian National Congress. His support for retaining the caliphate was determined by the policy of the Congress that used the issue of Khilāfat as a platform for attacking the British involvement in the issue. Iqbāl, on the other hand, supported the creation of a separate Muslim state in the Sub-continent, and he, like many Muslims of his times, regarded the emergence of the new Turkey as a sign of Islamic resurgence. Thus, in the context of Indian politics, the whole issue of Khilāfat was confused due to extra-Islamic considerations. Similarly, the response of the Egyptian and other Arab intellectuals was different, for most of them were convinced of the fact that the caliphate had become redundant in the present context. Nevertheless, as Enāyet indicates, some Arab thinkers were also guided by local or narrow national interests. The second chapter of the book brings the issue of the caliphate into focus in a broader perspective. It is obvious that the Shī'ah world, because of its different view of Islamic rulership, did not participate in the controversy.

With reference to the Shī'ah doctrine of rulership it may be pointed out that the Shī'ah believe that the choice of the successor of the Prophet (S) does not rest in the hands of the Ummah, for God Himself selects the successors of prophets. According to them the Prophet (S) explicitly indicated his choice under the instruction of revelation that 'Alī would succeed him as the leader of Muslims. A group of the Prophet's Companions and most of his blood relations did not agree with the choice of the first caliph. But 'Alī (A) and his supporters, including 'Abbās, the Prophet's uncle, agreed to suppress their differences in order to maintain the unity of the Ummah. At the time of the choice of the second and third caliphs also, 'Alī (A) considered himself to be the most qualified candidate for the office, but

he readily cooperated with all the three caliphs despite his sharp differences, particularly with regard to the appointment of governors and the distribution of *bayt al-māl* income. After 'Alī (A) was compelled by the majority of the Muslim world to accept the caliphate, Mu'āwiyah raised the issue of *qiṣāṣ* of 'Uthmān and made it a powerful weapon for realizing his political ambitions. Here we do not wish to dabble in this controversy, but it was at this juncture that the Muslims were divided into two fighting factions. Both were called 'shī'ah', i.e. the shī'ah of 'Uthmān or Mu'āwiyah and the shī'ah of 'Alī (A). Mu'āwiyah and 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ succeeded in dividing the supporters of 'Alī (A) into two factions at the pretext of arbitration (*taḥkīm*) by the Quran. Those who opposed arbitration separated from the ranks of 'Alī's Shī'ah and were called '*khawārij*'. Though after the tragedy of Karbalā' no Imam of the Prophet's Family contended for the caliphate, some individuals of the family of the Prophet (S) and 'Alī (A) led armed revolts against the tyrannical rule of Banū Umayyah and later Banū al-'Abbās, and made unsuccessful attempts to establish the rule of God upon the earth. Imam 'Alī ibn Mūsā al-Riḍā (A) was declared crown prince by al-Ma'mūn ibn al-Rashīd, but was poisoned later. The Imams of the family of the Prophet (S) remained content with their work of developing Islamic sciences and providing spiritual guidance to Muslims, and did not consider time to be opportune for establishing a truly Islamic state. Nevertheless, they were imprisoned and poisoned by the ruling families, which was an indication that they were regarded as potential threat to monarchies, as they were considered to be more qualified claimants to leadership. The common belief that the Imams were indifferent to politics is not true. Had they been neutral, what was the reason for being afraid of them? The Shī'ah in general followed the footsteps of their Imams (A); they opposed unjust rule but supported the just rulers, and even cooperated with those whom they disliked when the cause of Islam was threatened by external forces. Enāyet, with reference to al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1068) and al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (337-413/949-1022) and Ibn Idrīs (d. 598/1202), writes that they recommended paying of allegiance to righteous rulers (*al-sultān al-ḥaqq al-'ādil*) irrespective of their own allegiance to any school of Islamic faith. Practically the Shī'ah also took into consideration political exigencies of the times, but they did not make any attempt to legitimize exigencies. It is only in this sense that the Sunnis showed greater flexibility and displayed a sense of political realism as compared to the Shī'ah. Most of other generalizations made by Enāyet are controvertible.

At the end of the introduction, the author says that the present Islamic resurgence, Sunni as well as Shī'ī, is focussed on four themes: breaking the spell of the sanctity of status quo; rejecting the corrupting

realism of medieval writers; historical criticism; and salvaging the democratic and socialistic elements of the past. Of course, many eyebrows would rise at the mention of the term 'socialistic', but as Enāyet has discussed socialistic elements of Islamic teachings in the fourth chapter of his book, we should not be afraid of using it. Muṭahharī and some other modern but orthodox thinkers maintain that all attempts of reconciliation between Islam and socialism are futile and deviate from true Islam. And this claim is not unjustified, for the craze of incorporating new terminology in the body of any older philosophy is often an exercise in futility. However, the values cherished by modern philosophies of democracy and socialism were introduced and implemented by true Muslims many centuries before these movements came into vogue.

"Shī'ism and Sunnism: Conflict and Concord" is a topic of both historical and ideological interest. Enāyet gives a brief but comprehensive account of the development of the two sects in an objective manner. So far as the origin of Shī'ism is concerned, Enāyet has referred to the view of Montgomery Watt, who holds that early Shī'is came mostly from south Arabian tribes among whom kings were treated as semi-gods. Here lies the mischief of the famous Orientalist, and it is a matter of regret that Enāyet, acquainted with Shī'ī faith and its origin, has quoted him without any critical remark. What M. Watt and likes of him impose upon Muslim scholars are their mental fabrications, knowing that whatever they utter would be accepted by many intellectually backward Easterners. Watt wants to establish a relationship between Shī'ī belief in the infallible Imams and 'semi-divine kings.' On the other hand Louis Massignon traces back the origin of the Shī'ah faith in the aspirations of middle class artisans, and this sociological treatment finds more emphatic expression in the Marxist analysis of the Shī'ah faith. A Russian history of the world advances the view that the supporters of 'Alī and al-Husayn (A) belonged to the class of landless soldiers camped at Kūfah and Baṣrah cantonments. Even if the latter interpretation may hold some ground, the former, i.e. Watt's view, is totally baseless. Shī'ism's origin can be traced back to the teachings of the Quran and the life of the Prophet (S). As said earlier, in the beginning there were not two different versions of Islam but only one. Both the Shī'ah and the Sunnīs trace back their origin to the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet (S). Why some Muslims took the side of 'Alī (A) against Mu'āwiyah, apart from sociological reasons, can be explained only in the terms of Islamic teachings. The majority of Muslims, who were later identified as *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*, owed their allegiance to 'Alī (A), who was unanimously elected caliph after 'Uthmān. The later differences have their origin in the interpretation and implementation of the tenets of the faith, which

had, of course, socio-political implications too. Enāyet is justified in suggesting that the distinguishing features of Shī'ism, in relation to Sunnism, should be sought mainly in its ethos. I would like to suggest that the fundamental principles of Shī'ism are the same as those of Sunnism. Emphasis on *iṣmah*, *wilāyah* and *Imāmah* on the one hand, and on *ijmā'* on the other is only of secondary importance. With this difference in emphasis emerged a unique ethos under the influence of socio-politico-cultural factors that distinguished Shī'ism from Sunnism. This ethos is grounded in the remembrance of the martyrdom of al-Imām al-Husayn (A). The author, in the second and the last chapter, has rightly given due importance to it. But his conjecture that Shī'ism nurses a particular emotionalism is a bit exaggerated, for he contends that it issues from the peculiar Shī'i philosophy of Imamate. His assessment of Shī'i emotional attitude on the basis of *elegia* (*marthiyyah*) is also one-sided. He has ignored other aspects of Shī'i literature, particularly poetry, which is rich in a deep sense of commitment to Islamic and human values of justice, selflessness, sacrifice, and love of truth. These values of literature cannot be called eulogizing of suffering and asceticism, as Enāyet has called them. He knows fully the significance of *marthiyyah* literature, but fails to appreciate its real value. Some of his observations regarding the Shī'i ethos are also subject to question; that, for instance, it is an attitude of mind that refuses to admit that majority opinion is necessarily true or right; or that the Shī'ah are usually concerned with personalities. Both these observations are incorrect. The belief in infallibility of the Imams in no way can be explained in this way, for the Shī'ah faith also holds that prophets are equally infallible. They argue that a person prone to errors of judgement and sin cannot lead people spiritually. The Mu'tazilites, known for their strict adherence to the dictates of reason, accepted the Shī'i belief in Imamate without questioning its much propagated 'irrationality'. They rather advanced arguments in its favour. The statement that the Shī'i faith in the infallibility of the Imams is a perfect safeguard against the majority view is equally wrong. Here the concern is not for personalities, but for certain fundamental principles and facts. Enāyet's claim that the Shī'ah attitude is determined by 'persons' is a distortion of facts. Similarly the statement that the Shī'ah usually abstained from politics is historically wrong, for the basic difference between the majority view and the Shī'i view originated in socio-political attitudes and issues. Moreover, it amounts to claiming that the Shī'ah had no interest in political affairs, which is denying the truth. Basically, the Shī'i-Sunni difference is political, not religious in essence. The Shī'ah tried to uphold the values and norms of social and political life in strict adherence to the teachings of Islam. The author has quoted the criticism of Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Amini

without their critical evaluation. He himself has tried to discover some similarity between the Shī'ī practice of *taqiyyah* and esoterism, which is again an over-simplification. The esoteric attitude is purely spiritual, while *taqiyyah* is an attitude determined by socio-political conditions. During the later centuries this practice has proved to be more harmful than useful for the Shī'ah themselves. So far as the justification of *taqiyyah* is concerned, Amīnī, who levels many an objection against Shī'ī practices, accepts the validity of *taqiyyah*, and even admits that the Sunnis also followed it to some extent, for it is an expedient method to ensure the survival of a faith under hostile regimes. In the last chapter, Enāyet deals with it separately. Sunni scholars have been critical of this notion and its practice, but actually it does not in any way affect the cause of Muslim unity; it is rather instrumental in acquiring it. In the modern Shī'ī thought, the practice of *taqiyyah* has been critically examined. *Taqiyyah* comes from the root 'waqā' in Arabic, which means 'to shield' or 'to guard' oneself, the same root from which the important word *taqwā* (piety, or fear of God) is also derived. In English it may be translated as 'dissimulation' or 'expedient concealment'. All forms of concealment are not permissible in the Shī'ī faith, but only four under particular conditions: (1) the enforced (*ikrāhiyyah*), under an oppressor; (2) precautionary or apprehensive (*khawfiyyah*), related to performing acts and rituals according to *fatwā*'s of Sunni theologians; (3) arcane (*kitmāniyyah*), concealment of faith and number and strength of one's co-religionists in times of weakness; (4) symbiotic (*mudārātiyyah*), participation in the social and religious functions of the majority community for strengthening Islamic unity.

Ḥamīd Enāyet holds that in recent times there is an obvious attempt at bridging the gap between the Shī'ah and the Sunnis. He has surveyed a number of tendencies that have helped to attain the end of unity. In the new Shī'ī books the role of the first three caliphs has been re-evaluated. Abū Bakr and 'Umar have been separated from the third caliph 'Uthmān. The tone of criticizing the first two caliphs is less harsh than in the case of 'Uthmān. Enāyet has referred to many modern Arabic and Persian books in this context, but I would like to refer to a controversy with regard to the caliphate of the Banū Umayyah initiated by a book *Khilāfat-e Mu'āwiyah wa Yazīd*, written by a fanatic Sunni Pakistani scholar, Maḥmūd 'Abbāsī, in which he inadvertently made baseless allegations against 'Alī (A) and al-Ḥusayn (A), quoting extensively from early sources. However, in most of the cases the quotations were taken and used out of the context with an ulterior motive. I do not consider any Shī'ī work in refutation of this book worth mentioning. Yet the two most convincing rebuttals came from Sunnis, one was written by the founder-leader-ideologue of the Jamā'at-e

Islāmī, Abū al-'A'lā Mawdūdī, under the title *Khilāfat wa mulūkiyyat*, and the other was written by the famous scholar of Urdu and man of encyclopaedic works, Niyāz Fatehpūrī. It would not be inapt to mention that these two critics of the above-mentioned book held the third caliph responsible for the emergence of the monarchical rule of the Banū Umayyah. Enāyet has referred to such critical appraisal of Islamic history by Arab Sunnī scholars also, which paved the way for a better intersectarian understanding. The works of Tāhā Ḥusayn and 'Umar Abū al-Naṣr, Sunnī Arab scholars, showed the same critical re-evaluation of the rule of the first four caliphs. Rewriting of Islamic history from a truly objective, unbiased viewpoint has been instrumental in bringing the two communities closer to each other. Modern Shī'ah historians have conceded that despite the questionable mode of the election of the first two caliphs, their political integrity could not be doubted. The Shī'ah have reshaped their arguments in support of extolling 'Alī (A) and his descendants with emphasis on their human, down-to-earth qualities. Both the sects, or more appropriately, schools, as called by some modern writers, are trying to play down their mutual differences and highlighting the points of agreement. For this trend of rewriting history, Enāyet has used the term of historical revisionism, which is not a proper term to express the content carried by it. Another important departure from the past was marked by acceptance of the principle of *ijtihād* by Sunnī scholars, particularly by Jamāl al-Dīn Asadābādī, 'Abduh, and Iqbāl. The Sunnis accepted *ijtihād* as an important source of legislation, but they had practically blocked the road for any original thinking on the matters of reframing the laws in accordance with changing times. The Shī'ah, with their emphasis on 'aql, kept the door of new thinking on legislation open, and they gave much scope to reason for exercising its power. In recent times, the Shī'i view of *ijtihād* has found many defenders and champions among Sunnī theologians. Similarly the notion of *ijmā'* (consensus), which was emphasized much by the Sunnis and was given only a very minor role to play in legislation by the Shī'ah, came to be accepted as the basis of democratization by Shī'ah scholars. Thus, theoretically the scope of agreement was broadened and differences were minimized. Under the leadership of Shaykh Maḥmūd Shaltūt of al-'Azhar University was established an organization to promote unity among Shī'ah and Sunnis. As a first step towards attaining it the Ja'farī school of fiqh was included in the curriculum of al-'Azhar. Authorizing instruction in Shī'ah jurisprudence meant the recognition of Shī'ism on an equal footing with the four orthodox Sunnī schools of fiqh. The *fatwā* of Shaykh Maḥmūd Shaltūt was published (in 1959) under the title "Islam: the religion of unity," and it was prefaced by two arguments: the historical argument reminded about mutual respect and tolerance between

different legal schools of Sunnis as well as the Shi'i school; the pragmatic argument emphasized the harmful practical effects of blind prejudice against one another among Muslim schools of fiqh. It was argued that the spirit of *ijtihād*, which could help in promoting unity and was meant to generate a feeling of mutual respect, and encouraged plurality, degenerated into antagonism, and new avenues of free dialogue were shut down. Shaltūt holds that all schools of fiqh should be ready to accept from one another any idea which conforms to Islamic principles, and can together ensure the welfare of family and society. By way of example he mentions his own *fatwā* in favour of the Shi'i rejection of the validity of suspended divorce and divorce by triple repudiation in one sitting. In another *fatwā* he confirmed the validity of worship according to the Imāmiyyah Shi'i doctrine. The old authentic Shi'i classics of fiqh and *tafsīr* were published under the auspices of al-'Azhar. The post-revolutionary Iran launched a concerted movement of Islamic unity supported by a *fatwā* of Imam Khumaynī, which permitted the Shi'ah to offer prayers behind a Sunnī imām, for the sake of expressing solidarity with all the Muslims. Enāyet has referred to this *fatwā*. These and other moves towards attaining the goal of Islamic unity have paved the way for new creative thinking with immense possibilities to meet the political and social requirements of the modern age. In this respect, the radically new but truly Islamic concept of *ijtihād* can be applied to the current issues, and be made more relevant to contemporary Muslim politics.

It is but natural that while discussing modernism in the Shi'ah school the author has given a detailed account of the developments that took place in Iran during the last few centuries, with particular reference to the Uṣūli-Akhhbārī controversy, which resulted in the ultimate victory of rationalism and decided the role of the 'ulamā' in socio-political affairs. Enāyet himself has indicated that it would be wrong to construe that all Akhhbārī 'ulamā' were politically reactionary and all Uṣūlī 'ulamā' were progressive. He has also referred to the view that held that this controversy was mainly directed towards establishing the 'ulamā' as *de facto* regents of the Imam (A.F.) in social and political affairs. Here it would be unnecessary to go into the details of this interpretation, which obviously seems to be hostile towards Uṣūlī 'ulamā'. A reviewer's objection that Enāyet failed to grasp this point is unfounded.

Enāyet has rightly emphasized the significance of the Shi'i notions of *taqiyyah* and martyrdom. *Taqiyyah*, as he has pointed out, was not liked even by Shi'i thinkers of our age. Enāyet's reference to the Islamic Revolution of Iran is passing. He refers to Murtaḍā Muṭahharī and Shari'atī as 'semi-revisionist' thinkers, despite acknowledging his indebtedness to Muṭahharī for writing the present book. In my humble

view such terms and categories should be applied to Muslim thinkers with utmost caution, or rather must be avoided, for they lead to half-baked, misconceived judgements. What is strange is the fact that the author has avoided expressing any view on the leadership and ideology of the present Iranian Revolution. He seems to be over-cautious, and thus betrays his fear of being dubbed a fundamentalist or a fanatic by the so-called westernized critics in case he fully supports the Iranian conception of revolution.

In order to have a closer look at the content of the book, it would be appropriate to give a critical account of some of the reviews on the book.

A Review of the Reviews:

I hereby give a résumé of the main points of criticism contained in Muḥammad Surūsh's review in Persian, published in the fortnightly '*Ṣaḥīfah*' of the daily '*Jumhūrī Islāmī*'. This review is based on the Persian translation of Ḥamid Enāyet's book by Bahā' al-Dīn Khurramshāhī.

A. Islamic Beliefs (*'aqā'id*) and Laws (*aḥkām*):

(1) The author has confused *uṣūl al-'aqā'id* (fundamental doctrines of faith) with *furū'* (subsidiary rules). He says that the five pillars of the faith are: prayer, fasting, alms-giving (*zakāt*), pilgrimage to Ka'bah (*Ḥajj*), and *al-shahādātān* (*tawḥīd* and *nubuwwah*). (2) Islam, in the author's words, does not frame an integrated legal system. This shows his ignorance of the comprehensiveness of the Islamic Law. (3) In the author's view woman's position is made vulnerable in Islam mainly because of the law of inheritance which favours men. The author does not take into consideration greater financial responsibility of men in managing family affairs, and also ignores the fact that husband has no right over wife's earnings, while wife has a rightful share in husband's earnings and property. In defence of Ḥamid Enāyet it can be pointed out that all these three objections arose because of reading the author's remarks out of the context. He did not refer to *uṣūl* or *furū'*, he just mentioned the five 'pillars' of Islam. The second point under criticism is with reference to a misconception, to which the author does not subscribe. (4) Without any reference to authentic sources, he claims that the Sunnis believe that the Prophet (S) said that his followers were more well-informed in the worldly affairs than himself.

B. Historical Errors:

(1) It is said that Muslims, throughout history, have been indifferent to political events, and they rarely revolted against unjust rulers. This sweeping remark is contrary to the historical facts with regard to Muslims in general, and the Shi'ah in particular. The author unwittingly contradicted himself by citing examples of the founders of the four schools of Sunni fiqh, who had to undergo all sorts of hardship and oppression at the hands of the rulers. (2) He seems to accept the view of the Orientalists that the Prophet (S) did not lay down any guide-lines and principles for political life of the future generations of Muslims. (3) The author, while giving the meaning of *khawārij* (plural of *khārijī*, derived from *khurūj*), has confused the Persian usage of the term with the Arabic connotation of the word. The reviewer's objection is not clear, for in both the languages the word means rebellion, revolt, secession or breaking away. But so far as the fallacious statements made by the author in connection with the political and religious role of the Khawārij are concerned, the reviewer is justified in his criticism. These points would be discussed in some detail later.

C. Misstatements and Allegations Against Tashayyu' (The Shi'ite faith):

(1) The author's distinction between the Shi'ah and the Sunnis is made on false grounds. For instance, the author writes that the key terms with regard to Shi'ism are *Imāmah*, *wilāyah* and *'iṣmah*, and with regard to Sunnism are *khilāfah*, *ijmā'* and *bay'ah*. *Bay'ah* is acknowledged as an essential condition of accepting a leader's authority in both the sects, and *ijmā'* is also accepted by the Shi'ah as one of the basic principles of *ijtihād*, but of course in a limited sense. The author holds that the Sunnis believe that distance from the time of the Prophet (S) caused remoteness from the ideals of Islam, while the Shi'ah regard passage of time as a factor helping to attain the ideal. In fact both the Sunnis and Shi'ah consider the Prophet's lifetime as the ideal epoch, and as to latter periods no general rule can be framed either according to the beliefs of Sunnis or Shi'ah, for each period is judged according to its deeds. Similarly, both the sects believe in the establishment of an ideal State before the end of the world. The reviewer has quoted extensively from both the Sunni and Shi'ah sources for substantiating his point. At another place, it is alleged that Ḥamid Enāyet holds that while the Sunnis believe in the inherent goodness of man, the Shi'ah believe that man is essentially sinful and carries a sense of guilt. On this ground, the Sunnis regard man as superior to angels, and the Shi'ah regard him to be inferior to angels. This controversy owes its origin to the beliefs of the Mu'tazilah and the Ashā'irah, and has a

long and complicated history, which in no way can be appended particularly to the Shi'i or Sunni beliefs. The reviewer's brief survey of the controversy, ending with 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'i's view on the issue, is quite scholarly. All Muslims unanimously accept that man is the cream of creation and there is no difference among them with regard to human nature and its great potentialities. The *Nahj al-balāghah*, more than any other book, stresses upon the inherent virtue of human existence and the worth of the human self. (2) The author gives an account of the Egyptian author Aḥmad Amin's strictures against the Shi'i faith, but passes on without referring to their refutations by the Shi'ah scholars, which is against the basic principles of academic honesty required for research work, and gives an impression as if he is in agreement with the criticism. For instance, it is narrated that the source of the Shi'i belief in *Imāmah* and *iṣmah* (the spiritual leadership of the twelve Imams and their infallibility) is based on the Sāsānī myth of the infallibility of the kings of ancient Persia, which was popularized among the Shi'ah as a result of the marriage of al-Imām al-Ḥusayn (A) and Shahr Bānū, an Iranian princess. The author's silence on this issue shows his susceptibility to the influence of some Orientalists like Count de Gobineau and Edward G. Brown, who propagated this myth. It is also stated that the Iranians, in their attempt to make themselves distinct from Arabs, smuggled their old beliefs into Islam and moulded the Shi'ite faith according to them, for it served their cultural and political ends. It has not been pointed out by the author that almost all Iranians were Sunni for many centuries, and they embraced the Shi'i faith on mass scale only after Ṣafawids came in power (1502 A.D.). The early Shi'ah were all Arab with the only exception of Salmān al-Fārisī. The reviewer has discussed the baselessness of Aḥmad Amin's objections in a convincing manner, and pointed out that a number of great Sunni scholars, *fuqahā'*, *mufasssīrūn*, and *muḥaddithūn* were Iranians. Abū Ḥanīfah, al-Bukhārī (the greatest Sunni *muḥaddith*), Sibawayh (one of the founders of *al-naḥw*) and al-Zamakhsharī (the author of *al-Kashshāf*) were Iranian by origin. A long list of Sunni luminaries may be added to these names. The author has written that the significance of the martyrdom of al-Ḥusayn (A) in the context of Iranian culture has its origin in the pre-Islamic myth of the assassination of Siyāwash. The most startling statement quoted without any critical remark is that Iran was conquered during the reign of 'Umar, the second caliph, and, therefore, Iranians became his staunch enemies and supported 'Alī (A) and his family. Such a statement totally belies historical facts and perspective. Iranians had no reason to wait for centuries for smuggling ancient Iranian beliefs into Islam in the garb of the Shi'i faith. Why did Iranians not give vent to their supposedly anti-Arab feelings for a long time and so devotedly served Islam and contributed richly to the development of Islamic

sciences? All such issues have been logically raised and discussed in the review. (3) Ḥamid Enāyet is of the view that the Shi'ah invented *aḥādīth* to enhance the value of mourning on the martyrdom of al-Imām al-Ḥusayn (A) in addition to the *aḥādīth* praising weeping while reciting the Quran or offering prayer. He conveniently ignores all *aḥādīth* and traditions referring to the value of mourning on the martyrdom of al-Ḥusayn (A) recorded in the authentic Sunni collections of ḥadīth. (4) He similarly did not critically examine the allegations made by Ibn Taymiyyah against the Shi'i faith. He should have at least mentioned how Ibn Taymiyyah was severely criticized by his contemporary Sunni 'ulamā' and was not only dubbed a heretic but also an infidel, and a king had ordered his execution. (5) Ḥamid Enāyet writes that the martyrdom of al-Imām al-Ḥusayn (A), at one level, is similar to the crucifixion of Christ. As Christ by his death on the cross guaranteed the salvation of his followers, in the same fashion al-Imām al-Ḥusayn (A) purified the Muslim Ummah of all sins. This interpretation of the Imam's martyrdom is meant to belittle its political and social significance. Here again he uncritically accepted a false idea propagated by some Orientalists. (6) The comparison of the Sunni and Shi'i concepts of the caliphate with that of the Khawārij's is misleading, and fails to give a correct account of the Shi'i position in this matter. (7) The author's views on the attitude of the Shi'ah towards the rulers are also baseless. In his view, the Shi'ah were always in a passive state of waiting for the appearance of al-Imām al-Mahdī (A.F.); and as they regarded all the rulers and governments as illegitimate, they abstained from politics. Enāyet further writes that the Sunni realistic approach to this problem is preferable to the Shi'ah view. He also says in another place that because of the influence of Orientalists and non-Shi'ah scholars the view is held that the Shi'ah consider all the rulers to be usurpers and they have been opposed to them. The oldest Shi'i sources, like the works of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 461/1068) and Ibn Idrīs (d. 598/1202), suggest quite an opposite line of thought. The reviewer gives an account of the Shi'i views and beliefs, which could be derived from even a sketchy study of the history of *tashayyu'*. According to the Shi'i view: (a) Islam is a perfect *dīn* which takes into consideration all aspects of life. (b) As it is a comprehensive system of belief and action, it has also paid sufficient attention to the political problems of the Ummah during the period of the Twelfth Imam's occultation (*ghaybah*), and it actually laid down a course of action appropriate for it. (c) As Islam is a religion meant for the whole society, it prescribes certain laws for ensuring social justice and proper utilization of taxes like *zakāt* (alms) and *khums* (twenty percent Islamic tax levied on seven categories of property), which can be done under a just government only. It is impossible, therefore, that any Shi'i may be indifferent to the existing

form of government, which eventually means indifference to the implementation of the Divine Law. (d) There is no contradiction between the belief in the establishment of the ideal government under the guidance and leadership of the Twelfth Imam (A.F.) and a just government before that period. A just and ideal government may be of different degrees, and it is possible that just governments, much lower in degree than the ideal one, may exist in the form of the government of *faqīh-e 'ādil* or even of a *sultān-e 'ādil*. Hence, the Āyatullāh Nā'inī, in his book *Tanbīh al-'ummah*, says: "Though the reins of government should be in the hands of the fuqahā', but if the time is not opportune for this, it is better to have a constitutional government in preference to monarchical rule for the sake of achieving the targets made obligatory by Islam.' At this juncture attention may be drawn to Ḥamīd Enāyet's another remark regarding the attitude of the 'ulamā' towards constitutional government. According to him, in the past the 'ulamā' supported monarchy but later changed their opinion in favour of constitutional government. It may be generally believed that the *Uṣūlī* (rationalist) 'ulamā' supported constitutional government, while the *Akhhbārī* (traditionalist) 'ulamā' favoured tyrannical government. This inference is certainly wrong, for the 'ulamā' are divided into the *Uṣūlī* and the *Akhhbārī* groups on the basis of the method they employ in *ijtihād*, and not according to political ideology. Contrary to Ḥamīd Enāyet's conjecture, Shaykh Faḍl Allāh Nūrī, an opponent of constitutional government, was an *Uṣūlī*. The author committed another error by labelling the anti-monarchy movement of the spiritual leaders as a means of promoting the interests of the bourgeoisie, using the Marxist class-analysis. (8) The author considers the thought of Muslim philosophers, like Ibn Sinā and Mullā Ṣadrā to be purely deductive and unhistorical in content. This view, which holds speculative metaphysical thinking as unproductive and fruitless, is un-Islamic as well as unphilosophical. (9) The author's estimation of some great Shī'ah thinkers amounts to insolence. For instance his remarks about al-'Allāmah al-Hillī's *al-Minhāj* and Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's ideals of justice are contemptuous. Moreover they are not based on serious study. Similarly, his estimation of al-'Allāmah al-'Aminī, describing him as an opponent of the Muslim unity, is totally unjustifiable. In order to estimate his position correctly, the reviewer suggests, one should analyze the meaning of unity. This term may be defined in three different ways: (1) to select common elements of belief, and do away with all the ideas, derived from the basic tenets, which give rise to differences—this amounts to inventing a faith, to which no one adheres in fact—; (2) to select one of the various versions of faith and reject all other versions; (3) all Muslims should unite as one community, retaining their specific beliefs, for meeting the challenge of hostile forces. The Muslim intellectuals accept

the third definition, which emphasizes unity in diversity, i.e. unity on the basis of co-existence of different interpretations of the Islamic faith. The second alternative amounts to the suggestion that all the sects except one should be suppressed, and the first alternative logically results in the creation of a new faith rejecting all the existing faiths. Al-'Allāmah al-'Aminī took into consideration all the above-mentioned possibilities in his magnum opus, *al-Ghadir*, and critically evaluated the strictures passed against the Shi'ah by Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Ālūsī and al-Qāsimī. He holds such criticism not only as malicious but also responsible for sowing the seeds of difference and enmity between the Shi'ah and other Muslims. He particularly takes Rashīd Riḍā to task for making an extremely absurd statement saying that the Shi'ah are happy whenever Muslims are defeated in any field. In reality the Shi'ah always held Muslim interests in high esteem irrespective of inter-sectarian differences, and never confined Islamic fraternity to their own sect. *Al-Ghadir* played a positive role in attaining Muslim unity by highlighting the following facts about Shi'ism: It is proved logically and conclusively that the emergence of the Shi'ah does not owe its origin to any political or racial movement; many prejudices against the Shi'ah are products of the gulf created among them and other Muslim sects, such as the charge of jubilation over the defeat of Muslims, or the popular notion that the Shi'ah pay visit to the tombs of the Imams in preference to the *Hajj*; it explained the real character and role of 'Alī (A) in Islam. It is for this reason that the honest Sunnī 'ulamā' like 'Abd al-Ghanī Ḥasan al-Miṣrī and 'Ādil Ghadḥān paid rich tributes to the book *al-Ghadir*. (10) The author writes that the Shi'is' indulgence in mourning (*marthiyyah*, *rawdāh khwānī*) has been a powerful ally of the forces of tyranny, for it valued defeat and grief, and encouraged a sense of oppressedness more than active rejection and defiance of injustice and tyranny. The review justly proves that the case is quite opposite by pointing out the political role that the Shi'i emotionalism played in Muslim history. But the reviewer ignored those passages in the book which bring to light the revolutionary role played by the ceremonial mourning. Ḥamid Enāyet, with reference to F. Bagley, says that the Shi'i emotionalism carries with it a more humanistic message. (F. Bagley, "The Azhar and Shi'ism", *Muslim World*, vol. L2, 1960, pp. 65 ff.) He also holds that this factor produced great literature which enriched the emotional content of the Shi'i culture. At another place, he writes that "The memory of Ḥusayn's martyrdom serves as an everlasting exhortation to the Shi'is of all times to brave their numerical inferiority in the face of firmly established majorities." (p. 20) Ḥamid Enāyet explains both the positive and negative effects of the mourning ceremonies observed by the Shi'ah. There is no doubt that what the author calls the Shi'i emotionalism in its ritualized form has lost the true spirit of the

memory of the martyrdom and put undue emphasis on the virtue of suffering and deprivation, which dulled the spirit of dynamism among the majority of the Shī'ī masses, or the Shī'ah *rūḥāniyyūn* could not exploit the potentiality of the saga of the martyrdom to the advantage of their followers. There is no doubt that 'azādārī (mourning ceremonies) was started by Zaynab (A), the sister of al-Imām al-Ḥusayn (A), and 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn (A), the fourth Imam, with a view to reviving the spirit of martyrdom and to prepare Muslims emotionally to overthrow the tyrannical rule of the Banū Umayyah. It was essentially a revolutionary movement aimed at establishing the true Islamic State in conformity with the Quranic teachings. Later, when the Imams of the Prophet's Family realized that the time was not opportune for attaining this goal, they concentrated on educating and training their followers in Islamic sciences, and the mourning ceremonies were used as a vehicle of religious and political training so that Muslims might not be alienated from the socio-political realities. It was the institution of keeping alive the legacy of al-Ḥusayn's martyrdom that brought the Banū al-'Abbās to power, for they wore black robes and raised black flag and standard in memory of the martyrs of Karbalā', and their slogan was "Avenge the martyrdom of al-Ḥusayn (A)." Had this memory not been kept alive as an effective weapon against the assassins of al-Ḥusayn (A), the Banū Umayyah would not have been routed so decisively. In the history of Islam, the legacy of Karbalā' has been a vital force, with which all the unjust and tyrannical powers had to reckon. In later epochs, with the deterioration setting in all Islamic institutions, 'azādārī also lost its spirit and became an instrument of blunting the sharp sense of protest and agitation against injustice. But this spirit, however, remained effective in the Shī'ah ethos, and if one analyzes the role of different sects and factions in the movements of protest and revolution in various garbs, one can easily find the Shī'ah in the forefront of them in the Muslim world, even in countries which are not predominantly Muslim. Ḥamid Enāyet played down this aspect of 'azādārī and unwittingly emphasized its negative aspect. Had he not tried to avoid any discussion on the Islamic Revolution of Iran, he would have had to deal with the vital role played in the Revolution by the living legacy of the martyrdom of al-Ḥusayn (A). There is no other way to explain the great passion for martyrdom among the Iranian youth except by giving fullest credit to the Shī'ī passion for Karbalā'.

At another occasion when the author, perhaps unconsciously, plays into the hands of the Western political analysts and is trapped in their jargon is his estimation of the Iran-Iraq war, which he describes as a struggle between Arab and Persian nationalisms, and on this basis regards it as harmful to Muslim unity. Five years of the war imposed on the newly-born Islamic Republic of Iran by Iraq at the instance of the

U.S.A. have falsified the myth of 'Arab-'Ajam enmity, and proved it to be an ideological war in which Iran is supported by the progressive Arab powers. Iran has launched a programme of Islamic unity on both the national and international planes. The *'Şahifah'* review has justifiably taken exception to the author's statement regarding the nature of Iran-Iraq war.

One more point that needs to be discussed in some detail is the statement that the Shi'ah are more concerned with personalities than principles, while the Sunnis are concerned with beliefs and principles. In the reviewer's view, this statement is totally false and misleading. Ḥamid Enāyet expresses this view in connection with the Shi'ah conception of *Imāmah*, according to which the office of the caliphate could not be treated as elective, for it was a matter of Divine choice like that of prophethood. Ḥamid Enāyet has discussed the significance of the notions of *Imāmah* and *işmah* (infallibility of the Imams) treating them as complementary to each other. The belief that the Prophet (S), Fāṭimah (A), and the Twelve Imams (A) are infallible does not logically lead to the inference made by the author. They are infallible because they are the embodiments of the principles taught by Islam and willed by God. The reviewer has aptly quoted 'Alī's (A) saying that: "Don't determine the truth with reference to personalities. On the contrary, know the truth, so that persons can be judged accordingly." Ḥamid Enāyet's judgement implies that the Shi'i criterion of *Imāmah* revolves around certain personalities and is not based on any principle. As we do not like to indulge in the controversy of the caliphate, we leave it as it is.

At the end of this brief account of the *Şahifah's* review I would make a few brief critical remarks. Firstly, the review highlights only the weak points or errors made by the author. The reviewer himself says in another context that when the critical remarks against any faith are quoted, it is the duty of the writer to state how those objections were met by the defenders of the said faith. It would have been better if the reviewer had also applied the same criterion with regard to the book under review. The book, undoubtedly, has some commendable points, which are not at all discussed. The reason for this lapse may be that the review is mainly concerned with defending the Shi'i faith and aims to counteract the popular notions about Shi'ism propagated by the Orientalists, who totally rely upon the Sunni sources and interpretations, or distortions in some cases, and the Muslim scholar also falls in their trap and uses the borrowed glasses to view Shi'i Islam. At the beginning of the review it is stated that great importance is attached to this book because it is written by an Iranian Shi'i after the Islamic Revolution of Iran. It is, therefore, treated as an insider's view of the Shi'i political thought and faith, and is credited to be the most

authentic and scholarly work on the subject. It is also said that the aim of the review is not to assess the author and his work in the light of his total contribution to Islamic studies. The book is reviewed for the following reasons: (1) Every book written about Islam and possessing overt or covert distortions ought to be critically evaluated, so that the genuine searchers of truth should be in a position to separate facts from fiction and truth from falsehood. (2) Other papers usually ignore or avoid reviewing books that are in conflict with Islam. (3) It is desired that the readers, instead of accepting such books uncritically, should themselves research and investigate the truth. It is thus obvious that the book is regarded as misleading, which it is, of course, in some parts. But that cannot be said of the whole book. At least some credit should be given to the author, for his is the first attempt, in spite of all his lapses, to project the Shi'i faith in the proper perspective with justified emphasis on characteristic Shi'ah ethos.

I feel that some objections have arisen because of the inadequacy of the translation, which at many places leaves gaps, and it is not fully ascertainable which statement or idea belongs to whom, the author, the scholar whom he is quoting, or the general Orientalist view. Sometime the translation, however faithful it may be, strays away from the original. It would have been safer if the reviewer had compared the translation with the original. In most of the Eastern languages English terminology cannot be translated accurately due to the paucity of standardized terms. Despite these remarks, the translation by Khurram-shāhī is quite good and faithful to a great extent.

Now we can have a critical look at two English reviews published in two Western journals. It is interesting to note how a piece of writing is viewed by different reviewers in different colours, despite all the claims of objectivity and academic honesty. It may, therefore, be held that ideological bias plays a dominant role in social sciences, humanities and philosophy, which is veiled under the pretext of scientific attitude in the writings of the Western trained social scientists and critics, and particularly Orientalists. But the poor Orientals lacking training in hiding their beliefs and convictions under the pretext of scientific objectivity are dubbed as dogmatic or unscientific just because they are unfamiliar with the high sounding technical jargon of modern social sciences. Those who would consider the *Jumhūrī Islāmī*'s review as dogmatic and fundamentalist, I believe, would swallow the worst type of biased criticism of the so-called Western educated scholars without even realizing that they are given a dose of lies and prejudices in the name of intellectual treat.

Martin Kramer reviewed Ḥamid Enāyet's book in the *Middle Eastern Studies*. His review begins with a, presumably, funny anecdote, which seeks to indicate that Muslim theologians are no more 'simple

mullās'. They have become politically conscious, have general ideas, and are familiar with Western political thinkers. Kramer seems to lament over the supposed demise of the 'simple mullās' in the Muslim world. I have enough reason to believe that no non-Muslim scholar or politician is happy with the emergence of the new types of 'mullās', who are familiar with Western thinkers, ideas, and jargon, and who are products of 'what some call ferment'. They are not even prepared to accept that a 'mullā' can acquire knowledge and insight into the Western modes of thought, which they consider to be the sole property of Western trained scholars. An evidence of this type of belief is provided by Kramer himself, who describes Martyr Muṭahhari as "a professor of philosophy at Tehran University, who secured the rank of āyatullāh after the Revolution". It is further added that "so convincingly did he embrace the [new] role that in May 1979, anti-clericalist guerillas elected to assassinate him." This shows the nature of the so-called scholarship of a budding Orientalist, who instead of gathering correct information about such an eminent personality of modern Revolutionary Iran as Muṭahhari relies upon his own ignorance and conjectures, and at the same time hopes to have a right to write on the most complex and intriguing issues pertaining to Islamic political thought, which is, on the one hand, related to Islamic metaphysics, and on the other, is related to the contemporary realities and ideals of the Muslim World and the Muslim psyche. The complacency of the reviewer is amazing or rather alarming. He says that he is "again in the familiar company of Muslim thinkers", as if he is fully acquainted with all the Muslim political thinkers in general, and the Shi'i modernism in particular. In fact, the Shi'i Imāmiyyah Islam is still something unfamiliar to Orientalists, and even the most knowledgeable of them cannot claim to be familiar with the Shi'i thinkers.

Kramer is not pleased with Ḥamid Enāyet for his omission to discuss the motives of the thinkers. His displeasure issues from his own habit of imputing ulterior motives to all the moves of reform and modernism in the Muslim World. His brief review is full of such attempts. For instance, in his view, 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq's *al-Islām wa uṣūl al-ḥukm* was written to thwart a scheme of the Egyptian royal house to claim the caliphate; a group of leading al-'Azhar 'ulamā' under the leadership of Shaykh al-'Azhar al-Jizāwī and the president of the religious court, al-Marāghī, were accomplices of the Royal (Egyptian) Palace in supporting the move for abolition of the Ottoman caliphate; the famous ecumenical *fatwā* by Shaykh al-'Azhar Shaltūt, which recognized the validity of worship according to Twelver Shi'i doctrine and denied the existence of sects within Islam, and paved the way for Sunni-Shi'i unity, had been issued with the approval of 'a calculating' President Nāṣir. Kramer imputes ulterior motives to all these efforts in

order to prove the validity of his thesis, i.e. mullās are not so 'simple' as they appear to be. And this means that all reform movements and all attempts towards the unity of Muslim Ummah were motivated by some ulterior designs. He uses words like 'political exigency' and 'guile' for all political thinking in the modern Muslim world. Poor late Ḥamid Enāyet, may God forgive him, in Kramer's view, wanted to dispense with 'that higher criticism which has interpreted the writings of Muslim reformists through their mundane transactions' in such a simplistic way. The higher criticism, referred to by Kramer, is exemplified by his own criticism, which requires nothing but slandering in high sounding technical terms. Ḥamid Enāyet tries to give an account of the development of modern political thought in Islam, but Kramer describes modern Islamic political ideas as 'mutations of Islamic political thought' and 'attempts of striking balance between authenticity and accommodation'. He finds only Enāyet's doubts and fears acceptable, but readily rejects all his claims indicating hope for the Sunnī-Shī'ī unity. He views Shī'ī appeals for conformity to majority norms as futile or worthless, because he cannot prepare himself for giving any credit to the 'troublesome Iranians'. Kramer ends his 'higher criticism' with a reference to Lord Cromer's comment on too-well-read al-Shaykh al-Bakrī: 'Was this *fin de siècle* Sheikh, this curious compound of Mecca and the Paris boulevards, the latest development in Islamism? I should add that the combination produced no results of any importance'. This observation seems to give the reviewer a hope that all modern thought in Islam would fail to produce 'results of any importance'. Such self-consoling remarks save him from facing the realities of modern revolutionary Islam. In short, Kramer's review throws light only on his own fears and hopes, and fails to give any idea of the book reviewed by him.

Another review, published in the *Iranian Studies* (Winter 1984) by Mangol Bayat, is less hostile. The reviewer's restraint is due to Ḥamid Enāyet's sudden and untimely death a few months after the publication of this book. Nevertheless, she has not spared the book, and, despite giving credit to the author for his vast knowledge of contemporary political polemics in Persian, Arabic and English, considers the book another apology for recent developments in Islamic thought. The reviewer, a research associate at the Centre of Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University, feels that the book lacks consistency in historical detachment and objectivity. Here again, a reviewer seems to be obsessed by the myth of objectivity, without realizing that what one considers to be objective is his or her own subjective response to an issue. For instance, she regards *ijtihād* as 'originally a minor legal device' which was 'transformed by the force of circumstance into an important function', while Ḥamid Enāyet explains it in its correct perspective. But for the reviewer what is her notion of *ijtihād* is an objective reality, and

what others think of it 'lacks objectivity'. Ḥamid Enāyet defined *ijtihād* as 'the logical and imperative concomitant of the Shi'i creed, as much part of the Shi'i concept of the law as the doctrine of the Imamate'. Ḥamid Enāyet also concedes the right of leadership to a *mujtahid*, as it is inherent in the Shi'ah doctrine. The reviewer criticizes the author for neglecting 'the fact that centuries of religious institutional development accompanied by fierce power struggle led to the *mujtahid*'s rise to prominence'. Enāyet claims that, as a natural corollary, *ijtihād* led to a system of government which was, if not democratic, then at least accountable to people. Bayat demands evidence for this claim. On the one hand, she wants to study ideas in the light of historical changes, and on the other, she denies the role of the *Uṣūlīs* in bringing about progressive changes in Iranian politics, and concludes that 'the *Uṣūlī* concern was not to reformulate rigidified legal formulae' or restore 'the true function of *ijtihād*', or adapt the law to changing social conditions, but rather to consolidate the jurisconsult's authority over the religious dissidents. Her view may be her own subjective response to the *Uṣūlī-Akhhārī* controversy, and lacks both objectivity and consistency. However, she calls Enāyet's interpretation 'an unfortunate historical misconception', and goes on to remark that the book is replete with such 'misconceptions.'

Bayat is worried that Enāyet nowhere advocated separation of temporal from religious affairs. And perhaps because of this alleged lapse on the part of the author his treatment of the issues seems to her 'not thoroughly thought out'. At the end the reviewer condescendingly consoles the author that 'future historians who will study the role of the modern educated lay intellectuals in the Islamic revivalism will find in his book an ideal primary source.' This left-handed compliment negates all that the reviewer wrote earlier in praise of the book.

A balanced review of Ḥamid Enāyet's *Modern Islamic Political Thought* appeared in the *Nashr-e Dānish*, the journal of the Markaz-e Nashr-e Dānishgāhī, Tehran. The editor of the journal, Naṣr Allāh Pūr Jawādī, reviewed the book sympathetically in spite of his ideological differences with the author on many points. He compares this book with Ḥamid Enāyet's earlier work, *Sayrī dar andیشه-ye siyāsī-ye 'Arab* (A survey of Arab political thought), and recognizes its importance in the present context. Though he concedes that the major part of the contents of the two books is not much different, the present work is different in approach. The first book concentrated on the Arab world, while this one covers a much wider scope, for it deals with Islamic political thought beyond the confines of the Arab world, including the Indian Sub-continent. But the reviewer, I am afraid, was misled by the title of the first book, for its coverage of Indo-Muslim thought is more comprehensive than that of the book under review. For example, the

Sayrī dar andīsheh-ye siyāsī 'Arab deals with the religious and political ideas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān at some length in the context of Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-'Afghānī (Asadābādī) and his criticism of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān, while there is no mention of his name in the present book in spite of his influence on the modern Islamic thought in India and Pakistan. Of course, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* has discussed the ideological positions of many Muslim leaders and intellectuals of the Sub-continent with reference to the issue of *khilāfah*, and has also paid due importance to Abū al-'Alā Mawdūdī's political thought in the context of recent developments in the Islamic world. Anyhow, in some respects the earlier book is more comprehensive than the present one. The real worth of the present book lies in its approach, which is different from that of the first one. *Sayrī dar andīsheh-ye siyāsī-ye 'Arab* concentrated on the individual thinkers, while, as rightly pointed out by Naṣr Allāh Pūr Jawādī, the book under review is concerned with issues. In this book Enāyet's approach is problem-oriented, but he has not ignored the historical development of the ideas also. Another and probably the most distinguishing feature of this book is its exposition of Shī'ī thought, which has been till recently completely ignored by the Orientalists. The reviewer has highlighted this distinction of the book, which has greatly enhanced its value as the first authentic exposition of Shī'ī thought, both metaphysical and political. It is also acknowledged that the author's strength lies in his direct acquaintance with the original Sunnī and Shī'ī sources. The book is recommended as a must for all persons interested in Islamic thought. This review is brief, and the reviewer has not gone into details and has also abstained from indulging in ideological discussion of some controversial conceptions or misconceptions regarding the Shī'ah faith and Shī'ī attitude towards politics.

Towards the end of this review article I would like to sum up my impressions of the book. In my view, the book has succeeded in generating sufficient interest in Islamic political thought. Its main drawback seems to be its reliance on some books written by the Orientalists. Some of the ideas, for instance those regarding the origin of Shī'ism and the Shī'ī concept of the Imamate, are uncritically borrowed from Montgomery Watt's book *Islamic Political Thought*. Watt's book is biased against the Shī'ah. Not only the Shī'ah but also other sects of Muslims are maligned at many places by M. Watt. Enāyet, being well versed in Arabic and Persian, had access to the original sources, and he could have avoided banking upon unreliable sources. However, his own views reveal a transparent sincerity and loyalty to Islam. Some of the weaknesses of the book may be attributed to his not so well thought out, hasty general judgements. But the strength of the book lies in the

author's full grasp of the material with which he had to cope for reconstructing a systematic and methodical political philosophy of Islam.

From the Shi'i viewpoint, however, the book falls short of being considered as an 'insider's view' of the Shi'ah faith, for Hamid Enāyet has more than often relied upon the views and judgements fabricated by the 'outsiders' unfamiliar with or hostile towards the Shi'i political philosophy. Though the book attracted considerable attention of the academic circles by virtue of the author's relation to Iran, the author conspicuously avoided to discuss those notions in detail which were particularly relevant to contemporary Iranian thought. It can be said in the defence of Enāyat that he was familiar with the names of such important thinkers as Mirzā-yi Muḥammad Qummi, Shaykh Murtaḍā al-'Anṣārī, Mullā Muḥammad Kāzīm Khurāsānī and Muḥammad Ḥusayn Nā'inī, but he discussed their views on democracy and state within the framework of constitutionalism (*mashrūṭiyyah*). Even Enāyet's passing references to Āyatullāh Nā'inī's work the *Tanbīh al-'ummah wa tanzīh al-millah*, which he considers to be the only systematic work on Islamic conception of state and democracy produced during the constitutional movement, failed to throw light on Nā'inī's political theory. Enāyet confines his comments to just quoting one superficial remark made by 'Abd al-Hādī al-Ḥā'irī in the *Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran*, i.e. Nā'inī was unfamiliar with the Western concept of freedom, equality and separation of power. Enāyet's reference to Imam Khumaynī's conception of the *wilāyet-e faqīh* is still more inadequate, and falls short of the expectations of a reader who wishes to gain insight into this conception, which has evolved in the course of time on the basis of the ideas inherent in the teachings of the Quran and the tradition of the Infallibles (A). Most probably Enāyet had some reservations due to which he evaded the issue. He referred to Mullā Muḥammad al-Narāqī's notion of salvation through grief, but did not say anything about his interpretation of the *wilāyet-e faqīh*, of which he might be unaware. These conspicuous omissions did not make his book, in any way, more acceptable to the so-called westernized liberals, but diminished its authenticity and comprehensiveness by impairing its status as an up-to-date document of recent Shi'i political thinking.

Al-Tawhīd

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